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ABSTRACT		
	
There	are	diffuse	and	distinct	cortical	networks	involved	in	the	various	aspects	of	body	
representation	that	organize	information	from	multiple	sensory	inputs	and	resolve	
conflicts	when	faced	with	incongruent	situations.	This	coherence	is	typically	maintained	
as	we	maneuver	around	the	world,	as	our	bodies	change	over	the	years,	and	as	we	gain	
experience.	An	important	aspect	of	a	congruent	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain	
is	the	visual	perspective	in	which	we	are	able	to	directly	view	our	own	body.	There	is	a	
clear	separation	of	the	cortical	networks	involved	in	seeing	our	own	body	and	that	of	
another	person.	For	the	projects	presented	in	my	dissertation,	I	used	an	experimental	
design	in	which	participants	were	required	to	make	a	multisensory	temporal	asynchrony	
discrimination	after	self-generated	movements.	I	measured	sensitivity	for	visual	delay	
detection	between	the	movement	(proprioceptive,	efferent	and	afferent	information)	
and	the	visual	image	of	that	movement	under	differing	visual,	proprioceptive,	and	
vestibular	conditions.	The	self-advantage	is	a	signature	of	body	ownership	and	is	
characterized	by	a	significantly	lower	threshold	for	delay	detection	for	views	of	the	body	
that	are	considered	self	compared	to	those	that	are	regarded	as	‘other’.	Overall,	the	
results	from	the	collection	of	studies	suggest	that	the	tolerance	for	temporally	matching	
visual,	proprioceptive	and	efferent	copy	information	that	informs	about	the	perceived	
position	of	body	parts	depends	on:	whether	one	is	viewing	one’s	own	body	or	someone	
else’s;	the	perspective	in	which	the	body	is	viewed;	the	dominant	hand;	and	the	
reliability	of	vestibular	cues	which	help	us	situate	our	body	in	space.	Further,	the	self-
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advantage	provides	a	robust	measure	of	body	ownership.	The	experiments	provide	a	
window	on	and	support	for	the	malleable	nature	of	the	representation	of	the	body	in	
the	brain.	
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1.	GENERAL	INTRODUCTION	
What	is	self?	The	question	of	the	sense	of	self	is	a	rather	broad	one.	It	traverses	
disciplines,	can	be	interpreted	in	multiple	ways,	and	has	been	of	interest	for	centuries.	
For	example,	Descartes	(1637)	once	wrote	“My	body	is	an	integral	part	of	‘me’,	in	a	way	
that	other	objects	are	not.	Moreover,	the	relation	between	my	body	and	‘me’	is	quite	
different	from	the	relation	between	my	body	and	other	people”.		Although	seemingly	
simple	on	the	surface,	differentiating	what	is	considered	the	‘self’	and	‘other’	is	still	
being	investigated	today.	The	concept	of	our	body	is	malleable	in	nature	and	adapts	to	
changes	and	experience.	There	are	also	times,	for	example	created	in	experimental	
settings,	where	we	may	not	perceive	it	as	it	truly	is.		
The	self,	being	of	cross-disciplinary	interest,	has	a	mixed	ontology.		Although	
there	is	a	philosophical	sense	of	self,	a	view	that	identifies	self	as	“a	particular,	
irreducible	thing	or	mental	subject”,	herein	I	will	speak	to	the	bodily	sense	of	self,	a	view	
that	identifies	self	with	“some	set	of	bodily	or	mental	processes	or	states”	(Sturm,	2012).	
There	are	many	ways	to	view	our	body.	It	can	be	seen	as	a	unique	object	that	interacts	
with	the	world,	it	is	where	our	senses	originate,	and	it	provides	a	set	of	inherent	
reference	frames	for	many	of	our	actions/movements.	Of	particular	importance	to	the	
experiments	I	present	here,	our	body	is	the	origin	of	the	first-person	perspective	and	
when	we	move	or	act	in	the	world	we	do	so	in	such	a	way	that	is	established	by	this	
perspective.	Referencing	the	first-person	perspective	can	help	us	visually	discriminate	
our	body	parts	from	the	body	parts	of	others	–	the	sense	of	body	ownership.		
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For	my	research	projects,	I	have	used	an	experimental	design	in	which	I	measure	
sensitivity	for	visual	delay	detection	between	a	self-generated	movement	
(proprioceptive	and	efferent	copy)	and	the	visual	image	of	that	movement	under	
differing	visual,	proprioceptive,	and	vestibular	conditions.	In	order	to	detect	such	a	
delay,	an	observer	needs	to	compare	their	internal	representation	of	their	body	with	the	
visual	feedback.	I	thus	quantify	the	sense	of	body	ownership	by	comparing	thresholds	to	
the	added	visual	delay	and	have	established	the	self-advantage	as	the	advantage	one	
has	at	detecting	the	visual	delay	when	what	is	seen	matches	the	internal	representation	
of	the	body.		
1.1.	The	sense	of	agency	and	the	sense	of	body	ownership	
There	are	two	basic	senses	we	have	about	the	body:	agency	and	body	
ownership.	The	sense	of	agency	is	the	feeling	that	one	can	control	and	move	one’s	body	
(Gallagher,	2000;	Tsakiris,	Prabhu,	&	Haggard,	2006).	It	constitutes	a	central	
representation	of	a	motor	signal	(efference	copy)	as	well	as	sensory	feedback	(afferent	
signals)	(Farrer,	Franck,	Paillard,	&	Jeannerod,	2003b).	The	sense	of	body	ownership	is	
the	feeling	that	the	body	is	uniquely	one’s	own	(Gallagher,	2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2006).	It	
makes	sense	that	agency	and	ownership	go	hand	in	hand.	For	example,	if	I	move	my	
hand	I	have	the	sense	of	being	the	agent	of	that	movement,	and	since	I	am	the	agent	
then	I	must	own	the	hand	that	is	moving.	Therefore,	there	are	interactions	between	
these	two	senses.	The	sense	of	ownership	and	correlating	motor	activity	with	the	visual	
feedback	is	also	a	contributor	to	the	sense	of	agency.	If	my	hand	is	moved	involuntarily,	
however,	there	is	no	motor	command	(efference	copy),	but	there	would	be	visual	and	
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proprioceptive	information	(afferent	signals)	and	one	could	still	experience	body	
ownership	if	these	two	modalities	are	not	in	conflict.			
Agency	has	been	experimentally	manipulated	by	comparing	self-recognition	of	
one’s	movements	during	voluntarily	and	involuntarily	made	movements	with	added	
temporal	and/or	spatial	conflict	(Daprati,	Sirigu,	&	Nico,	2010;	Farrer,	Bouchereau,	
Jeannerod,	&	Franck,	2008;	Farrer,	Franck,	Georgieff,	Frith,	Decety,	et	al.,	2003a;	Franck,	
2001;	Jeannerod,	2009;	Tsakiris,	Carpenter,	James,	&	Fotopoulou,	2010a;	Tsakiris,	
Haggard,	Franck,	Mainy,	&	Sirigu,	2005;	van	den	Bos	&	Jeannerod,	2002)	in	attempts	to	
isolate	ownership	(difference	between	efferent	+	afferent	information	vs	afferent	
information	alone).	Tsakiris	et	al.	(2005)	demonstrated	that	the	efference	copy	is	
important	to	self-body	recognition.	The	participants	in	their	experiment	viewed	hand	
movements	made	by	the	experimenter	or	by	themselves	wearing	gloves	(to	eliminate	
any	differences	in	the	way	the	hands	looked)	on	a	screen	in	front	of	them.	They	were	
asked	if	the	movement	they	saw	was	their	own	or	not.	Participants	were	more	accurate	
in	discriminating	self/other	movements	in	the	active	rather	than	the	passive	condition.	
The	authors	concluded	that	since	an	active	movement	was	judged	more	accurately	the	
efference	copy	is	important	because	the	reafferent	sensory	information	could	be	used	
to	compare	the	movement	in	both	cases.	This	supports	findings	by	others	that	efference	
copy	is	important	for	the	perception	of	movements	(Farrer,	Franck,	Georgieff,	Frith,	
Decety,	et	al.,	2003a;	Leube	et	al.,	2003).	
	Taken	together,	the	results	from	these	studies	suggest	that	although	
multisensory	congruency	is	an	important	part	of	sensing	ownership	it	is	not	sufficient	–	
	 4	
to	determine	what	is	and	what	isn’t	a	part	of	our	body,	we	must	compare	what	is	
presented	to	us	with	a	pre-existing	representation	of	our	body.		
1.2.	The	representation	of	the	body	(or	body	schema)	
From	the	early	1900s	the	term	“body	schema”	has	been	used	to	describe	the	
representation	of	our	body	and	has	placed	an	emphasis	on	proprioception	and	touch	in	
describing	how	the	brain	processes	the	body	(Head	&	Holmes,	1911).		In	the	literature,	
this	term	has	also	been	used	interchangeably	with	body	image	(Longo,	Schuur,	Kammers,	
Tsakiris,	&	Haggard,	2009),	corporeal	awareness	(Berlucchi	&	Aglioti,	1997),	the	bodily	
self	conscious	(Aspell	et	al.,	2013;	Lenggenhager,	Tadi,	Metzinger,	&	Blanke,	2007),	or	
postural	schema	(Longo,	Azañón,	&	Haggard,	2010).	There	has	been	much	debate	over	
terminology,	however,	all	the	terms	equate,	to	some	extent	(see	Berlucchi	&	Aglioti,	
2010	for	a	review	of	the	body	schema	and	the	differences	in	popular	terminology),	to	a	
representation	of	the	body	that	we	have	in	the	brain.	Feeling,	seeing,	moving,	and	
interacting	with	our	body	in	and	with	the	world	develops	our	body	representation.		
Updating	the	schema	is	thought	to	involve	an	updating	the	relationship	of	our	posture	
and	position	of	the	limbs	relative	to	our	other	body	parts.	Therefore	this	representation	
must	be	dynamic	in	nature	and	must	relate	our	body	not	only	in	terms	of	the	relation	
between	its	various	parts	but	also	relative	to	the	space	around	us.	Locating	oneself	in	
space	(self-location)	is	important	because	we	use	our	body	as	a	reference	when	
interacting	with	objects	and	other	people	in	the	environment	(Lopez,	Halje,	&	Blanke,	
2008).			
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The	body	schema	can	be	broken	down	into	components	(Longo	et	al.,	2010).	
These	components	are:	(1)	Somatosensation,	which	is	defined	as	“primary	sensory	
processing	of	somatic	stimuli”	(Longo	et	al.,	2010)	and	happens	in	the	primary	
somatosensory	cortices	(Kaas,	1983)	;	(2)	somatoperception,	which	is	defined	as	“higher	
level	percepts	of	the	body	and	objects	contacting	the	body”	(Longo	et	al.,	2010);	and	(3)	
somatorepresentation,	which	is	defined	as	“abstract	knowledge,	beliefs,	and	attitudes	
about	bodies	generally	and	one’s	own	specifically	on-line	perception	and	off-line	
representation	of	the	body”	(Longo	et	al.,	2010).	Of	key	importance	to	the	experiments	
that	I	present	in	this	dissertation	is	somatoperception.	Somatoperceptual	information	
processing	is	the	combination	of	efferent	commands,	and	tactile	and	proprioceptive	
afferent	inputs	to	create	representations	of	the	posture	of	the	body	(or	postural	
schema),	the	sense	of	touch	on	the	body	surface	(or	superficial	schema),	and	body	
shape	and	size.	
1.3.	Non-visual	cues	for	constructing	the	body	in	the	brain		
The	somatoperceptual	inputs	to	the	representation	of	the	body	include	
somatosensory	(tactile)	and	proprioception	information.		These	inputs	provide	
information	that	helps	to	locate	stimuli	on	the	skin’s	surface,	judge	the	size	and	shape	of	
body	parts,	and	locate	the	body	in	space.	They	are	fundamental	to	being	able	to	move	
about	the	world	and	to	recognize	what	is	the	self	and	what	is	not	self.	
The	sense	of	touch	has	a	long	history	and	was	regarded	by	Bishop	Berkeley	
(1732/Gallace	&	Spence,	2014)	as	the	“primary	source	of	sensory	information”	–	
without	which	vision	could	not	work.	The	skin	has	a	somatotopic	representation	in	the	
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brain,	which	means	that	body	parts	that	are	near	each	other	on	the	body	are	
represented	near	each	other	in	the	brain.	This	somatotopic	organization	is	mapped	onto	
the	superficial	schema	(the	representation	of	the	body’s	surface)	(see	Medina	&	Coslett,	
2010	for	a	review).	The	sense	of	touch	is	uniquely	our	own	–	stimuli	touching	our	skin	
cannot	be	felt	by	others.	The	accuracy	of	perceived	size	of	our	body	parts	has	been	
shown	to	correlate	with	the	sensitivity	of	the	body	part	(Longo	&	Haggard,	2011;	Weber,	
Ross,	&	Murray,	1996).		When	afferent	information	is	altered,	for	example	by	using	
anesthesia	to	numb	a	finger,	the	perception	of	the	size	of	the	body	part	is	altered	and	
the	estimation	of	the	actual	size	becomes	less	accurate	(Gandevia	&	Phegan,	1999).		
Further,	simply	vibrating	muscles	on	the	arm	can	alter	the	perceived	size	and	shape	of	it	
(Goodwin	et.	al.,	1972;	Lackner,	1988).	This	suggests	that	the	representation	of	the	body	
can	be	quickly	changed	by	acute	changes	in	tactile/afferent	information	concerning	the	
body--	even	in	the	absence	of	vision	and	implies	that	tactile	information	is	crucial	to	
forming	the	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.		
We	also	need	to	be	able	to	determine	the	location	of	our	limbs	in	space	to	
execute	movements	and	maneuver	about	the	world.	In	order	to	determine	where	the	
limbs	are	in	space	information	from	the	joints	and	muscles	and	vision	are	combined	
resulting	in	an	estimate	of	where	“I”	am	in	space	(Graziano,	1999).	The	postural	schema	
is	used	to	help	in	the	perception	of	“the	current	posture	of	the	body”	(Longo	et	al.,	
2010).	When	sighted	individuals	are	asked	to	locate	limbs	in	space	without	being	able	to	
see	the	arms	performance	is	poorer	when	the	arm	is	moved	passively	(when	efferent	
information	is	not	available),	than	when	the	arm	can	be	seen	(Mather	&	Lackner,	1981).	
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Efferent	information,	and	possibly	the	sense	of	being	the	agent	of	the	movement,	
provides	vital	information	about	the	posture	of	the	body	when	we	cannot	see	the	body	
(Farrer,	Franck,	Paillard,	&	Jeannerod,	2003b;	Leube	et	al.,	2003;	Mather	&	Lackner,	
1981).	Given	that	multiple	senses	provide	different	types	of	information	about	the	same	
body,	it	seems	likely	that	the	posture	of	the	body	can	also	affect	tactile	perception	on	
the	skin.	For	example,	when	the	hands	are	crossed	it	is	more	difficult	to	determine	
touch	position	and	the	timing	of	touches	(Shore,	Spry,	&	Spence,	2002).	However,	this	is	
not	the	case	for	individuals	who	have	been	blind	since	birth	who	do	not	exhibit	this	
crossed	arms	effect	(Röder,	Rösler,	&	Spence,	2004).				
	 So	the	somatoperception	of	the	body	schema	combines	tactile	(superficial	
schema)	and	proprioceptive	(postural	schema)	information,	but	it	also	must	take	into	
account	visual	information/visual	experience	of	the	body.	When	asked	to	detect	the	
position	of	our	limbs	in	the	dark	without	visual	input	we	have	trouble	doing	so	
accurately	(Graziano,	1999;	Làdavas,	Farnè,	Zeloni,	&	di	Pellegrino,	2000).	This	is	
especially	the	case	when	an	arm	is	moved	passively	to	a	new	location.	The	lack	of	a	
motor	command	seriously	hinders	our	ability	to	accurately	detect	arm	position.	When	a	
light,	however,	is	attached	to	the	hand	the	ability	to	detect	arm	position	improves	
(Mather	&	Lackner,	1981).		A	proprioceptive	map	of	the	body	could	therefore	be	
expected	to	be	of	poor	resolution	and	visual-proprioceptive	matching	to	be	broadly	
tuned.	Further,	when	non-informative	vision	of	the	arm	is	available	in	two-point	tactile	
discrimination	there	is	a	significant	improvement	in	spatial	resolution	(35mm	instead	of	
42mm)	suggesting	a	case	for	vision	in	the	construction	of	the	representation	of	the	body	
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(Röder	et	al.,	2004).		
	 Thus	we	can	see	that	the	knowledge	of	our	body	is	improved	by	vision	of	the	
body.	Normally	we	see	the	body	only	from	a	first-person	perspective.	What	are	the	
implications	of	this?	
1.4.	Visual	cues	for	constructing	the	body	in	the	brain	
Another	part	of	somatoperception	is	the	body	image.	The	body	image	is	“a	
conscious,	essentially	visual,	representation	of	the	body	in	its	canonical	position”	(Longo,	
Cardozo,	&	Haggard,	2008).	The	canonical	position	(see	Figure	1A)	is	the	default	posture	
of	the	body	that	has	been	postulated	to	be	a	statistical	estimate	of	what	the	most	likely	
position	of	the	limbs	with	respect	to	the	trunk	would	be	(Bremner,	Holmes,	&	Spence,	
2012).	This	canonical	posture	is	most	likely	represented	in	the	brain	from	the	first-
person	perspective	(see	Figure	1B	for	an	example	of	a	first-person	view	of	the	body)	–	a	
perspective	that	is	uniquely	‘self’.			
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	 	 A)	
	
B)	
	
Figure	1.	A	first-	person	view	of	the	body.	A)	The	canonical	posture	of	the	body	as	seen	
from	the	first-person	perspective	modified	from	Harris	et	al.,	2015;	B)	Self-Portrait	by	
Ernst	Mach,	1886	(available	freely	online	publicdomainreview.org/collections/self-
portrait-by-ernst-mach-1886/).		
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1.4.1.	Neural	distinction	between	the	‘self’	and	‘other’		
Being	able	to	distinguish	what	is	not	your	body	is	important	for	determining	
what	is	your	body.	We	can	visually	discriminate	ourselves	from	others,	at	least	from	
certain	views,	but	how	general	is	this	skill?		In	the	literature,	the	focus	has	primarily	
been	on	face	recognition	(Gillihan	&	Farah,	2005).		On	a	cortical	level,	researchers	have	
identified	areas	of	the	brain,	through	neuroimaging	techniques,	which	are	related	to	
face	recognition	in	the	inferior	occipital	gyrus	of	the	occipital	lobe,	the	fusiform	gyrus	of	
the	temporal	lobe	and	the	posterior	superior	temporal	sulcus	of	the	temporal	lobe	
(Pitcher,	Walsh,	&	Duchaine,	2011)	and	specifically	one’s	own	face	in	the	right	
hemisphere	(van	Veluw	&	Chance,	2013).			
There	has	been	a	surge	in	the	literature	in	the	exploration	of	body	recognition	
networks	in	the	brain	in	recent	years.	Single	cell	recording	studies	in	non-human	
primates	have	provided	evidence	for	neurons	that	respond	when	monkeys	are	shown	
images	of	bodies	and	body	parts	(humans	and	monkeys).	Others	have	found	cells	in	the	
superior	temporal	sulcus	that	code	for	body	postures	and	actions	(Oram,	Perrett,	&	
Hietanen,	1993;	Perrett	et	al.,	1985).		
Discovery	of	the	extrastriate	body	area	(EBA)	in	the	lateral	occipitotemporal	
cortex	(Downing,	Jiang,	Shuman,	&	Kanwisher,	2001),	through	neuroimaging	techniques	
with	human	subjects,	has	provided	a	major	development	in	the	role	of	the	visual	system	
in	the	creation	of	the	body	representation	in	the	brain.	The	EBA	is	selective	for	human	
body	parts	regardless	of	whether	they	are	presented	as	photographs,	line	drawings,	
stick	figures,	silhouettes,	or	still	images	depicting	bodies	in	motion	(Peelen	&	Downing,	
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2007).	The	EBA	is	not	significantly	activated	for	object	parts,	whole	objects,	and	
scrambled	control	versions	of	the	stick	figures.	Responses	to	parts	of	faces	and	to	
mammals	show	an	intermediate	level	of	activation	(Peelen	&	Downing,	2007).	This	
suggests	that	bodies	are	distinguishable	from	other	objects	in	the	world	and	are	visually	
processed	with	a	distinct	neural	mechanism.	
The	EBA	had	been	researched	primarily	using	images	of	bodies	and	body	parts	
presented	in	the	allocentric	perspective.	In	other	words,	the	images	presented	were	
shown	to	observers	in	a	visual	perspective	incompatible	with	ownership	of	the	body	or	
the	body	parts.	Considering	the	first	person	perspective	is	an	important	vantage	point	
for	constructing	a	body	representation,	Saxe	and	colleagues	(Saxe,	Jamal,	&	Powell,	
2006)	looked	at	whether	areas	of	the	brain	activated	for	images	of	the	body	were	
modulated	by	‘self’	perspectives	and	‘other’	perspectives.	They	looked	at	the	
differences	in	EBA	activity	between	body	parts	presented	in	a	‘self-congruent’	
perspective	and	an	‘other’	perspective;	other	areas	in	the	frontal,	and	parietal	cortices	
were	also	examined.	The	right	EBA	was	more	active	during	the	presentation	of	body	
parts	shown	in	the	allocentric	perspective	and	the	right	dorsal	lateral	prefrontal	cortex	
(DLPFC)	and	the	post-central	gyrus	(PCG)	were	more	activated	for	body	parts	shown	in	
egocentric	viewpoints.	Their	results	coincide	with	findings	from	Chan	and	colleagues	
(Chan,	Peelen,	&	Downing,	2004)	who	proposed	that	the	EBA	was	activated	in	“social	
vision”.	Here,	seeing	the	body	in	an	allocentric	perspective	would	represent	social	vision.	
Further,	Hodzic	and	others	(Hodzic,	Muckli,	Singer,	&	Stirn,	2009)	also	conducted	a	
neuroimaging	study	and	provided	results	that	complement	the	study	above,	where	
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there	was	a	specific	distributed	network,	including	parietal	and	frontal	cortex,	that	was	
involved	when	looking	at	or	recognizing	one’s	own	body.	What	does	this	suggest?	
Although	bodies	are	seen	as	unique	objects	to	us,	there	is	a	clear	separation	of	the	
cortical	networks	involved	in	simply	seeing	a	body	that	could	be	one’s	own	(DLPFC	and	
PCG)	or	that	could	be	another	person	(EBA)	(See	Figure	2).	However,	this	can	only	be	
true	for	the	relatively	small	part	of	our	body	that	can	be	seen	directly.	
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Figure	2.	Areas	of	the	brain	activated	for	visual	body	recognition.		The	right	EBA	is	
activated	for	the	presentation	of	bodies	or	body	part	shown	in	an	allocentric	(or	other)	
perspective.	The	PCG	and	DLPFC	are	activated	for	the	presentation	of	bodies	or	body	
parts	shown	in	the	egocentric	(or	self)	perspective.	
	
	
	
	
EBA
PCG DLPFC
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1.4.2.	Behavioural	distinction	between	‘self’	and	‘other’			
In	a	recent	study,	Conson	and	colleagues	(2010)	looked	at	the	ability	of	
individuals	to	recognize	their	hands	in	egocentric	(or	self)	and	allocentric	(or	other)	
perspectives.	They	recruited	left-	and	right-handers	for	the	study	and	showed	them	
images	of	their	own	hands	and	the	hands	of	others	in	the	two	differing	perspectives.	
Participants	were	then	asked	to	make	self/not-self	judgments	as	quickly	as	possible.	
Importantly,	both	the	dominant	and	the	non-dominant	hands	of	the	participants	were	
presented.		They	found	that	in	the	egocentric	perspective	individuals	were	more	quickly	
able	to	recognize	their	dominant	hands	compared	to	the	allocentric	perspective.	The	
authors	referenced	the	Body	Specificity	Hypothesis,	which	states	that	since	we	interact	
with	the	environment	primarily	with	our	dominant	hand	we	would	create	specific	
representations	of	“action-	and	body-related	information”	centred	on	that	hand	
(Casasanto,	2009;	Willems	&	Hagoort,	2009).	Therefore,	the	lowered	response	times	for	
identifying	the	dominant	hand	presented	in	the	expected	first-person	perspective	is	
most	likely	due	to	the	fact	that	it	matches	the	internal	representation	of	the	body.		This	
could	provide	behavioral	support	for	past	neuroimaging	research	claiming	that	left	and	
right	handers	have	different	patterns	of	activation	for	areas	of	the	visual	cortex	that	are	
specifically	related	to	body/	they	found	a	lateralization	in	activity	in	this	area	(Willems,	
Hagoort,	&	Casasanto,	2010a;	Willems,	Peelen,	&	Hagoort,	2010b).	
What	happens	when	we	introduce	changes	of	visual	perspective	during	an	action	
control	task?	Sutter	and	Musseler	(2010)	looked	at	whether	the	visual	perspective	in	
which	participants	viewed	themselves	making	small	finger	movements	to	targets	
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affected	their	performance.	When	the	perspective	changed	between	trials,	the	
participant	must	monitor	the	discrepancies	between	the	tactile/proprioceptive	feedback	
and	the	visual	feedback.	Self	–perspective	movements	were	identified	89ms	faster	at	
moving	to	the	target	than	when	the	movements	were	seen	in	a	perspective	reflected	
about	the	y-axes.	The	authors	therefore	suggested	that	the	participants	primarily	used	
visual	information,	but	relied	on	proprioceptive	information	when	it	facilitated	the	task.	
Previous	studies	investigating	self	recognition	during	active	movement	have	found	
misattribution	of	hand	movements	to	another	agent	when	the	participants’	movements	
and	the	other	agents’	movements	(superimposed	over	top	of	their	movements)	were	
similar	and,	in	some	instances,	when	there	were	discrepancies	between	the	movements	
(Jeannerod,	2003;	Fourneret	&	Jeannerod,	1998;	Nielsen,	1963).		These	results	suggest	
the	importance	placed	upon	visual	cues	when	making	self/other	judgements.	
The	data	from	these	two	experiments	provide	evidence	for	the	effect	of	visual	
perspective	for	body	part	recognition	and	during	action	control,	and	suggest	a	possible	
quantitative	measure	for	body	ownership	that	I	will	build	on	as	part	of	this	thesis.	Up	to	
this	point	I	have	discussed	the	contributions	of	vision,	somatosensation	and	
proprioception	in	the	construction	of	the	representation	of	the	body,	but	what	about	
the	vestibular	system?	The	vestibular	system	provides	us	with	the	most	basic	sense	of	
our	orientation	in	space	and	keeps	us	upright	when	moving	about	the	world.	
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1.5.	Vestibular	cues	for	constructing	the	body	in	the	brain	
The	literature	on	the	‘self’	has	just	recently	started	to	consider	the	vestibular	
system	as	playing	an	important	role	in	the	representation	of	the	body.	It	is	not	
unreasonable	to	think	that	changes	in	vestibular	input	would	alter	feelings	about	the	
body.		Starting	at	the	beginning	of	the	last	century	1905,	there	have	been	reports	of	
distorted	percepts	of	the	body	by	patients	with	lesions	that	affected	vestibular	regions	
of	the	brain	(Bonnier,	1905).		The	vestibular	system	provides	information	as	to	the	
orientation	of	the	body	with	respect	to	gravity,	and	thus	is	important	for	deciphering	
where	the	body	is	located	in	space.	Directly	relevant	to	the	experiments	in	my	
dissertation	is	that	patients	with	vestibular	disorders	have	reported	that	they	
experience	a	lessened	sense	of	agency	(Sang,	Jáuregui-Renaud,	Green,	Bronstein,	&	
Gresty,	2006)	and	ownership	(Lopez	et	al.,	2008;	Lopez,	Bieri,	Preuss,	&	Mast,	2012a).			
In	the	laboratory,	experimenters	have	induced	vestibular	disruption	with	either	
galvanic	or	caloric	vestibular	stimulation	resulting	in	the	decreased	ability	to	locate	
limbs	in	space	(Bresciani,	Blouin,	Popov,	&	Bourdin,	2002)	and	altered	awareness	of	the	
size	and	shape	of	our	hands	(Ferrè,	Vagnoni,	&	Haggard,	2013).	Most	interestingly	
though	is	the	increased	susceptibility	to	multisensory	illusions	of	body	ownership	(see	
section	1.6.)	(Lopez,	Lenggenhager,	&	Blanke,	2010).	Taken	together,	vestibular	inputs	
provide	crucial	information	with	respect	to	self-location,	body	shape,	and	body	
ownership	that	help	create	and	maintain	a	coherent	representation	of	the	body.	
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1.6.	The	multisensory	body	
As	discussed	above,	the	representation	of	the	body,	combines	tactile,	
proprioceptive,	visual,	and	vestibular	information.	It	is	multisensory	experience,	
therefore,	that	shapes	the	body	schema	(Melzack,	Israel,	Lacroix,	&	Schultz,	1997).	One	
of	the	more	current	definitions	of	the	body	schema	is	that	there	are	“multiple	
integrated	representations	of	organized	models	of	ourselves”	(Astafiev,	Stanley,	
Shulman,	&	Corbetta,	2004;	Longo	et	al.,	2010)	which	are	created	through	the	
combination	of	proprioceptive,	haptic,	visual	(Serino	&	Haggard,	2010),	and	more	
recently	thought	to	include	vestibular	signals	(Ferrè	et	al.,	2013).	Activity	in	the	visual	
body	areas	in	the	brain	(e.g.,	the	EBA),	for	example,	has	been	correlated	with	limb	
movement	(Astafiev	et	al.,	2004)	providing	a	neural	substrate	for	the	interconnectivity	
of	sensory	and	motor	information.		
An	excellent	way	to	assess	the	contributions	of	multisensory	input	in	the	
creation	of	the	representation	of	the	body	is	by	way	of	illusions	that	result	from	
experimentally	created	conflict	between	vision,	proprioception,	and	tactile	information.		
1.6.1	Rubber	hand	illusion	
The	Rubber	hand	illusion	(RHI)	is	a	consistently	replicated	illusion	that	takes	
advantage	of	the	multisensory	nature	of	the	body	schema	as	it	introduces	conflict	
between	visual,	tactile	and	proprioceptive	information	(Armel	&	Ramachandran,	2003;	
Botvinick	&	Cohen,	1998;	Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	Holmes	&	Spence,	2005;	Makin,	
Holmes,	&	Ehrsson,	2008;	Tsakiris	&	Haggard,	2005b;	Zopf,	Savage,	&	Williams,	2010).		
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Interestingly	this	illusion	challenges	a	participant’s	sense	of	body	ownership	(Botvinick	&	
Cohen,	1998).		
Generally,	participants	are	seated	with	a	rubber	hand	in	front	of	them	and	
beside	their	real	hand,	which	is	hidden	from	view.	The	experimenter	stimulates	the	
unseen,	real	arm	and	the	seen,	fake	arm	together	with	a	brush	synchronously.	After	
prolonged	exposure	to	the	tactile	stimulation,	participants	begin	to	feel	a	sense	
ownership	toward	the	rubber	arm	(Botvinick	&	Cohen,	1998).	The	correlation	between	
the	seen	and	felt	experience	leads	people	to	associate	the	two	and	assume	that	they	are	
both	coming	from	their	own	body.	
In	a	review	paper,	Tsarkiris	et	al.	(2010)	broke	down	the	illusion	and	proposed	a	
neurocognitive	model	of	body-ownership.		Initially,	the	observer	sees	the	rubber	hand	
and	makes	a	comparison	between	it	and	the	stored	body	model	(representation	of	the	
body	in	the	brain	or	schema).	This	body	model	contains	information	about	the	body’s	
structural	and	visual	form,	which	obviously	does	not	include	the	rubber	hand.	Secondly,	
there	is	a	comparison	of	the	posture	of	the	rubber	arm	and	the	current	plausible	
posture	of	the	real	arm	(body	state),	which	adds	a	probability	that	it	could	be	part	of	
your	body.	Thirdly,	there	is	a	comparison	between	the	touch	that	is	felt	on	the	real	arm	
and	the	touch	that	is	seen	on	the	false	arm.	The	comparisons	repeat	until	“conflict”	is	
resolved	(touch	referral)	and	body	ownership	is	sensed	or	until	the	information	being	
compared	changes.	This	experimentally	induced	ownership,	however,	is	dependent	on	a	
few	things:	1)	posture	of	the	dummy	arm	(anatomical	plausibility)	(Holmes	&	Spence,	
2007),	2)	temporal	synchrony	of	the	seen	and	felt	stoking(Bertamini,	Berselli,	Bode,	
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Lawson,	&	Wong,	2011;	Botvinick	&	Cohen,	1998;	Shimada,	Fukuda,	&	Hiraki,	2009a),	(3)	
‘realness’	of	the	dummy	hand	(Haans,	IJsselsteijn,	&	de	Kort,	2008;	Press,	Heyes,	
Haggard,	&	Eimer,	2008;	Tsakiris,	2010).	
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Figure	3.	The	rubber	hand	illusion	(RHI).	In	the	RHI	a	participant	is	seated	in	front	of	a	
dummy	hand	with	one	of	their	hands	hidden	from	view	by	a	screen.	The	experimenter	
strokes	the	real	hand	and	the	dummy	hand	with	a	paintbrush	at	the	same	time.	When	1)	
the	hand	is	placed	in	an	anatomically	plausible	position,	2)	the	stroking	of	the	hand	and	
dummy	hand	are	in	synchrony,	and	3)	the	dummy	hand	resembles	a	real	human	hand	
the	participant	will	feel	a	sense	of	body	ownership	over	the	dummy	hand.		
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Quantification	of	the	outcome	–	the	extent	of	body	ownership	–	is	not	
straightforward.	In	order	to	assess	body	ownership	during	the	RHI	one	of	three	types	of	
measures	are	typically	used.	Firstly,	researchers	tend	to	rely	on	a	scaled	questionnaire	
measure	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	someone	feels	like	the	rubber	hand	is	theirs.		
Many	of	the	questionnaires	are	adapted	from	Botvinick	and	Cohen’s	(1998)	original	
study	which	asked	participants	to	rate	nine	statements	about	their	hand	and	the	rubber	
hand	after	prolonged	synchronous	(or	asynchronous)	stroking	such	as:	“It	seemed	as	if	I	
were	feeling	the	touch	of	the	paintbrush	in	the	location	where	I	saw	the	rubber	hand	
touched”,	“it	seemed	as	though	the	touch	I	felt	was	caused	by	the	paintbrush	touching	
the	rubber	hand”	and	“I	felt	a	if	the	rubber	hand	were	mine.”	Obviously	these	are	all	
subjective	opinions	and	as	such	are	vulnerable	to	suggestibility,	trying	to	please	the	
experimenter,	etc.	Secondly,	the	perceived	location	of	the	participant’s	real	arm	is	
measured	and	if	the	illusion	was	induced	participants	tend	to	feel	as	though	their	real	
arm	is	closer	to	that	of	the	rubber	hand	than	it	actually	is:	a	phenomenon	that	has	been	
called	proprioceptive	drift	(Tsakiris,	2010).		Thirdly,	physiological	responses	to	threat	of	
the	dummy	hand	(such	as	stabbing	it	or	hitting	it	with	a	hammer)	have	been	recorded	
and	when	there	is	a	sense	of	ownership	over	the	dummy	hand	participants	show	
changes	in	galvanic	skin	response	(Hägni	et	al.,	2008).	Regardless	of	the	type	of	
experimental	measure	used,	researchers	have	interpreted	the	results	as	indicating	that	
the	rubber	hand	was	at	least	partially	and	temporarily	incorporated	into	the	
participant’s	body	representation	or	body	schema.		The	RHI	demonstrates	successful	
transfer	of	ownership	to	a	part	of	the	body,	but	what	about	ownership	of	whole	bodies?	
	 22	
1.6.2.	Full	body	illusions	
Building	upon	the	RHI,	full	body	illusions	use	similar	multisensory	stimulation	in	
order	to	probe	the	sense	of	ownership	over	a	virtual	body	(Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007),	
mannequin,	or	the	participant’s	real	body	presented	in	an	allocentric	perspective	
(Blanke	&	Metzinger,	2009;	Ehrsson,	2007;	Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007).	In	the	more	well	
known	“out	of	body”	illusions	(Blanke	&	Metzinger,	2009;	Ehrsson,	2007;	Lenggenhager	
et	al.,	2007)	experimenters	manipulated	visual	perspective.	Cameras	and	virtual	reality	
displays	were	arranged	to	allow	subjects	to	view	themselves	from	a	third	person	
perspective	(note	that	this	therefore	breaks	one	of	the	principles	of	the	RHI).	The	
experimenter	then	tapped	either	the	back	or	the	chest	of	the	subject	with	a	rod	(not	in	
the	view	of	the	subject)	and	‘tapped’	the	back	or	the	chest	of	the	body	of	the	illusory	
‘other’	person	by	making	the	movement	in	front	of	the	cameras.	Skin	conductance	
responses	were	recorded	while	a	threat	was	made	to	“other	body”	(the	body	they	see	in	
the	third	person	perspective)	after	synchronous	and	asynchronous	tapping,	body	
ownership	questionnaires	were	filled	out,	and	proprioceptive	drift	was	calculated	
(Blanke	&	Metzinger,	2009;	Ehrsson,	2007;	Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007)	.	The	results	
showed	that	there	was	a	greater	skin	conductance	response	during	the	synchronous	
condition,	along	with	greater	sense	of	body	ownership	and	locating	the	perceived	body	
closer	to	the	‘other’	body	than	it	actually	was.	This	reinforces	the	importance	of	
temporal	alignment	during	ownership	illusions	and	how	experience	alters	body	
ownership.			
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Figure	4.	Full	body	illusions.	Participants	were	tapped	with	a	rod	while	viewing	their	
body	from	a	third-person	or	‘other’	perspective.	Synchronous	seen	and	felt	tapping	
induces	illusory	ownership	over	this	perspective	as	reported	by	questionnaires,	
proprioceptive	drift	measures	and	skin	conductance	(Blanke	&	Metzinger,	2009;	
Ehrsson,	2007;	Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007).		
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There	have	been	many	variations	of	this	illusion	produced	with	parts	of	whole	
bodies	(Petkova	et	al.,	2011),	virtual	bodies,	and	mannequins	(Petkova	&	Ehrsson,	2008).	
The	manipulations	in	all	of	these	studies	provide	evidence	for	the	following:	1)	the	first	
person	perspective	is	highly	influential	in	determining	the	location	of	self	in	space	
because	seeing	oneself	in	a	third	person	perspective	does	not	elucidate	feelings	of	self	
until	multisensory	stimulation	is	applied	while	seeing	oneself	in	the	third-person	
perspective;	and	2)	that	the	representation	of	the	body	is	highly	malleable	and	can	
update	and	adapt	through	experience	(integration	of	visual	and	tactile	information	in	
the	creation	of	the	representation	of	self)	to	incorporate	a	new	perspective	as	self	.	
1.6.3.	Neural	evidence	for	a	multisensory	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain	
The	multisensory	illusions	discussed	in	the	previous	section	rely	on	the	artificial	
binding	of	visual,	tactile	and	proprioceptive	information	concerning	the	body	mimicking	
the	correlation	that	is	normally	experienced	during	the	normal	development	and	
maintenance	of	a	body	representation.	When	synchronous	touch	is	applied	to	a	seen	
body	part	for	a	short	while,	there	is	an	undeniable	feeling	of	ownership	over	said	body	
part	and	potentially	the	whole	body	(Petkova	et	al.,	2011).	Neuroimaging	studies	during	
multisensory	illusions	have	shown	activation	in	multisensory	areas	of	the	brain	such	as	
the	left	ventral	premotor	cortex,	intraparietal	cortex,	and	the	temporo-parietal	junction	
Petkova	et	al.,	2011;	Petkova	&	Ehrsson,	2008;	Makin,	Holmes,	&	Zohary,	2007;	Gentile	
et	al.,	2015;	Bekrater-Bodmann,	Foell,	&	Kamping,	2011;	Ehrsson,	Holmes,	&	
Passingham,	2005)	suggesting	a	network	of	areas	that	are	important	in	maintaining	the	
representation	of	our	whole	body	in	the	brain	(See	Figure	5).	The	temporo-parietal	
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junction	(TPJ),	in	particular,	has	been	associated	with	the	first-person	(egocentric)	
perspective	in	neuroimaging	studies	(De	Ridder,	Van	Laere,	&	Dupont,	2007;	Ionta,	
Martuzzi,	Salomon,	&	Blanke,	2014;	McCleery,	Surtees,	Graham,	Richards,	&	Apperly,	
2011).		Therefore	not	surprisingly,	it	has	also	been	correlated	with	self/other	
discrimination	(Farrer,	Franck,	Georgieff,	Frith,	Decety,	et	al.,	2003a).	Considering	the	
importance	of	the	egocentric	viewpoint	in	constructing	the	representation	of	our	body	it	
makes	sense	that	the	TPJ	plays	a	role	in	both.		Ionta	and	colleagues	(2014)	looked	at	the	
brain	networks	involved	in	self-location	and	the	first-person	perspective	and	found	that	
the	TPJ	receives	input	from	intraparietal,	occipitotemporal,	supplementary	motor,	and	
premotor	areas	in	the	brain	providing	evidence	for	multisensory	integration	in	this	area.	
Further,	information	from	the	visual	and	the	vestibular	systems,	in	particular,	come	
together	and	help	us	to	locate	our	body	in	space	(Blanke	&	Metzinger,	2009).	
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Figure	5.	Multisensory	brain	areas	involved	in	the	representation	of	the	body	in	the	
brain:	The	premotor	cortex,	intraparietal	cortex	(IPC),	and	the	tempo-roparietal	junction	
(TPJ).		The	TPJ	receives	input	from	various	areas	in	the	brain		(as	depicted	by	the	arrows)	
corresponding	to	different	senses.		
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In	summary,	the	TPJ,	along	with	areas	such	as	the	posterior	parietal	cortex,	is	
where	multisensory	integration	of	the	senses	–	visual,	proprioceptive,	auditory,	tactile	
and	vestibular	–	become	coherent	representations	forming	a	body-centered	reference	
system	(Andersen	&	Buneo,	2002;	Avillac,	Denève,	Olivier,	Pouget,	&	Duhamel,	2005;	
Azañón,	Longo,	Soto-Faraco,	&	Haggard,	2010).			
1.7.	Purpose	
Given	the	literature	reviewed	in	the	sections	above,	we	can	conclude	that	we	
have	a	flexible	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain	that	can,	to	some	extent,	be	
manipulated	using	artificial	cross-modal	correlations	in	neurologically	intact	adults.	Also,	
brain	areas	involved	form	a	multisensory	network	that	appears	to	be	the	
neurophysiological	basis.	The	purpose	of	the	experiments	in	this	thesis	was	to	test	and	
quantify	the	concept	of	‘self’,	by	way	of	the	sense	of	body	ownership.	This	was	achieved	
by	manipulating	visual,	proprioceptive,	vestibular,	and	tactile	information.	I	will	quantify	
the	sense	of	body	ownership	using	a	temporal	asynchrony	detection	task	(described	
below),	which	does	not	explicitly	require	participants	to	consider	any	aspect	of	their	
perception	of	self.	This	is	therefore	a	more	objective	measure	of	body	ownership	than	
simply	asking	someone	if	something	is	perceived	as	being	part	of	their	own	body.	The	
task	introduces	a	delay	in	the	visual	feedback	concerning	a	voluntary	movement	made	
by	participants	and	requires	them	simply	to	detect	the	delay	under	various	conditions.	
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1.8.	General	method:	Interval	forced-choice	temporal	asynchrony	detection	under	
varying	visual	perspectives	
In	order	to	overcome	the	subjective	or	possibly	biased	nature	of	some	of	the	
previous	techniques	that	have	been	put	forward	to	assess	‘self’	I	used	an	objective	
psychophysically	robust	method	(two	interval	forced-choice;	2IFC)	where	I	measured	
the	ability	of	participants	to	detect	small	asynchronies	between	what	was	felt	and	what	
was	seen	during	a	self-generated	movement.		The	displayed	movements	were	subject	to	
temporal	manipulation	(e.g.,	adding	time	delays	to	the	presented	live	video	images)	and	
spatial	manipulation	(e.g.,	flipping	the	presented	live	video	images).		
1.8.1.Temporal	congruency	and	the	self		
Interpreting	different	sensory	modalities	as	belonging	together	(or	as	one	event)	
requires	that	they	happen	within	a	certain	temporal	window	(Spence,	Pavani,	Maravita,	
&	Holmes,	2004).	Temporal	congruency	promotes	binding	of	the	visual,	proprioceptive,	
and	efferent	signals	associated	with	a	self	initiated	movement.	Coherence	is	therefore	
an	integral	factor	in	creating	a	sense	of	self	(Gallagher,	2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2006).		This	
is	a	key	reason	why	some	multisensory	illusions	are	so	powerful	–	they	exploit	temporal	
congruency	during	the	stimulation	phase.	In	the	RHI,	for	example,	synchronously	seen	
and	felt	stroking	on	the	rubber	and	real	hands	creates	the	illusory	effect	of	ownership	
(Botvinick	&	Cohen,	1998;	Shimada,	Fukuda,	&	Hiraki,	2009).	However,	when	the	seen	
and	felt	touches	are	separated	in	time	(more	than	300ms;	Shimada,	Kukuda,	&	Hiraki,	
2009;	Bekrater-Bodmann	et	al.,	2014)	the	illusion	is	degraded.	This	is	consistent	with	
others	who	have	found	that	if	tactile	and	visual	stimuli	happen	within	a	200ms	window	
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we	tend	to	accept	that	they	correspond	to	a	single	event	(Tipper	et	al.,	2001).	In	a	delay	
detection	task	during	passive	and	active	movements,	Shimada	et	al.	(2010)	found	that	
asynchrony	was	best	detected	during	active	movements.	During	active	movements,	
participants	identified	the	movement	as	their	own	only	when	the	visual	delay	of	the	
presented	movement	was	less	than	150ms.	This	is	a	considerably	shorter	delay	than	the	
delay	needed	for	the	RHI	to	work	(around	300ms;	Shimada,	Kukuda,	&	Hiraki,	2009;	
Bekrater-Bodmann	et	al.,	2014)	and	most	likely	due	to	the	available	extra	efferent	
information	making	the	system	more	precise	and	demanding.	
In	my	experiments	I	used	self-generated	movements	and	varied	the	amount	of	
added	visual	delay	from	approximately	30	to	350ms.	This	range	of	delay	captures	both	
of	the	thresholds	mentioned	above	for	associating	the	movement	(or	body	part)	as	self	
and	extends	to	temporal	delays	that	would	not	be	associated	as	self.		
1.8.2.	Spatial	congruency	and	the	self	
Just	as	temporal	congruency	is	an	important	cue	that	information	from	multiple	
sources	should	be	packaged	together,	spatial	congruency	is	also	an	important	feature.	
Even	if	two	pieces	of	information	arrive	at	the	same	time,	they	should	probably	not	be	
treated	as	belonging	together	if	they	originate	from	widely	separate	locations.	Not	only	
does	the	ability	to	identify	static	images	of	one’s	body	parts	and	to	move	one’s	hand	
accurately	to	a	target	get	degraded	if	the	movements	are	seen	in	an	incompatible	or	
implausible	perspective,	but	so	does	the	efficacy	of	the	RHI	(Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	
Holmes	&	Spence,	2007).	Being	presented	with	visual	stimuli	(e.g.,	hands	and	bodies)	in	
ergonomically	or	spatially	relevant	positions	with	respect	to	our	own	body	is	important	
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in	feeling	the	sense	of	ownership	over	the	stimuli.	When	vision	is	available	to	us	we	
compare	vision	with	our	other	senses.	For	example,	Franck	et	al.	(2001)	found	that	as	
long	as	a	visual	presentation	of	a	hand	and	arm	was	within	a	+/-	15deg	rotation	from	the	
actual	arm	then	it	was	still	identified	as	one’s	own	arm.			
In	my	experiments	I	present	participants’	movements	seen	in	different	visual	
perspectives.	These	perspectives	were	achieved	by	flipping	the	presentation	of	the	hand	
or	body	about	the	x-	and/or	y-axes	(See	Figure	6	for	examples	of	the	hand).	If	a	rotation	
of	more	than	15°	away	from	the	actual	position	of	the	hand	is	enough	to	make	someone	
not	identify	with	the	hand	as	theirs	(Franck,	2001),	any	visual	manipulation	of	the	
images	introducing	this	amount	of	discrepancy	(e.g.,	flipped	by	90°	around	one	of	the	
axes)	should	then	be	considered	‘other’.	Further,	as	described	in	section	1.4.1.	and	
1.4.2.,	inverting	the	image	of	the	hand	produced	differences	in	self/other	performance	
and	differences	in	brain	activation.			
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Figure	6.	Examples	of	a	right	hand	in	the	different	visual	perspectives.	In	my	
experiments	participants	are	shown	body	parts	in	varying	visual	perspectives:	1)	the	self	
(or	natural)	perspective	which	is	the	perspective	that	one	would	expect	to	see;	2)	a	
vertical	axis	flip	of	the	image	(flipped	along	the	y	axis);	3)	the	horizontal	axis	flip	of	the	
image	(flipped	along	the	x	axis);	and	both	axes	flip	of	the	image	(flipped	along	the	x	and	
y	axes).	The	last	three	images	are	interpreted	as	‘other’.		
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1.8.3.	The	task	
I	looked	for	a	measure	where	robust	psychophysical	techniques	could	be	used.	
The	principle	of	the	task	is	that	the	participant	makes	a	decision	that	is	orthogonal	to	
the	dimension	being	tested,	for	example	answering	“first”	or	“second”	period	when	
identifying	the	lowest	luminance	of	a	light	(Green	&	Swets,	1966).	Here,	I	used	video	of	
self-generated	movement	with	increments	of	added	visual	delay.	The	participants	were	
asked	to	discriminate	this	added	delay.		
The	typical	response	method	for	‘self-recognition’	experiments	using	video	
stimuli	is	a	yes-no	judgement	task.	Participants	were	asked	to	indicate	whether	the	
movements	they	were	presented	with	were	in-synch	with	the	felt	movement	(i.e.,	“yes,	
that	is	me”)	or	out-of-synch	with	their	felt	movement	(i.e.,	“no,	that	is	not	me”)	to	
individual	videos.		Such	a	measure	is	vulnerable	to	response	bias	in	which	a	participant	
may	not	have	a	perception	of	self	but	a	tendency	to	respond	self	based	on	extraneous	
cues	or	even	just	a	guess	that	one	or	other	perspective	is	the	“right	answer”.	In	order	to	
avoid	contamination	by	such	a	response	bias,	I	employed	a	two-interval	forced	choice	
(2IFC)	paradigm.	Participants	make	two	movements	on	each	trial,	only	one	of	which	was	
delayed.	They	were	then	asked	to	indicate	which	of	the	two	periods	had	the	added	
visual	delay	(See	Figure	7	for	a	schematic	of	events	in	a	given	trial).	A	set	of	delays	was	
pre-chosen,	limited	by	the	refresh	rate	of	the	display	screen,	and	the	probability	of	
correct	responses	were	calculated.	This	method	allows	for	the	following:	1)	participants	
are	able	to	compare	the	delay	to	a	baseline	in	each	trial;	2)	reduces	likelihood	for	
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response	bias;	and	3)	does	not	require	the	participant	to	speculate	on	which	
presentation	looked	more	like	themselves.		
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Figure	7.	Schematic	of	a	trial	in	the	2IFC	temporal	synchrony	discrimination	task.	In	any	
given	trial	participants	made	two	movements.	These	movements	were	separated	by	an	
inter-stimulus	interval	(ISI)	of	100ms.	In	one	of	the	presentations	there	was	an	added	
visual	delay	to	the	video	of	the	movement	(ranging	from	85	to	350ms)	and	in	the	other	
presentation	there	was	no	added	visual	delay.	Participants	were	asked	to	respond	to	
which	of	the	two	presentations	had	the	visual	delay,	or	was	not	in	synchrony	with	the	
felt	movement.	They	used	foot	pedals	to	respond.			
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Measuring	the	tolerance	of	temporal	mismatch	between	visual	and	
proprioceptive	information	while	making	active	movements	has	been	used	as	a	measure	
of	body	ownership	in	which	perceived	synchrony	is	identified	as	self	and	perceived	
asynchrony	is	not	identified	as	self	(Daprati	et	al.,	2010;	Franck,	2001).	Further,	self-
generated	movements	provide	participants	with	efferent	information	as	well	as	
proprioceptive	information,	which	are	both	important	factors	in	determining	whether	
you	are	the	agent	of	the	action	(Farrer,	Franck,	Paillard,	&	Jeannerod,	2003b;	Gallagher,	
2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005).	The	sense	of	agency	is	an	important	contributor	to	the	sense	
of	body	ownership	(Tessari,	Tsakiris,	Borghi,	&	Serino,	2010;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005).	I	
manipulated	the	perspective	in	which	the	movements	were	displayed	to	participants	
(those	that	could	be	considered	self	and	other)	by	positioning	a	camera	close	to	the	line	
of	sight	and	then	flipping	the	image	about	the	axes	(see	Figure	6	for	examples	of	the	
hand	in	four	different	perspectives).	Visual	perspective,	as	we	have	seen	(sections	1.4.	
and	1.6.),	modulates	the	ability	to	distinguish	our	own	body	parts	from	others’	(Conson	
et	al.,	2010;	van	den	Bos	&	Jeannerod,	2002),	discriminate	between	left	and	right	hands	
(Dyde,	MacKenzie,	&	Harris,	2011)	and	experience	the	rubber-hand	illusion	(Costantini	&	
Haggard,	2007;	Holmes	&	Spence,	2007).	Therefore,	I	expected	the	changes	in	viewpoint	
would	modulate	the	ability	to	detect	the	delay.	Figure	8	provides	a	schematic	of	the	
processes	involved	in	the	temporal	asynchrony	discrimination	task	under	differing	visual	
perspectives.		
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Figure	8.	Performing	temporal	asynchrony	discrimination.	During	active	movement,	
participants	know	when	to	expect	a	movement	because	of	the	efference	copy.	This	is	
then	confirmed	by	proprioceptive	and	visual	reafference.	If	the	reafference	does	not	
agree	with	the	expectation,	the	sense	of	ownership	will	be	weakened.	The	comparison	
is	easier	if	the	seen	movement	matches	the	internal	representation.	So	in	the	case	of	
the	two	images	above,	it	would	be	easier	to	detect	differences	between	the	seen	and	
the	felt	movement	in	the	“self”	perspective	compared	to	the	“non-self”	perspective.	
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1.9.	Brief	overview	of	proposed	experiments	and	main	hypotheses			
	 The	overarching	prediction	for	my	experiments	was	that	when	the	view	of	the	
body	that	was	seen	matches	the	internal	representation	of	the	body	there	would	be	
greater	sensitivity	in	detecting	the	added	visual	delay.	The	rationale	was	that	it	should	
be	easier	to	bind	visual	and	motor	information	if	the	visual	component	is	aligned	with	
the	internal	representation	of	the	body	in	both	space	and	time.	Variations	in	sensitivity	
for	detecting	a	delay	between	the	view	of	the	movement	and	the	movement	itself	
would	depend	on	the	sense	of	ownership	of	the	body	part	being	viewed	and	the	sense	
of	agency	of	the	body	part	being	moved.	From	any	such	variations	in	sensitivity,	in	
general,	I	would	be	able	to	conclude	whether	the	participants	identify	the	body	part	
moving	as	self,	whereby	high	sensitivity	to	temporal	delay	would	suggest	‘self’	and	a	low	
sensitivity	to	temporal	delay	would	suggest	‘other’	or	‘not	self’.		
	 My	experiments	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	how	we	represent	ourselves	
in	our	brain	by	providing	a	quantifiable	measure	of	body	ownership	that	has	never	been	
used	before	in	live	video	self-recognition	studies.	Specifically,	I	addressed	the	following:	
	 In	Chapter	2,	Detecting	delay	in	visual	feedback	of	an	action	as	a	monitor	of	self	
recognition,	I	looked	at	the	relative	roles	of	vision,	proprioception,	and	efference	copy	in	
identifying	self.	I	varied	each	of	these	and	used	the	discrimination	of	temporal	delay	as	a	
measure.	I	used	unseen	discrete	or	continuous	finger	movements	and	presented	
participants	with	a	view	of	their	movement	from	egocentric	or	allocentric	perspectives.	I	
then	measured	the	sensitivity	with	which	temporal	synchrony	discriminations	between	
the	movement	and	the	sensory	feedback	and	looked	for	variation	in	this	sensitivity	with	
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visual	perspective,	movement	type,	and	which	hand	was	moving.	I	hypothesized	that	
when	the	sensory	information	matched	the	internal	representation	greater	sensitivity	in	
detecting	a	delay	would	result.			
In	Chapter	3,	The	role	of	the	viewpoint	on	body	ownership,	I	had	participants	
view	movements	of	their	hand	and	head	as	if	seen	from	three	different	viewpoints:	the	
direct	view	(hand	movements	viewed	as	if	looking	down	at	the	hand);	the	mirror	view	
(hand	and	head	movements	viewed	as	if	looking	in	the	mirror)	and	the	behind	view	(the	
same	hand	and	head	movements	as	in	the	mirror	but	viewed	as	if	from	behind).		Each	of	
these	five	live	videos	was	presented	in	the	“natural”	or	expected	perspective	or	with	the	
video	flipped	around	the	horizontal,	vertical	or	both	axes	to	simulate	looking	at	the	head	
or	hand	of	another	person;	that	is,	to	switch	from	an	egocentric	(self)	to	an	allocentric	
(other)	perspective.	I	hypothesized,	that	If	the	natural,	unflipped	view	was	regarded	as	
“self”	then	there	would	be	a	self-advantage	in	which	smaller	asynchronies	would	be	
detected	in	the	unflipped	than	in	the	flipped	views	for	the	first	person	view	of	the	body	
(i.e.	looking	down	at	the	hands)	and	for	the	view	in	the	mirror.	There	would	be	no	self-
advantage,	however,	for	the	view	of	the	back.		
In	Chapter	4,	Disrupting	vestibular	activity	disrupts	body	ownership,	I	sought	to	
confirm	the	contribution	of	the	vestibular	system	in	the	representation	of	the	body.	
Given	that	the	vestibular	system	has	been	linked	to	registering	spatial	and	temporal	
aspects	of	the	self	(Ferrè,	Lopez,	&	Haggard,	2014;	Lopez	et	al.,	2008),	I	hypothesized	
that	vestibular	stimulation	would	decrease	the	ability	for	participants	to	detect	
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asynchrony	when	the	hand	movements	are	presented	in	the	‘self’	perspective	and	not	in	
the	‘other’	perspective.		
	 In	Chapter	5,	Inducing	ownership	over	an	‘other’	perspective	with	a	visuo-tactile	
manipulation,	I	introduced	synchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation	(sVTS)	and	
asynchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation	(aVTS),	similar	to	that	used	in	the	RHI	and	full-
body	illusions.	Live	video	of	participants’	movements	were	presented	in	the	natural	
perspective	or	flipped	around	both	the	vertical	and	horizontal	axes,	and	with	varying	
amounts	of	delay.	I	hypothesized	that	participants	who	received	sVTS,	encouraging	
them	to	interpret	that	view	as	‘self’,	would	subsequently	show	an	advantage	in	
detecting	temporal	asynchrony.	Those	in	the	aVTS	group	would	not	show	a	difference	in	
performance	between	the	viewpoints.	
	
	 	 	
	 40	
	
2.	CHAPTER	2:	DETECTING	DELAY	IN	VISUAL	FEEDBACK	OF	AN	ACTION	AS	A	MONITOR	
OF	SELF	RECOGNITION	
	
Adria	E.	N.	Hoover	and	Laurence	R.	Harris	
	
Experimental	Brain	Research	(2012)	222:389–397	
Published	online:	25	August	2012		
Published	in	print:	01	October	2012		
The	final	publication	is	available	at	Springer	via	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-
012-3224-3	
	
Corresponding	author:	
	
Adria	Hoover	
Dept	Psychology	
York	University,		
4700	Keele	Street,	Toronto	
ON		M3J	1P3,	Canada	
	
email:	adriah@yorku.ca	
416-736-2100	x	40886	
	
	
Keywords:	crossmodal	interactions;	visual	perspective;	self-recognition;	body	
ownership;	agency;	continuous	and	discrete	movements.	
	 41	
2.1.	Abstract	
How	do	we	distinguish	“self”	from	“other”?	The	correlation	between	willing	an	action	
and	seeing	it	occur	is	an	important	cue.	We	exploited	the	fact	that	this	correlation	needs	
to	occur	within	a	restricted	temporal	window	in	order	to	obtain	a	quantitative	
assessment	of	when	a	body	part	is	identified	as	“self”.		We	measured	the	threshold	and	
sensitivity	(d’)	for	detecting	a	delay	between	movements	of	the	finger	(of	both	the	
dominant	and	non-dominant	hands)	and	visual	feedback	as	seen	from	four	visual	
perspectives	(the	natural	view,	and	mirror-reversed	and/or	inverted	views).	Each	trial	
consisted	of	one	presentation	with	minimum	delay	and	another	with	a	delay	of	between	
33	and	150ms.		Participants	indicated	which	presentation	contained	the	delayed	view.	
We	varied	the	amount	of	efference	copy	available	for	this	task	by	comparing	
performance	for	discrete	movements	and	continuous	movements.	Discrete	movements	
are	associated	with	a	stronger	efference	copy.	Sensitivity	to	detect	asynchrony	between	
visual	and	proprioceptive	information	was	significantly	higher	when	movements	were	
viewed	from	a	“plausible”	self-perspective	compared	to	when	the	view	was	reversed	or	
inverted.	Further,	we	found	differences	in	performance	between	dominant	and	non-
dominant	hand	finger	movements	across	the	continuous	and	single	movements.	
Performance	varied	with	the	viewpoint	from	which	the	visual	feedback	was	presented	
and	on	the	efferent	component	such	that	optimal	performance	was	obtained	when	the	
presentation	was	in	the	normal	natural	orientation	and	clear	efferent	information	was	
available.	Variations	in	sensitivity	to	visual/non-visual	temporal	incongruence	with	the	
viewpoint	in	which	a	movement	is	seen	may	help	determine	the	arrangement	of	the	
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underlying	visual	representation	of	the	body.	
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2.2.	Introduction	
	 We	have	the	awareness	that	something	we	are	looking	at	is	a	part	of	our	own	
body	from	experiencing	expected	sensations	correlated	with	what	we	are	seeing	
(Gallagher	2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2010).		Seeing	something	being	touched	and	feeling	
synchronous	tactile	sensations	helps	create	a	sense	of	ownership	of	the	seen	item	and	
can	even	mislead	us	into	thinking	that	foreign	objects,	such	as	rubber	hands	(the	rubber	
hand	illusion;	Botvinick	&	Cohen,	1998;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2010;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005)	or	other	
inanimate	objects	(Armel	&	Ramachandran,	2003),	are	parts	of	our	own	body.	Similarly,	
seeing	a	finger	move	after	we	have	attempted	to	move	it	helps	identify	it	as	belonging	
to	us	(Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005).	This	case	involves	correlating	what	is	seen	with	the	
simultaneous	sensory	and	motor	information.	Identifying	sensory	and	motor	
information	that	comes	through	very	different	channels	as	“belonging	together”	
requires,	among	other	things,	that	they	occur	in	a	certain	temporal	window	(Spence	et	
al.,	2004).	Temporal	congruency	promotes	binding	of	the	visual,	proprioceptive,	and	
efferent	signals	associated	with	movement	and	hence	assists	in	creating	a	sense	of	self-
identification	(Gallagher,	2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2006).	We	measured	the	tolerance	to	
disruption	of	this	temporal	congruency	by	introducing	a	delay	in	the	visual	feedback	
concerning	a	voluntary	movement	and	asking	people	to	detect	the	delay.	Our	logic	was	
that	it	should	be	easier	to	bind	visual	and	motor	information	if	the	visual	component	
was	aligned	with	the	internal	representation	of	the	body	in	both	space	and	time.	This	is	
therefore	a	potentially	more	objective	measure	of	body	ownership	than	simply	asking	
someone	if	something	is	perceived	as	being	part	of	their	own	body.		
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2.2.1.	The	effect	of	perspective	
	 The	visual	perspective	in	which	we	view	a	body	part	modulates	the	ability	to	
recognize	it	as	our	own	(Conson	et	al.,	2010).	We	are	able	to	recognize	our	dominant	
hand	most	quickly	when	it	is	seen	from	an	“egocentric”	or	“plausible	self”	perspective	
(i.e.,	the	normal	view)	compared	to	when	it	is	seen	in	some	anatomically	impossible	
orientation	(referred	to	as	viewing	from	an	“allocentric”,	“other”	or	“not	self”	
perspective).	As	well,	the	ability	to	identify	a	hand	as	left	or	right	hand	(Dyde	et	al.,	
2011;	Fiorio	et	al.,	2007;	Parsons,	1994)	and	the	effectiveness	of	the	rubber	hand	
illusion	(Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	Holmes	&	Spence,	2007)	is	likewise	reduced	if	
viewed	from	an	allocentric	perspective.	The	fact	that	perspective	makes	a	difference	
suggests	that	there	is	an	internal	representation	of	the	body	providing	an	“expected”	
view	that	can	be	matched	to	what	is	actually	seen.	Varying	perspective	can	therefore	be	
used	as	an	experimental	tool	to	assess	the	nature	of	the	body’s	internal	representation:	
the	view	that	is	matched	against	proprioceptive	and	efferent	signals.	
2.2.2.	Proprioceptive	awareness	
	 The	ability	to	detect	the	position	of	a	limb	from	proprioceptive	information	alone	
is	poor	(Graziano,	1999;	Làdavas	et	al.,	2000).	When	an	arm	is	moved	passively	to	a	new	
location,	such	that	its	position	can	only	be	identified	by	proprioceptive	information	
about	joint	position	and	muscle	length,	participants	are	significantly	less	accurate	at	
tracking	the	arm	compared	to	when	a	target	light	is	attached	to	the	hand	(Mather	&	
Lackner,	1981).		A	proprioceptive	map	of	the	body	could	therefore	be	expected	to	be	of	
poor	resolution	and	visual-proprioceptive	matching	to	be	broadly	tuned.	This	is	not	to	
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say	that	proprioceptive	information	is	unimportant:	loss	of	the	proprioceptive	system	
has	devastating	consequences	for	movement	control	and,	particularly	relevant	here,	is	
associated	with	a	loss	of	body	schema	(Cole	&	Paillard,	1998).	The	proprioceptive	sense	
thus	gives	us	some	information	about	the	position	of	a	moving	finger.	However,	since	
we	are	looking	at	an	active	finger	movement,	not	only	sensory	feedback	is	involved	but	
also	information	related	to	the	motor	signals	(Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005).	
2.2.3.	Awareness	of	a	motor	act	
	 The	sense	of	agency,	the	feeling	that	one	can	control	and	move	one’s	body	
(Gallagher,	2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2010),	includes	the	motor	signal	(efference	copy)	as	well	
as	sensory	feedback	(afferent	signals)	(Farrer	et	al.,	2003).	A	sense	of	agency	contributes	
to	the	sense	of	ownership	and	correlating	motor	activity	with	visual	feedback	is	thus	an	
important	contributor	to	this	sense.	Activity	in	the	visual	body	areas	in	the	brain	(e.g.,	
the	extrastriate	body	area)	is	correlated	with	limb	movement	(Astafiev	et	al.,	2004)	
providing	a	neural	substrate	for	the	interconnectivity	of	sensory	and	motor	information	
in	the	construction	of	the	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.	Here	we	quantify	the	
important	relationship	between	the	sense	of	agency	and	ownership	without	explicitly	
asking	about	either.	Instead	we	look	for	variations	in	the	sensitivity	for	detecting	a	delay	
between	the	view	of	one’s	finger	(ownership	if	the	perspective	is	correct)	and	
movement	of	that	finger	(agency,	if	it	is	thought	to	be	one’s	own	finger).	
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2.2.4.	Varying	the	efferent	contribution:	continuous	vs.	discrete	movements	
	 Repetitive	movements,	such	as	waving	one’s	hand	or	finger	up	and	down	
rhythmically,	are	controlled	differently	than	discrete	movements	(Spencer,	2003).	The	
use	of	efference	copy	to	specify	timing	seems	to	be	most	explicit	for	discrete	
movements	(Spencer,	Verstynen,	&	Brett,	2007).	We	took	advantage	of	this	difference	
in	the	weighting	assigned	to	efference	copy	to	assess	the	contribution	of	efferent	
control	by	comparing	performance	with	repetitive	and	discrete	finger	motions.	We	
expected	performance	to	be	more	sensitive	for	discrete	movements.	
2.2.5.	The	dominant	hand	
	 Most	people	show	a	preference	to	use	one	or	other	hand	(Oldfield,	1971).	The	
Body	Specificity	Hypothesis	(Casasanto,	2009;	Willems	et	al.,	2010a;	Willems	&	Hagoort,	
2009)	proposes	that	people	with	dominant	right	hands	interact	in	different	ways	with	
their	environment	than	left-handed	people	and	create	different	representations	of	
“action-	and	body-related	information”.	Given	the	extensive	use	of	the	dominant	hand,	
right-handers	might	be	expected	to	be	best	at	tasks	that	use	their	right	hand	and	less	so	
when	using	their	non-dominant	left	hand.	If	this	were	true,	then	we	may	expect	
differences	detecting	a	delayed	visual	feedback	depending	on	which	hand	was	moving	
that	may	be	correlated	with	the	reference	frame	for	egocentrically	centered	body	
representation.	We	therefore	performed	our	experiments	with	both	dominant	and	non-
dominant	hand	movements.		
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2.2.6.	Our	project	
	 In	order	to	look	at	the	relative	roles	of	vision,	proprioception,	and	efference	copy	
in	identifying	self,	we	varied	each	of	these	and	used	the	discrimination	of	temporal	
delay	as	a	measure.	We	used	unseen	discrete	or	continuous	finger	movements	and	
presented	participants	with	a	view	of	their	movement	from	egocentric	or	allocentric	
perspectives.	We	measured	the	sensitivity	with	which	temporal	synchrony	
discriminations	between	the	movement	and	the	sensory	feedback	could	be	made	and	
looked	for	variation	in	this	sensitivity	with	visual	perspective,	movement	type,	and	
which	hand	was	moving.	We	hypothesized	that	when	the	sensory	information	matches	
the	internal	representation	greater	sensitivity	in	detecting	a	delay	should	result.	
	
2.3.	Method	
2.3.1.	Participants	
	 10	right-handed	adults	(6	females,	4	males),	mean	age	of	28.9	(±	10.7)	years,	
participated	in	this	study.	All	participants	took	part	in	all	the	experiments	using	both	
hands	in	both	the	continuous	and	the	discrete	movement	paradigm.	Participants	gave	
their	informed	consent,	which	conformed	to	York	University	ethical	guidelines	and	the	
Declaration	of	Helsinki.	Handedness	was	determined	by	an	adapted	version	of	the	
Edinburgh	Handedness	Inventory	(Oldfield,	1971).		
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2.3.2.	Apparatus	
Participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	chair	at	a	table	with	their	head	on	a	chin	rest	50	
cm	from	a	LCD	display	(HP	Fv583AA	20”	widescreen	monitor;	1600	x	900	pixels;	5	ms	
refresh	response	time)	centred	at	eye	level.	They	placed	their	hand	on	the	table	
shielded	from	view	by	black	cloth.	A	PlayStation	Eye	camera	(SCEI;	resolution	640x480	
pixels	@	30	Hz)	was	mounted	on	the	front	of	the	chin	rest	and	pointed	down	at	their	
hand	(Figure	9).	The	camera	was	angled	to	capture	the	view	as	seen	from	a	“natural”	
egocentric	perspective	for	the	participant	as	if	looking	down	at	their	own	hand.		
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Figure	9.	Apparatus:	participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	chair	at	a	table	50	cm	from	an	LCD	
display	centred	at	eye	level.	They	placed	their	hand	on	the	table	shielded	from	view	by	a	
black	cloth.	A	PlayStation	Eye	camera	was	mounted	on	the	front	of	the	chin	rest	and	
pointed	down	at	their	hand.	The	camera	was	angled	to	capture	the	view	as	seen	from	a	
‘‘natural’’	egocentric	perspective	for	the	participant	as	if	looking	down	at	their	own	
hand.	Participants	used	foot	pedals	to	make	responses.	
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2.3.4.	Introducing	a	delay	in	the	display	
	 The	video	signal	from	the	USB	camera	was	fed	into	an	iMAC,	read	by	a	Matlab	
program	(version	R2009_b)	and	played	through	the	LCD	screen	either	at	a	minimal	delay,	
or	with	an	added	delay	of	between	33	and	231	ms.	To	calibrate	the	system	we	had	the	
camera	view	a	flashing	LED	and	compared	the	voltage	across	it	with	its	appearance	on	
the	screen	(measured	by	a	light	sensitive	diode).	This	revealed	a	minimum	delay	of	85ms	
±	one-half	screen	refresh	duration	and	confirmed	the	delay	values	we	introduced	by	
software.	With	the	minimum	system	delay,	motion	on	the	screen	appeared	
simultaneous.	The	delays	presented	in	the	results	have	all	been	corrected	by	the	
addition	of	the	system	delay.	
2.3.5.	Finger	motions	
	 We	used	either	continuous	or	discrete	movements	of	the	index	fingers	of	both	
the	right	and	left	hands.	For	continuous	movements,	participants	were	required	to	make	
a	repetitive	flexion	and	extension	of	their	index	finger	of	about	2	cm	at	2	Hz.	The	
movements	began	before	they	saw	their	hand	on	the	screen	and	continued	until	the	
hand	was	no	longer	visible	(1	s	presentation	time).	For	discrete	movements,	participants	
made	a	single	flexion	of	their	index	finger	through	about	2	cm	as	soon	as	they	saw	their	
hand	on	the	screen.		To	reduce	between-subject	differences	in	the	speed	and	type	of	
movement	all	participants	went	through	a	15-trial	practice	phase	for	each	session	
during	which	the	experimenter	observed	and	corrected	the	movement.	We	ensured	
that	participants	avoided	touching	the	table,	other	fingers,	and/or	their	hand	with	their	
index	finger	during	the	movement	so	as	not	to	introduce	other	tactile	cues.		
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2.3.6.	Manipulating	the	perspective	
	 Through	the	use	of	MATLAB	and	Psychophysics	Toolbox	extensions	(Brainard,	
1997;	Pelli,	1997)	,	participants’	movements	were	displayed	on	the	LCD	monitor	in	one	
of	four	perspectives	for	each	of	the	delays:	1)	self	perspective	(no	axis	reflection);	2)	y-
reflection	(so	that	the	hand	appeared	as	the	opposite	hand);	3)	x-reflection	(so	that	the	
hand	appeared	upside	down);	and	4)	xy-reflection	(so	that	the	hand	appeared	as	the	
opposite	hand	presented	upside	down).		Viewing	conditions	1	and	2	represent	
egocentric	(or	“plausible	self”)	viewing	perspectives	and	conditions	3	and	4	represent	
allocentric	(or	“other”)	perspectives.	Examples	of	these	views	are	shown	as	insets	to	
Figure	10.	
2.3.7.	Procedure	
	 To	explore	temporal	synchrony	discrimination,	a	2AFC	discrimination	paradigm	
was	used.	Each	trial	consisted	of	two	presentations:	a	minimum-delay	presentation	
(duration	1000ms)	and	a	delayed	presentation	(duration	1000ms)	separated	by	an	inter-
stimulus	interval	(ISI)	of	100ms.	Whether	the	delayed	presentation	or	the	minimum-
delay	presentation	was	displayed	first	was	randomly	chosen	by	MATLAB.	There	were	
eight	possible	differences	in	visual	delays	between	the	two	presentations	in	any	given	
trial:	0,	33,	66,	99,	132,	165,	198,	and	231ms.	Participants	indicated	which	presentation	
was	delayed	using	foot	pedals	(left	=	first	presentation;	right	=	second	presentation).		
	 Experiments	were	run	in	a	counterbalanced	block	design	where	either	continuous	
or	discrete	movements	of	either	the	left	or	right	hand	were	tested	in	four	blocks.	For	
each	block,	the	eight	differences	of	visual	delay	were	presented	eight	times	for	the	four	
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viewing	conditions	in	a	random	order	resulting	in	a	total	of	256	trials.	After	the	first	128	
trials,	participants	were	given	a	break.	Each	session	of	128	trials	lasted	approximately	15	
minutes.	Each	experiment	was	repeated	for	left	and	right	hands,	and	for	continuous	and	
discrete	movements	resulting	in	a	total	of	256*4	=	1024	trials.	The	entire	experiment	
took	two	hours	to	complete.		
2.3.8.	Data	analysis	
	 To	assess	performance	for	each	visual	perspective,	we	fitted	a	sigmoidal	function	
to	the	proportion	of	times	participants	correctly	chose	the	delayed	presentation	as	a	
function	of	the	delay	using:	
…………………………………………………………………………………….(1)	
where	x	is	the	delay,	x0		is	the	75%	detection	threshold	and	b	is	the	standard	deviation.		
	
	 The	sensitivity	(d’)	values	were	calculated	from	the	2AFC	discrimination	data	by	
dividing	the	data	into	trials	where	the	minimum	delay	was	presented	first	and	those	
where	it	was	presented	second.		The	hit	rate	was	taken	from	the	trials	in	which	the	
delay	was	correctly	identified	as	presented	in	the	first	presentation;	the	false	positive	
rate	was	taken	as	the	rate	at	which	the	delay	was	incorrectly	identified	as	occurring	in	
the	first	presentation	when	it	actually	occurred	in	the	second.	These	rates	were	
converted	into	Z	scores	and	the	difference	converted	to	a	d’	score	(Macmillan	&	
Creelman,	1991).		
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	 The	statistical	analysis	comprised	of	repeated	measures	analysis	of	variances	
(ANOVAs).	For	all	tests,	alpha	was	set	at	P	<	0.05.	All	multiple	comparisons	were	carried	
out	with	the	False	Discovery	Rate	P	value	correction	(Benjamini	&	Hochberg,	1995).		
2.4.	Results	
2.4.1.	Detecting	visual	delays	using	continuous	movement	(thresholds)	
	 Figures	10A	and	B	show	the	mean	proportion	correct	plotted	as	a	function	of	
delay	for	the	data	averaged	across	the	10	participants.	For	the	statistics,	each	
participant’s	performance	was	analysed	separately.	75%	threshold	values	were	
extracted	from	these	curves	and	converted	to	absolute	thresholds	by	adding	the	system	
delay	(85ms).	The	mean	thresholds	are	shown	in	Table	1.	
	
Table	1.	Mean	thresholds	and	standard	errors	for	all	conditions	tested	using	continuous	
movements.		
	
The	values	were	obtained	by	adding	the	system	delay	(85	ms)	to	the	imposed	delay.	
	
	 A	2	(hands)	x	4	(viewing	conditions)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	revealed	a	
significant	main	effect	of	viewing	condition	(F(3,	27)	=	10.308,	P	<	0.001,	ηp2	=	0.534)	and	
no	effect	of	hand	(F(1,9)	=	0.183,	P	=	0.678,	ηp2	=	0.020).		Pairwise	comparisons	showed	
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that	participants	had	lower	thresholds	for	detecting	an	imposed	delay	while	viewing	
their	movement	in	the	“self”	perspective	compared	to	the	“other”	perspective	(x-	and	
xy-reflections)	(P	<	0.001	and	P	=	0.005,	respectively).	Participants	also	had	lower	
thresholds	for	detecting	the	delay	when	viewing	their	movement	in	y-reflection	
compared	to	the	“other”	(P	=	0.005	and	P	=	0.021,	respectively;	Figure	10A,	B).		In	other	
words,	when	movements	were	seen	in	a	“plausible	self”	(self	and	y-reflection)	
perspective,	participants	detected	shorter	delays	(mean	threshold	149		±	13	ms)	
compared	to	when	movements	were	seen	in	an	“other”	perspective	(mean	threshold	
187		±	13	ms).		
	
2.4.2.	Detecting	visual	delays	in	continuous	movement	(sensitivity)	
	 The	same	data	used	for	the	threshold	analysis	were	converted	into	sensitivity	
scores	(d’;	see	methods).	A	2	(hands)	x	4	(viewing	conditions)	repeated	measures	
ANOVA	revealed	a	significant	effect	of	perspective	(F(3,	27)	=	15.256,	P	<	0.001,	ηp2	=	
0.629)	and	no	effect	of	hand	(F(1,	9)	=	0.067,	P	=	0.802,	ηp2	=	0.007)	on	sensitivity	scores.		
Pairwise	comparisons	confirmed	the	threshold	analysis	showing	that	participants	were	
more	sensitive	at	detecting	a	delay	when	viewing	their	movement	in	the	self	perspective	
compared	to	the	“other”	perspective	(P	<	0.001	and	P	=	0.004,	respectively).	Participants	
were	also	more	sensitive	at	detecting	the	delay	when	viewing	their	movement	in	y-
reflection	compared	to	the	“other”	(x-	and	xy-reflections)	viewing	conditions	(P	=	0.003	
and	P	=	0.015,	respectively).		Regardless	of	the	hand	used,	participants	performed	better	
(that	is,	they	could	detect	shorter	delays)	when	their	continuous,	repetitive	movement	
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was	viewed	from	a	“plausible	self”	perspective	compared	to	when	it	was	viewed	from	
an	“other”	perspective	(Figure	10C,	D).		
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Figure	10.	Continuous	movement:	Plots	of	the	mean	proportion	correct	as	a	function	of	
the	imposed	visual	delay	for	the	dominant	(right)	(A)	and	non-	dominant	(left)	(B)	hands.	
The	curves	are	for	self	perspective	(black	solid	line	and	filled	circles),	y-reflection	(black	
dashed	and	filled	squares),	x-reflection	(grey	solid	line	and	grey	circles),	and	xy-
reflection	(grey	dashed	line	and	grey	triangles).	The	data	expressed	as	mean	sensitivity	
scores	(d’)	are	plotted	as	bar	graphs	for	the	dominant	(C)	and	non-dominant	(D)	hands.	
Viewing	condition	indicated	by	the	insets	beneath	each	column.	All	error	bars	are	the	SE	
of	the	mean.	
	 57	
2.4.3.	Discriminating	visual	delay	in	discrete	movement	(thresholds)	
	 Figure	11A	and	B	shows	the	mean	proportion	correct	for	detecting	a	delay	in	the	
visual	feedback	for	discrete	movements	plotted	as	a	function	of	delay	averaged	across	
the	10	participants.	For	the	statistics,	each	participant’s	performance	was	analysed	
separately.	As	for	the	continuous	movement	analysis,	the	system	delay	was	added	to	
these	values	to	obtain	absolute	threshold	values.	The	mean	75%	threshold	values	are	
shown	in	Table	2.	
	
Table	2.		Mean	thresholds	and	standard	errors	for	all	conditions	tested	using	discrete	
movements.		
	
The	values	were	obtained	by	adding	the	system	delay	(85	ms)	to	the	imposed	delay.	
	
	 A	2	(hands)	x	4	(viewing	conditions)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	of	the	discrete	
movement	data	revealed	a	significant	main	effect	of	viewing	condition	(F(3,	27)	=	8.850,	P	
<	0.001,	ηp2	=	0.496)	and	no	effect	of	hand	(F(1,9)	=	0.680,	P	=	0.431,	ηp2	=	0.070;	Figure	
11B).	Pairwise	comparisons	showed	that	participants	had	lower	thresholds	when	
detecting	a	delay	while	viewing	their	movement	in	the	self	perspective	compared	to	the	
“other”	perspective	(P	=	0.002	and	P	<	0.005,	respectively).	Participants	also	had	lower	
thresholds	when	detecting	the	delay	when	viewing	their	movement	in	the	y-reflection	
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compared	to	the	“other”	(xy-reflection)	viewing	condition	(P	=	0.057;	Figure	11A,	B).		
Further,	there	was	a	near-significant	difference	between	the	self	and	y-axis	reflection	
within	the	“plausible	self”	perspectives	(P	=	0.058).	In	other	words,	when	movements	
were	seen	in	the	self-perspective	participants	detected	shorter	delays	(mean	threshold	
131	+/-	7	ms)	compared	to	when	movements	were	seen	in	all	other	perspectives	(mean	
threshold	144	+/-	8	ms).	
2.4.4.	Discriminating	visual	delay	in	discrete	movement	(sensitivity)	
	 The	same	data	used	for	the	timing	analysis	were	analysed	as	sensitivity	scores	
(d’;	see	methods).	Unlike	for	the	continuous	movement	data,	a	2	(hands)	x	4	(viewing	
conditions)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	revealed	a	significant	interaction	between	which	
hand	was	used	(dominant	or	non-dominant)	for	the	discrete	movement	and	viewing	
condition	(F(3,	27)	=	6.724,	P	=	0.002,	ηp2	=	0.428).		Participants	performed	differently	
across	the	viewing	conditions	depending	on	the	hand	with	which	they	performed	the	
movement.	To	break	down	the	significant	interaction,	2	x	2	interaction	contrasts	were	
run.	The	contrasts	confirmed	that	participants	performed	differently	in	the	self	
perspective	and	y-axis	reflection	conditions	for	the	dominant	and	non-dominant	hand	
by	revealing	a	significant	interaction	(F(1,	9)	=	13.190,	P	=	0.005,	ηp2	=	0.594).	The	
difference	in	sensitivity	scores	between	the	self	perspective	and	y-axis	reflection	
conditions	was	greater	for	the	dominant	hand	than	for	the	non-dominant	hand	(Figure	
11C,	D).	This	difference	was	also	reflected	in	the	threshold	data	listed	in	Table	2.		In	fact,	
there	were	no	differences	for	the	different	viewing	conditions	for	the	non-dominant	
hand.	When	the	non-dominant	left	hand	was	y-reflected	so	that	it	was	seen	as	the	
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dominant	right	hand	it	appeared	to	inherit	the	right	hand’s	advantage	whereby	
participants	showed	higher	sensitivity	(first	two	bars	in	Figure	11D).	Further,	when	
comparing	the	dominant	and	non-dominant	hand	across	the	x-axis	and	xy-axis	refection	
conditions,	we	find	only	a	significant	main	effect	of	condition	where	performance	was	
best	(regardless	of	hand)	in	the	x-axis	reflection	condition	(F(1,	9)	=	5.847,	P	=	0.039,	ηp2	=	
0.394).		
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Figure	11.	Discrete	movement:	Plots	of	the	mean	proportion	correct	as	a	function	of	the	
imposed	visual	delay	for	the	dominant	(right)	(A)	and	non-	dominant	(left)	(B)	hands.	
The	curves	are	for	self	perspective	(black	solid	line	and	filled	circles),	y-reflection	(black	
dashed	and	filled	squares),	x-reflection	(grey	solid	line	and	grey	circles),	and	xy-
reflection	(grey	dashed	line	and	grey	triangles).	The	data	expressed	as	mean	sensitivity	
scores	(d’)	are	plotted	as	bar	graphs	for	the	dominant	(C)	and	non-dominant	(D)	hands.	
Viewing	condition	indicated	by	the	insets	beneath	each	column.	All	error	bars	are	the	SE	
of	the	mean		
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2.4.5.	Continuous	versus	discrete	movements	
	 From	the	above	data,	a	difference	between	continuous	and	discrete	movements	
appeared	when	comparing	the	“self”	with	the	y-reflection	condition.	Therefore,	we	
looked	in	more	detail	at	these	conditions.	Figure	12	compares	the	d’	scores	obtained	
with	continuous	movement	with	those	from	discrete	movements	for	the	dominant	
(Figure	12A)	and	non-dominant	(Figure	12B)	hand.	A	2	x	2	x	2	repeated	measures	
ANOVA	on	the	d’	scores	revealed	a	significant	three-way	interaction	between	the	
movement	(continuous	or	discrete),	hand	used	(dominant	or	non-dominant),	and	visual	
perspective	(no	reflection	or	y-reflection),	F(1,	9)	=	16.560,	P	=	0.003,	ηp2	=	0.648.	That	is,	
the	effect	of	perspective	depends	on	the	type	of	movement	and	the	hand	used.	To	
break	down	this	three-way	interaction,	we	ran	pairwise	comparisons	to	compare	
performance	across	the	different	movements	for	both	hands	and	both	conditions.	There	
were	significant	differences	between	continuous	and	discrete	movements	for	all	
comparisons	except	for	the	non-dominant	hand	in	the	self-perspective	condition	
(dominant	hand:	self	perspective	P	=	0.004	and	y-axis	reflection	P	=	0.022;	non-
dominant	hand:	self-perspective	P	=	0.396	and	y-axis	reflection	P	=	0.023).	Overall,	
participants	were	most	sensitive	at	detecting	a	delay	when	viewing	their	dominant	hand	
making	a	discrete	movement.	
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Figure	12.	Continuous	versus	discrete	movement:	a	comparison	of	the	sensitivity	to	
detecting	delay	for	the	self	and	y-reflection	views	for	the	dominant	(A)	and	non-
dominant	(B)	hands.	All	error	bars	are	the	SE	of	the	mean.	
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2.5.	Discussion	
	 The	current	study	has	shown	significant	variation	in	the	ability	to	detect	
temporal	asynchrony	between	a	movement	and	visual	feedback	concerning	that	
movement	that	depended	on	the	visual	perspective	(egocentric	or	allocentric),	the	
nature	of	the	movement	(continuous	or	discrete),	and	the	hand	used	to	make	the	
movement	(dominant	or	non-dominant).	Performance	varied	with	the	perspective	from	
which	the	visual	feedback	was	presented	and	on	the	efferent	component	such	that	
optimal	performance	was	obtained	when	the	presentation	was	in	the	normal	natural	
orientation	and	clear	efferent	information	was	available.	In	other	words,	participants	
were	most	sensitive	when	viewing	the	dominant	hand	in	its	natural	(“self”)	perspective	
making	a	discrete	movement.	For	this	condition,	participants	could	make	a	reliable	
discrimination	between	the	minimal	delay	of	85ms	(which	appeared	simultaneous)	and	
85+38	=123ms	(the	mean	threshold	for	the	perception	of	delay).	When	participants	
were	viewing	the	dominant	hand	in	its	natural	perspective	making	a	continuous,	
repetitive	motion	(with	less	access	to	an	efference	copy	command)	the	corresponding	
mean	threshold	was	85+59	=	134ms,	indicating	a	21ms	improvement	attributable	to	the	
availability	of	a	clear	onset	of	the	movement	(efference	copy).	
2.5.1.	An	unnatural	perspective	reduces	the	ability	to	detect	a	delay	
	 Perception	of	the	relative	timing	of	visual	and	non-visual	cues	to	hand	motion	
depends	on	whether	one	is	viewing	in	a	"self"	(egocentric)	or	"other"	(allocentric)	
perspective.		All	conditions	provided	the	participant	with	an	efference	copy	of	their	
movement,	which	is	deemed	as	intrinsically	important	in	identifying	agency	and	self	
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(Gallagher,	2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2006).	However,	when	movements	were	viewed	in	a	
“plausible	self"	perspective,	there	was	a	higher	sensitivity	to	delay	between	visual	and	
non-visual	cues,	suggesting	an	enhanced	sense	of	ownership	(Gallagher,	2000)	and	a	
better	ability	to	match	the	image	presented	on	the	screen	in	an	egocentric	perspective	
to	the	visual	motion	expected.	Participants	performed	best	(regardless	of	the	type	of	
movement)	when	the	hand	was	viewed	in	the	self	or	plausible	self-perspective.	This	is	in	
line	with	previous	research	which	revealed	that	the	rubber	hand	illusion	was	not	
effective	when	the	observer	saw	the	rubber	hand	in	a	spatially	or	anatomically	
incongruent	posture	(Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	Holmes	&	Spence,	2007).		The	pattern	
of	performance	for	our	cross-modal	task	replicates	a	similar	pattern	of	performance	
found	in	the	detection	of	self	while	viewing	static	images	in	which	performance	was	best	
when	images	were	presented	in	a	self	(or	egocentric)	perspective	(Conson	et	al.,	2010).	
However,	this	study	used	only	a	subjective	method	of	report.	We	conclude	that	
variation	in	temporal	synchrony	discrimination	provides	quantitative	evidence	for	an	
internal	representation	of	the	body	providing	an	“expected”	perspective	that	can	be	
matched	to	what	is	actually	seen.			
2.5.2.	The	contribution	of	a	clear	efferent	component	
	 Discrete	motion	is	associated	with	more	efferent	activity	and	a	sharper	onset	of	
that	activity	than	is	present	while	maintaining	a	repetitive,	continuous	movement	
(Spencer	et	al.,	2007).	Sensitivity	for	detecting	a	delay	in	visual	feedback	was	greater	for	
discrete	movements	thus	suggesting	a	role	of	efference	copy	("forward	model";	Wolpert,	
1997).	Delays	could	be	detected	on	average	22ms	earlier	if	the	movement	was	discrete.	
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We	thus	conclude	that	having	such	a	clean	efferent	component	may	have	made	it	
possible	to	detect	shorter	delays	between	the	“efferent	plus	proprioceptive”	and	the	
visual	feedback.	This	is	reminiscent	of	the	29ms	advantage	for	detecting	an	active	rather	
than	a	passive	finger	movement	measured	by	Winter	et	al.,	(2008)	and	Lau	et	al.,	(2004).	
Of	course	this	advantage	would	have	been	constant	across	perspectives.	
2.5.3.	Dominant	versus	non-dominant	hand	
	 Participants	were	most	sensitive	at	detecting	a	delay	when	viewing	their	
dominant	hand	making	a	discrete	movement	compared	to	a	continuous	movement.	
Further,	we	found	that	participants	showed	less	of	a	difference	in	performance	between	
the	“plausible	self”	conditions	(self	perspective	and	y-reflection)	during	a	discrete	
movement	when	performing	that	movement	with	the	non-dominant	hand.	Thus	
subjects	were	best	at	cross-modal	asynchrony	detection	when	moving	their	dominant	
hand	in	a	discrete	movement.	This	is	consistent	with	previous	self	recognition	
experiments	which	indicated	superior	recognition	of	movement	of	the	dominant	hand	
(Conson	et	al.,	2010)	and	the	Body	Specificity	Hypothesis	(Casasanto,	2009).			
	 It	is	possible	that	when	participants	perform	a	continuous	movement	(typical	for	
bimanual	tasks,	Swinnen,	2002)	they	consider	the	right	and	left	hands	as	yoked	or	
working	in	tandem.	Under	these	conditions,	the	advantage	would	be	compatible	with	
our	observation	that	participants	did	not	show	a	difference	between	the	two	“plausible	
self”	(self	and	y-reflection)	perspectives	during	continuous	movements	performed	with	
the	non-dominant	hand.	In	contrast,	during	the	discrete	movements,	which	are	typical	
of	goal-directed	movements,	participants	may	consider	the	left	and	right	hands	as	
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different/separate.	Goal-directed	movements	are	typically	initiated	and	performed	by	
the	dominant	hand	because	they	often	require	greater	precision	(Bryden	et	al.,	2000).	
	
	 Our	results	provide	further	evidence	that	handedness	could	possibly	define	the	
reference	frame	for	egocentrically	centered	body	representation	and	create	different	
representations	of	“action-and	body-related	information”	(Conson	et	al.,	2010).	Past	
neuroimaging	research	has	shown	that	the	dominant	hand	provides	the	basis	for	left	
and	right	handers	having	different	patterns	of	activation	in	areas	of	the	visual	cortex	
that	are	specifically	related	to	body	(Willems	et	al.,	2010;	Willems	et	al.,	2009a;	Willems	
et	al.,	2009b).		
2.5.4.	Neural	correlates	of	self	recognition	
	 The	discovery	of	an	area	in	the	brain	responsive	to	views	of	the	body	
(extrastriate	body	area:	EBA;	Downing	et	al.,	2011)	has	provided	a	possible	neural	
substrate	for	how	the	body	may	be	represented	in	the	brain.	The	EBA	responds	
selectively	to	views	of	human	body	parts	regardless	of	whether	they	are	presented	as	
photographs,	line	drawings,	stick	figures,	silhouettes,	or	still	images	depicting	bodies	in	
motion	(see	review	in	Peelen,	2007).	It	does	not	respond	selectively	based	on	
perspective,	lending	doubt	as	to	whether	it	may	be	involved	in	representing	one’s	own	
body.	However,	EBA	activity	has	been	correlated	with	motor	imagery	of	the	movements	
of	a	limb	suggesting	that	integration	of	visual,	efference,	and	proprioceptive	information	
tantalizingly	suggestive	of	an	involvement	in	creating	a	representation	of	one’s	body	in	
the	brain	(Astafiev	et	al.,	2004).	We	suggest	that	the	EBA	may	be	particularly	active	
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during	the	combination	of	agency	and	ownership	employed	in	this	study,	possibly	
underpinning	the	enhanced	sensitivity	to	discrepancy	between	motor	and	visual	
correlates	of	finger	movements	when	viewed	in	the	natural	perspective.	Another	area	
that	might	be	involved	in	the	recognition	of	these	finger	actions	is	in	the	parietal.	
Reduction	of	activity	in	parietal	and	frontal	cortices	has	been	correlated	with	difficulties	
in	recognizing	self	actions	in	schizophrenia	(Maruff	et	al.,	2005).	
2.5.5.	Conclusion	
	 We	manipulated	the	recognition	of	“self”	by	varying	the	visual	perspective	in	
which	participants	saw	their	movements	and	the	quality	of	efferent	information	
available	by	varying	the	nature	of	the	movement.	Overall,	we	find	that	egocentric	
perspectives	of	self	are	very	important.	We	are	able	to	discriminate	asynchrony	from	
our	proprioceptive	information	and	visually	presented	information	more	efficiently	
when	our	movements	are	seen	in	a	plausible	self	perspective	and	when	efferent	
information	is	most	distinctive	during	a	discrete	movement.	Further,	there	is	a	clear	
difference	in	whether	the	dominant	hand	provides	an	advantage	in	detecting	
asynchrony	during	a	discrete	movement	compared	to	a	continuous	movement.	
Together,	these	data	contribute	to	the	evidence	for	the	roles	of	both	vision	and	
information	about	posture/movement	from	proprioceptive	and	motor	systems	in	the	
development	of	representations	of	self	(body	schema).		
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3.1.	Abstract		
People	are	more	sensitive	at	detecting	asynchrony	between	a	self-generated	movement	
of	the	hand	and	delayed	visual	feedback	when	what	they	see	matches	the	expected	
“self”	perspective	rather	than	an	“other”	perspective	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012).	We	take	
this	as	corresponding	to	the	ability	to	distinguish	self	from	others	and	call	it	the	“self	
advantage”:	a	measure	of	body	ownership.	What	about	views	of	the	body	that	cannot	
be	seen	directly?	Here	we	assessed	the	effect	of	familiarity	of	the	view	of	the	body	on	
the	self	advantage.	Participants	performed	self-generated	hand	and	head	movements	
viewed	directly,	in	a	mirror,	and	from	behind	with	a	variable	delay	added	to	the	visual	
feedback.	Each	view	was	shown	either	in	the	natural	perspective	or	flipped	about	the	
vertical	or	horizontal	axes	to	provide	a	view	from	another	perspective.	Thresholds	for	
detecting	a	delay	in	visual	feedback	were	calculated.	Dependency	of	the	self	advantage	
on	perspective	was	most	evident	for	views	of	the	body	that	are	seen	most	often.	Results	
support	the	importance	of	correlating	visual	feedback	with	movement	information	in	
creating	the	sense	of	body	ownership.	
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3.2.	Introduction	
	 Seeing	and	feeling	a	self-initiated	movement	is	a	strong	indicator	that	the	body	
part	that	we	see	moving	belongs	to	us	(Gallagher,	2000;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005;	Tsakiris	
2010;	Walsh	et	al.,	2011).	This	sense	of	agency	and	the	associated	feeling	of	ownership	
derive	from	a	correlation	between	the	motor	and	proprioceptive	signals	and	the	visual	
feedback	confirming	the	expected	outcome	(Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005;	Tsakiris,	2010).	
Artificially	created	synchrony	between	seeing	and	feeling	an	event	can	trick	us	into	
feeling	ownership	over	rubber	hands	(Botvinick	&	Cohen	1998;	Tsakiris	&	Haggard,	
2005;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2010)	and	even	inanimate	objects	(Armel	&	Ramachandran,	2003).	
Temporal	synchrony	alone,	however,	is	not	sufficient	for	knowing	what	is	self.		We	
usually	experience	our	body	and	its	movements	from	a	first-person	(egocentric)	
perspective	and	from	this	we	build	up	an	expected	view	of	ourselves,	constrained	by	
anatomical	limits	and	by	how	much	of	our	body	we	can	ever	see.		Here	we	investigate	
the	significance	of	visual	perspective	of	self-generated	movement	on	body	ownership	of	
views	of	the	body	that	cannot	normally	be	seen	and	for	which	we	therefore	have	no	
chance	to	build	up	an	expected	view.		
	 Matching	the	consequences	of	our	actions	with	what	we	expect	is	an	important	
part	of	controlling	our	actions.	Information	comes	from	proprioception	and	from	an	
efferent	copy	of	the	motor	command	signal,	both	of	which	can	be	matched	to	visual	
feedback.	The	successful	completion	of	this	loop	provides	a	basis	for	constructing	and	
updating	the	perception	of	self.	When	a	person	views	their	hand	from	an	anatomically	
plausible	perspective	they	are	better	at	making	laterality	judgements	(Parsons,	1994;	
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Fiorio	et	al.,	2007;	Dyde	et	al.,	2011),	self-other	judgements	(Conson	et	al.,	2010),	finger	
movements	to	targets	(Sutter	&	Müsseler,	2010),	and	at	detecting	multisensory	
asynchrony	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012)	than	they	are	when	the	hand	is	seen	in	an	
anatomically	implausible	perspective.	Furthermore,	the	effectiveness	of	body	ownership	
illusions,	such	as	the	rubber	hand	illusion,	is	lessened	if	the	rubber	hand	is	not	at	least	
approximately	aligned	with	the	actual	hand	(Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	Holmes	&	
Spence,	2007).	This	suggests	that	a	uniquely	egocentric	visual	perspective	is	required	to	
generate	the	feeling	of	ownership	and	self	identity.	Is	there	an	“anatomically	plausible”	
perspective	for	body	parts	that	cannot	be	seen	directly?	We	consider	the	front	and	back	
of	the	head.	Neither	view	can	be	seen	directly,	but	we	are	familiar	with	the	view	of	the	
front	of	the	head	because	of	our	daily	use	of	mirrors.	Is	this	view	adequate	to	provide	a	
quantifiable	sense	of	identifying	the	face	in	the	mirror	as	our	self?	
	 The	link	between	the	mirror	and	the	self	is	one	that	has	been	made	since	ancient	
times	(Bartsch,	2006)	and	the	ability	to	identify	the	person	in	the	mirror	as	oneself	has	
been	used	as	evidence	that	humans	(and	some	non-human	primates)	demonstrate	self-
awareness	(Gallup,	1970;	Bertenthal	&	Fischer,	1978;	Nielsen	et	al.,	2006).		The	process	
by	which	one	equates	an	image	in	the	mirror	to	oneself	involves	prior	experience	in	
which	the	visual	information	seen	in	a	mirror	is	correlated	with	other	sensorimotor	
information	about	movement	or	tactile	information	experienced	for	example	while	
shaving,	combing	one’s	hair,	or	putting	on	makeup.		This	is,	in	essence,	similar	to	how	
we	use	multisensory	cues	in	creating	the	sense	of	ownership	over	other	body	parts	but	
with	one	integral	difference.	The	difference	is	that	we	must	correlate	these	
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sensorimotor	experiences	with	visual	information	seen	now	from	an	allocentric	
perspective.	Therefore,	interpreting	the	image	in	a	mirror	is	a	special	case	that	in	some	
sense	combines	both	egocentric	and	allocentric	perspectives.			
	 Measuring	the	tolerance	of	temporal	mismatch	between	visual	feedback,	efferent	
copy,	and	proprioceptive	information	concerning	self-generated	movement	can	be	used	
as	a	measure	of	body	ownership	(Daparti	et	al.,	1997;	Franck	et	al.,	2001;	Hoover	&	
Harris,	2012).		When	sensory	information	matches	the	expected	self	perspective,	it	
provides	a	signature	self	advantage	in	which	the	asynchrony	can	be	detected	about	
40ms	sooner	than	when	viewed	from	some	other	perspective.	Using	the	self	advantage	
as	a	probe,	we	asked	whether,	when	you	see	yourself	in	a	mirror	or	from	an	unfamiliar	
viewpoint,	do	you	truly	attribute	what	you	see	as	being	yourself?	Using	a	live	video	to	
which	we	could	add	delays,	we	had	participants	view	movements	of	their	hand	and	
head	as	if	seen	from	three	different	viewpoints:	the	direct	view	(hand	movements	
viewed	as	if	looking	down	at	the	hand);	the	mirror	view	(hand	and	head	movements	
viewed	as	if	looking	in	the	mirror)	and	the	behind	view	(the	same	hand	and	head	
movements	as	in	the	mirror	but	viewed	as	if	from	behind).		Each	of	these	five	live	videos	
was	presented	in	the	“natural”	or	expected	perspective	described	above	or	with	the	
video	flipped	around	the	horizontal,	vertical	or	both	axes	to	simulate	looking	at	the	head	
or	hand	of	another	person;	that	is,	to	switch	from	an	egocentric	(self)	to	an	allocentric	
(other)	perspective.	If	the	natural,	unflipped	view	were	regarded	as	“self”	then,	
following	the	logic	of	Hoover	and	Harris	(2012),	there	should	be	a	self	advantage	in	
which	smaller	asynchronies	can	be	detected	than	in	the	flipped	views.	
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3.3.	Materials	and	Methods	
3.3.1.	Participants	
	 10	right-handed	adults	(7	females,	3	males),	with	a	mean	age	of	29.8	(±	5	SD)	years,	
participated	in	this	study.	All	participants	took	part	in	all	five	blocks	of	the	experiment	
and	gave	their	informed	consent.	The	experiment	was	approved	by	the	York	University	
office	of	research	ethics	and	followed	the	guidelines	of	the	Declaration	of	Helsinki.	
Handedness	was	determined	by	an	adapted	version	of	the	Edinburgh	Handedness	
Inventory	(Oldfield,	1971).	
3.3.2.	Apparatus	and	camera	viewpoints	
	 For	hand	movements	seen	in	the	direct	view,	participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	
chair	at	a	table	with	their	head	on	a	chin	rest	50	cm	away	from	a	LCD	display	(HP	
Fv583AA	20”	widescreen	monitor;	1600	x	900	pixels;	5ms	refresh	response	time)	
centred	at	eye	level.	They	placed	their	hand	on	the	table	shielded	by	a	black	cloth.	A	
PlayStation	Eye	camera	(SCEI;	resolution	640x480	@	30	Hz)	was	mounted	on	the	front	of	
the	chin	rest	pointing	down	at	their	hand	(Camera	A	in.	Figure	13).	The	camera	was	
angled	to	approximately	capture	the	view	seen	by	participants	looking	down	at	their	
own	hand.		
	 For	the	hand	and	head	movements	seen	in	the	mirror	view,	participants	sat	50cm	
away	from	the	display	and	were	not	restrained	by	a	chin	rest.	The	camera	was	mounted	
to	the	LCD	display	and	angled	to	capture	the	view	as	if	they	were	looking	in	a	mirror	
(Camera	B	in	Figure.	13).		
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	 For	the	hand	and	head	movements	seen	in	the	behind	view,	participants	sat	50cm	
away	from	the	display	and	were	not	restrained	by	the	chin	rest.	The	camera	was	
mounted	on	a	post	positioned	40cm	directly	behind	the	participants’	head	(Camera	C	in	
Figure	13).			
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Figure	13.	Apparatus:	participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	chair	at	a	table	50	cm	from	an	
LCD	display	centered	at	eye	level.	PlayStation	Eye	cameras	(see	text)	were	used.	Camera	
A	was	mounted	on	the	front	of	the	chin	rest	and	pointed	down	at	the	participant’s	hand,	
Camera	B	was	mounted	on	the	LCD	display	pointed	at	the	participant’s	face,	and	
Camera	C	was	mounted	on	a	post	directly	behind	the	participant	pointed	at	the	
participant’s	back.	Insets	show	the	view	on	the	monitor	for	each	camera.		
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3.3.3.	Introducing	a	delay	in	the	display	
	 The	video	signal	from	the	USB	camera	was	fed	into	a	computer	(iMac	11.2,	mid	
2010),	read	by	MATLAB	(version	R2009_b)	and	played	through	the	LCD	screen	at	either	
a	minimal	system	delay,	or	with	an	added	delay	of	between	33	and	264ms.	To	calibrate	
the	system	we	had	the	camera	view	a	flashing	LED	and	compared	the	voltage	across	it	
with	its	appearance	on	the	screen	measured	by	a	light	sensitive	diode.	This	revealed	a	
system	delay	of	85ms	±	one-half	camera	refresh	duration	and	confirmed	the	delay	
values	we	introduced	by	the	software.		
3.3.4.	Movements	
	 For	all	hand	movements,	participants	performed	a	single	flexion	of	the	right	index	
finger	through	approximately	2cm	both	when	their	hand	was	on	the	table	or	held	up	by	
the	side	of	their	head.	They	made	the	movement	as	soon	as	they	saw	their	hand	on	the	
screen	in	a	given	trial.	Participants	avoided	touching	the	table,	other	fingers,	or	their	
face	with	their	index	finger	during	the	movement	so	as	to	not	introduce	additional	
tactile	cues.	For	the	head	movements,	participants	performed	a	single,	small	roll	of	the	
head	of	approximately	5°	to	either	the	left	or	the	right	while	looking	straight	ahead.	To	
reduce	between-subject	differences	in	the	speed	and	type	of	movement,	all	participants	
went	through	a	15-trial	practice	phase	for	each	of	the	movements	during	which	the	
experimenter	observed	and	corrected	movement.	
3.3.5.	Manipulating	the	visual	perspective	
	 In	order	to	display	the	movements	in	the	four	perspectives,	video	images	were	
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flipped	and	delayed	using	the	Psychophysics	Toolbox	extension	of	Matlab	subroutine	
PsychVideoDelayLoop.	This	program	implemented	a	realtime	video	feedback	loop	in	
which	the	video	images	could	be	flipped	about	the	horizontal,	vertical,	both	or	neither	
axes.	Delays	were	introduced	in	33ms	increments	(Brainard,	1997;	Pelli,	1997)	to	match	
the	rate	of	image	capture	of	the	camera.	These	manipulations	are	illustrated	as	inserts	
in	Figures.	14	and	15.		
3.3.6.	Procedure	
	 To	explore	temporal	synchrony	detection,	a	two-interval	forced	choice	paradigm	
was	used.	Each	trial	consisted	of	two	1s	periods	separated	by	an	inter-stimulus	interval	
of	100ms.	One	interval	contained	a	minimal-delay	presentation	of	the	movement	while	
the	other	contained	a	delayed	presentation.	Which	presentation	was	displayed	first	was	
chosen	randomly.	There	were	nine	possible	differences	in	visual	delay	between	the	two	
periods:	33,	66,	99,	132,	165,	198,	231,	264,	and	297ms	(corresponded	to	an	integral	
number	of	camera	frames).	Participants	responded	by	means	of	foot	pedals	(Yamaha	
FC5).	They	kept	their	feet	on	the	foot	pedals	for	the	entirety	of	the	block	and	raised	
their	left	foot	to	indicate	that	the	delay	was	in	the	first	period	or	their	right	to	indicate	
the	second	period.			
	 Each	of	the	five	movement/viewpoint	combinations	were	run	in	separate	blocks.	
For	each	block,	the	nine	visual	delays	were	presented	eight	times	for	each	of	the	four	
perspectives	(flip	conditions)	in	a	random	order	resulting	in	a	total	of	9x8x4=288	trials.	
Blocks	were	broken	down	into	144	trial	sessions,	each	lasting	approximately	20	minutes.	
The	10	sessions	of	144	trials	were	run	in	a	counterbalanced	order	separated	by	at	least	
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an	hour.	
3.3.7.	Data	analysis	
		 To	compare	performance	across	conditions	we	fitted	a	logistic	function1	to	the	
proportion	of	times	participants	correctly	chose	the	delayed	period	as	a	function	of	the	
delay	using:	
……………………………………................................................(1)	
where	x	is	the	delay,	x0	is	the	75%	threshold	value,	and	b	is	the	standard	deviation.			
	
	 The	statistical	analysis	comprised	of	repeated	measures	analyses	of	variances	
(ANOVAs)	and	paired	samples	t-tests.	For	ANOVA	tests,	alpha	was	set	at	P	<	0.05.	All	a	
priori	multiple	comparisons	were	performed	using	one-tailed	Student’s	T	tests	and	
corrected	using	the	false	discovery	rate	P	values	(Benjamini	&	Hochberg,	1995).	
	
3.4.	Results	
	 Figure	14	shows	the	proportion	of	times	participants	correctly	identified	the	
interval	with	the	delay	plotted	as	a	function	of	the	total	delay	(system	delay	plus	added	
delay)	averaged	across	10	participants	for	each	condition.	Psychometric	functions	are	
plotted	through	these	average	data.	Mean	thresholds	are	shown	in	Table	3.		
																																																									
1	In	the	published	version	the	function	was	incorrectly	named	cumulative	Gaussian	
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Table	3.		Mean	thresholds	and	standard	errors	for	the	hand	and	head	movements	tested		
	
The	values	were	obtained	by	adding	the	system	delay	(85	ms)	to	the	added	delay.	
	
3.4.1.	Discriminating	visual	delays	for	hand	movements	
		 A	one-way	repeated	measures	ANOVA	revealed	a	significant	main	effect	of	
perspective	when	participants	viewed	their	hand	movements	in	the	direct	view	(F(3,	27)	=	
9.45,	P	=	0.01,	ηp2	=	0.51;	see	Figure	14A).	The	threshold	for	detecting	the	delay	was	
significantly	lower	for	the	natural	(unflipped)	perspective	(M	±	SE	=	126	±	7	ms)	
compared	to	the	other	perspectives	(vertical	axis	flip	M	±	SE	=	138	±	8	ms,	M	±	SE	
difference	=	12	±	5	ms,	P	=	0.02;	horizontal	axis	flip	M	±	SE	=	148	±	9	ms,	M	±	SE	
difference	=	22	±	7	ms,	P	=	0.01;	and	both	axes	flip	M	±	SE	=	144	±	8	ms,	M	±	SE	
difference	=	18	±	6	ms,	P	=	0.01)	thus	confirming	the	self	advantage	(Hoover	&	Harris,	
2012).	
	
	 Interestingly,	the	same	effect	of	perspective	was	found	when	participants	made	
hand	movements	while	looking	at	their	hand	raised	up	beside	their	head	in	the	mirror	
view	(F(3,	27)	=	4.12,	P	=	0.02,	ηp2	=	0.31;	see	Figure	14B).	Again,	the	threshold	was	lower	
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for	the	natural	(unflipped)	perspective	(M	±	SE	=	141	±	6	ms)	compared	to	the	other	
perspectives	(vertical	axis	flip	M	±	SE	=	173	±	13	ms,	M	±	SE	difference	=	32	±	11	ms,	P	=	
0.03;	horizontal	axis	flip	M	±	SE	=	167	±	14	ms,	M	±	SE	difference	=	26	±	13	ms,	P	=	0.03;	
and	both	axes	flip	M	±	SE	=	184	±	18	ms,	M	±	SE	difference	=	43	±	18	ms,	P	=	0.03).	That	
is,	the	view	of	the	hand	in	the	mirror	was	still	associated	with	a	perspective-dependent	
self	advantage.	There	was,	however,	no	such	self	advantage	when	participants	viewed	
their	hand	movements	in	the	behind	view	where	thresholds	for	detecting	asynchrony	
were	similar	across	all	perspectives	(F(3,	27)	=	1.32,	P	=	0.29,	ηp2	=	0.13;	see	Figure	14c).	
	
	 Analysis	of	the	standard	deviations	of	the	psychometric	functions	showed	no	
significant	differences	between	the	perspectives	for	the	direct	and	mirror	views	(F(3,	28)	=	
1.11,	P	=	0.36	and	F(3,28)	=	0.88,	P	=	0.46	respectively).	There	was,	however,	a	just-
significant	effect	of	perspective	for	the	behind	view	(F(3,28)	=	2.64,	p	=	0.05)	where	the	
vertical	axis	flip	slope	was	considerably	lower	(M	±	SE	=		17	±	4	ms;	solid	light	curve	in	
Figure	14C)	than	the	three	other	slopes	(unflipped	M	±	SE	=		36	±	5	ms;	horizontal	axis	
flip	M	±	SE	=		42	±	8	ms;	and	both	axes	flip	M	±	SE	=		41	±	7	ms).		
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Figure	14.	Detecting	an	added	delay	to	the	visual	feedback	for	hand	movements	viewed	
in	the	direct	view	(A),	in	the	mirror	view	(B)	and	in	the	behind	view	(C).		Mean	
proportion	correct	is	plotted	as	a	function	of	the	imposed	visual	delay.	The	sigmoidal	
curves	plotted	through	the	data	are	for	the	natural	(unflipped)	perspective	(solid	dark	
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lines	and	filled	inverted	triangles),	the	video	flipped	around	the	vertical	axis	(solid	light	
lines	and	filled	circles),	flipped	around	the	horizontal	axis	(dashed	dark	lines	and	filled	
squares),	and	flipped	around	both	axes	(dashed	light	lines	and	filled	triangles).	Vertical	
lines	represent	the	75%	threshold	and	the	horizontal	dashed	line	represents	the	75%	
criterion.		Error	bars	represent	SEM.	
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3.4.2.	Discriminating	visual	delays	for	head	movements	
		 A	one-way	repeated	measures	ANOVA	revealed	a	significant	main	effect	of	
perspective	when	participants	saw	their	head	movements	in	the	mirror	view	(F(3,	27)	=	
3.26,	P	=	0.04,	ηp2	=	0.27;	see	Figure	15A).	The	threshold	for	the	natural	(unflipped)	
perspective	(that	is,	the	view	expected	when	looking	in	a	mirror)	was	lower	(M	±	SE	=	
152	±	7	ms)	than	for	the	other	perspectives	(vertical	axis	flip	M	±	SE	=	182	±	12	ms,	M	±	
SE	difference	=	30	±	9	ms,	P	=	0.03;	horizontal	axis	flip	M	±	SE	=	177	±	15	ms,	M	±	SE	
difference	=	25	±	12	ms,	P	=	0.03;	and	both	M	±	SE	=	190	±	16	ms,	M	±	SE	difference	=	38	
±	16	ms,	P	=	0.03):	the	self	advantage	prevailed.	There	was,	however,	no	such	self	
advantage	when	participants	saw	their	head	movements	in	the	behind	view	(F(3,	27)	=	
0.50,	P	=	0.68,	ηp2	=	0.05;	see	Figure	15B).			
	
	 Analysis	of	the	standard	deviations	of	the	psychometric	functions	showed	no	
significant	difference	between	perspectives	for	the	mirror	and	behind	views	(F(3,	28)	=	
1.393,	p	=	0.27	and	F(3,28)	=	0.81,	p	=	0.5	respectively).		
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Figure	15.	Detecting	an	added	delay	to	the	visual	feedback	for	head	movements	viewed	
in	the	mirror	view	(A)	and	in	the	behind	view	(B).		Mean	proportion	correct	is	plotted	as	
a	function	of	the	imposed	visual	delay.	The	sigmoidal	curves	plotted	through	the	data	
are	for	the	natural	(unflipped)	perspective	(solid	dark	lines	and	filled	inverted	triangles),	
with	the	video	flipped	around	the	vertical	axis	(solid	light	lines	and	filled	circles),	flipped	
around	the	horizontal	axis	(dashed	dark	lines	and	filled	squares),	and	flipped	around	
both	axes	(dashed	light	lines	and	filled	triangles).	Vertical	lines	represent	the	75%	
threshold	and	the	horizontal	dashed	line	represents	the	75%	criterion.		Error	bars	
represent	SEM.	
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3.4.3.	Is	temporal	delay	better	detected	for	views	of	the	body	experienced	most	often?		
	 We	compared	the	performance	at	detecting	delays	in	visual	feedback	for	the	
natural	(unflipped)	perspectives	(solid	dark	lines	in	Figure	14A-C	and	Figure	15A,B)	for	
each	movement	and	viewpoint.	For	hand	movements,	a	one-way	repeated	measures	
ANOVA	revealed	a	significant	main	effect	of	view	(F(2,	18)	=	13.22,	P	<	0.001,	ηp2	=	0.6)	
with	a	linear	trend	between	the	natural,	mirror,	and	behind	views	of	the	body	(F(1,	9)	=	
35.38,	P	<	0.001,	ηp2	=	0.8).		The	mean	thresholds	for	the	natural	perspectives	differed	
from	one	another	(direct	view	was	15	±	5ms	lower	than	the	mirror	view,	P	=	0.02;	direct	
view	was	34	±	6ms	lower	than	the	behind	view,	P	<	0.001;	and	the	mirror	view	was	19	±	
8ms	lower	than	the	behind	view,	P	=	0.02).	Thresholds	for	detecting	asynchrony	
between	hand	movement	and	visual	feedback	were	lowest	when	the	body	was	seen	
from	the	direct	view.	Analysis	of	the	standard	deviations	of	the	psychometric	functions	
showed	no	significant	difference	between	the	views	(F(2,	18)	=	0.51,	p	=	0.61).		
	 A	similar	story	was	found	for	head	movements	where	a	paired	t-test	showed	that	
threshold	for	the	natural	(unflipped)	perspective	was	20	±	10ms	lower	when	the	head	
movement	was	seen	in	the	mirror	view	than	when	it	was	seen	in	the	behind	view	(t	(9)	=	-
1.92,	P	=	0.04).	Analysis	of	the	standard	deviations	of	the	psychometric	functions	
showed	no	significant	difference	between	the	views	(t(9)	=	0.36,	p	=	0.72).	
3.4.4.	Differences	between	hand	and	head	movements	
	 Repeated	measures	ANOVA’s	revealed	no	significant	difference	between	detecting	
delays	for	head	or	hand	movements	seen	in	the	mirror	view	(F(1,9)	=	1.93,	p	=	0.2,	=0.18)	
or	in	the	behind	view	(F(1,	9)	=	3.49,	p	=	0.10,	=	0.279),	although	the	thresholds	for	the	
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head	movements	ranged	from	6	to	26ms	longer	than	the	thresholds	for	the	hand	
movements.	
	
3.5.	Discussion	
This	study	demonstrates	significant	variation	in	the	ability	to	detect	a	temporal	
asynchrony	between	a	movement	and	its	visual	feedback	depending	on	the	perspective	
from	which	the	movement	was	viewed	(manipulated	by	the	various	flips	of	the	video	
image	we	employed)	and	previous	experience	of	the	view.	A	self	advantage	in	detecting	
delays	viewed	from	the	natural	perspective	was	evident	only	for	the	direct	view	(looking	
down	at	the	hand)	or	viewing	indirectly	(looking	at	the	hand	or	head	in	the	mirror),	and	
not	for	a	view	of	the	body	that	is	never	seen	(looking	at	the	hand	or	head	from	behind).	
We	interpret	the	variation	of	performance	across	viewing	perspectives	as	reflecting	
when	the	visual	feedback	matches	the	internal	representation	of	the	body	and	the	view	
is	thus	recognized	as	being	of	the	“self”.		
	 There	was	no	clear	systematic	variation	in	the	slopes	(standard	deviations)	of	the	
psychometric	functions	with	perspective	for	any	of	the	viewpoints.	In	particular,	the	
natural	perspective	was	not	associated	with	lower	standard	deviations	than	the	other	
perspectives.	Neither	was	there	a	systematic	variation	in	the	standard	deviations	
between	the	views.	This	suggests	that	the	difficulty	of	the	task	was	equivalent	in	all	
conditions	and	that	there	was	no	variation	in	the	reliability	of	the	sensory	information	
involved.	Rather,	the	self	advantage	results	instead	from	the	information	needed	to	the	
task	being	available	faster.				
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	 The	self	advantage	in	detecting	delay	in	visual	feedback	about	a	movement	
when	it	is	viewed	in	the	natural	perspective	is	an	objective	measure	of	body	ownership	
through	agency	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012).	Variation	in	performance	with	perspective	has	
also	been	found	in	self-other	recognition	of	hands	and	feet	(Saxe	et	al.,	2006;	Conson	et	
al.,	2010),	when	judging	which	hand	is	portrayed	in	a	static	image	(Parsons,	1994;	Dyde	
et	al.,	2011),	and	for	the	rubber	hand	illusion	(Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	Holmes	&	
Spence,	2007).	So	interpreting	the	self	advantage	as	indicating	ownership	is	clear	when	
looking	directly	at	one’s	own	body.	But	why	might	a	similar	advantage	be	given	to	views	
of	the	face	seen	in	a	mirror?	
3.5.1.	Mirror	viewing	
	 Identifying	the	face	in	the	mirror	as	being	one’s	own	has	long	been	regarded	as	
an	ultimate	test	of	self-recognition.	Thus,	countless	hours	have	been	spent	trying	to	get	
various	species	to	indicate	that	they	can	recognize	themselves	in	mirrors	by,	for	
example,	seeing	if	they	could	remove	tags	that	could	only	be	seen	in	a	mirror	(Gallup,	
1970;	Bertenthal	&	Fischer,	1978;	Nielsen	et	al.,	2006).	Of	course	humans	can	perform	
this	task	with	ease,	but	the	present	study	is	the	first	objective	demonstration	that	the	
face	in	the	mirror	is	given	preferential	treatment.		
	 Mirrors	allow	us	to	match	personal	sensorimotor	events	with	simultaneous	
visual	information	seen	from	an	allocentric	perspective.		Since	mirrors	are	used	on	a	
daily	basis	it	is	likely	that	we	create	an	internal	representation	of	our	face	that	combines	
egocentric	and	allocentric	perspectives.		Interestingly,	performance	at	detecting	delays	
while	viewing	the	natural	perspective	in	the	mirror	view	(hand	141ms;	head	152ms)	falls	
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between	performance	while	viewing	the	direct	(hand	126ms)	and	the	behind	(hand	
160ms;	head	172ms)	views	in	the	natural	perspective.	This	indicates	that	there	is	
possibly	less	of	a	sense	of	ownership	for	the	face-in-the-mirror	than	for	the	hands.	Faces	
are	highly	ecological	and	provide	very	strong	cues	to	self-identification	relying	heavily	on	
featural	configuration.		Thus,	when	a	face	is	inverted	it	is	harder	to	identify	changes	in	
these	configurations	(Yin,	1969;	Leder	&	Bruce,	2000;	Thompson,	1980).	Our	data	
suggest	that	when	the	face-in-the-mirror	is	viewed	upside	down,	the	consequent	
reduction	in	performance	is	a	quantifiable	estimate	of	this	reduction	in	identifiability	
and	ownership.		
3.5.2.	Viewing	invisible	views	
	 There	was	no	self	advantage	when	detecting	visual	feedback	asynchrony	for	
head	or	hand	movements	viewed	in	the	behind	view.	This	suggests	an	absence	of	an	
internal	visual	representation	of	this	viewpoint	of	our	body	–	all	such	presentations	
could	best	be	considered	as	“other”.		Of	course,	we	cannot	see	ourselves	from	behind	
so	it	is	unlikely	that	we	would	recognize	the	image	as	corresponding	to	ourselves.	But	
what	then	does	this	mean	for	our	sense	that	the	back	is	part	of	our	self?	Recent	studies	
have	suggested	a	special	connection	between	the	front	and	back	of	the	body	(D'Amour	
&	Harris,	2014).	Perhaps	non-visible	parts	of	the	body	are	pinned	to	surfaces	that	are	
visible;	but	this	is	not	enough	to	provide	a	self	advantage.		
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3.5.3.	Conclusion	
	 We	have	examined	three	views	of	the	body:	the	direct	view	of	the	hand,	the	
mirror	view	of	the	face	and	hand,	and	the	view	from	behind.	We	have	demonstrated	a	
progressively	weaker	effect	of	varying	the	visual	perspective	from	which	these	views	are	
seen	in	the	ability	to	detect	temporal	asynchrony	between	self-initiated	movements	and	
visual	feedback	concerning	the	movement	for	these	three	views.	We	interpret	this	as	
indicating	that	body	parts	that	can	be	seen	directly	are	treated	as	more	part	of	the	self	
than	other	body	parts.	We	conclude	that	the	sense	of	self	is	linked	with	the	sight	of	self.		
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4.1.	Abstract	
People	are	more	sensitive	at	detecting	asynchrony	between	a	self-generated	movement	
and	visual	feedback	concerning	that	movement	when	the	movement	is	viewed	from	a	
first-person	perspective.	We	call	this	the	“self	advantage”	and	interpret	it	as	an	
objective	measure	of	self	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012;	2014).	Here	we	ask	if	disruption	of	the	
vestibular	system	in	healthy	individuals	affects	the	self	advantage.	Participants	
performed	finger	movements	while	viewing	their	hand	in	a	first-person		(“self”)	or	third-
person	(“other”)	perspective	and	indicated	which	of	two	periods	(one	with	minimum	
delay	and	the	other	with	an	added	delay	of	33	–	264ms)	was	delayed.	Their	sensitivity	to	
the	delay	was	calculated	from	the	psychometric	functions	obtained.	During	the	testing,	
disruptive	galvanic	vestibular	stimulation	(GVS)	was	applied	in	five-minute	blocks	
interleaved	with	five	minutes	of	no	stimulation	for	a	total	of	40	minutes.	We	confirmed	
the	self	advantage	under	no	stimulation	(31ms).	In	the	presence	of	disruptive	GVS	this	
advantage	disappeared	and	there	was	no	longer	a	difference	in	performance	between	
perspectives.	The	threshold	delay	for	the	“other”	perspective	was	not	affected	by	the	
GVS.		These	results	suggest	that	an	intact	vestibular	signal	is	required	to	distinguish	“self”	
from	“other”	and	to	maintain	a	sense	of	body	ownership.		
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4.2.	Introduction	
	 The	representation	of	body	in	the	brain,	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	body	
schema,	is	created	through	convergence	of	proprioceptive,	haptic,	and	visual	signals	
(see:	Serino	&	Haggard,	2010	for	a	review).	Recently	the	vestibular	system	has	been	
implicated	in	a	previously	unsuspected	role	in	the	development	of	the	body	schema	
(Lopez,	Schreyer,	Preuss,	&	Mast,	2012).	For	example,	individuals	with	vestibular	
disorders,	such	as	vestibular	vertigo	or	vestibular	deafferentation,	tend	to	misrepresent	
the	size,	shape,	and	location	of	their	body	parts	even	though	the	vestibular	system	
provides	no	information	of	direct	relevance	to	making	these	judgments	(Lopez,	Halje,	&	
Blanke,	2008;	Sang,	Jáuregui-Renaud,	Green,	Bronstein,	&	Gresty,	2006;	Lopez	&	Blanke,	
2007;	Schilder,	1935).		Healthy	individuals	with	no	vestibular	symptoms	can	also	be	
made	to	show	degraded	performance	on	tasks	that	require	knowledge	about	their	body	
and	self	by	adding	temporary,	disruptive	galvanic	vestibular	stimulation	(GVS).	For	
example,	Bresciani	and	colleagues	(2002)	found	that	unilateral	GVS	disrupted	reaching	
movements	toward	the	side	being	stimulated	and	created	a	less	accurate	estimate	of	
where	the	hands	were	in	space.		More	remarkably,	caloric	vestibular	stimulation	affects	
the	ability	to	discern	the	size	and	shape	of	a	participant’s	own	hands	(Lopez	et	al.,	2012)	
and	increases	susceptibility	to	self-attribution	illusions	such	as	the	rubber-hand	illusion	
(Lopez,	Lenggenhager,	&	Blanke,	2010).	Taken	together,	these	observations	suggest	that	
intact	vestibular	background	activity	is	integral	for	creating	and	maintaining	a	coherent	
representation	of	the	self	and	that	losing	this	signal	undermines	a	person’s	perception	
of	self.	However,	reliable,	quantitative	assessments	of	how	a	person	perceives	
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themselves	as	themselves	is	lacking	and	studies	have	generally	been	restricted	to	using	
questionnaires	or	self	report	measures.	
Previous	studies	investigating	self	recognition	during	active	movement	have	
found	misattribution	of	hand	movements	to	another	agent	when	the	participants’	
movements	and	the	other	agents’	movements	(superimposed	over	top	of	their	
movements)	were	similar	and,	in	some	instances,	when	there	were	discrepancies	
between	the	movements	(Nielsen,	1963;	Forneret	&	Jeannerod,	1998;	see	Jeannerod,	
2003	for	a	review).	These	results	suggest	the	importance	placed	upon	visual	cues	when	
making	self/other	judgements.	Visual	perspective,	in	particular,	has	been	shown	to	
modulate	the	ability	to	recognize	our	own	body	parts	from	others’	(van	den	Bos	&	
Jeannerod,	2002;	Conson,	Aromino,	&	Trojano,	2010),	discriminate	between	left	and	
right	hands	(Dyde,	MacKenzie,	&	Harris,	2011),	and	experience	the	rubber-hand	illusion	
(Holmes	&	Spence,	2007).	We	have	previously	shown	that	visual	perspective	also	affects	
the	threshold	for	detecting	a	temporal	mismatch	between	a	self-generated	movement	
(e.g.,	of	the	finger)	and	visual	feedback	of	the	movement	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012;	2014).	
We	found	that	when	body	movements	are	seen	from	a	first-person	perspective	(e.g.,	
when	looking	down	at	your	own	hands)	there	is	a	signature	self	advantage	in	detecting	
the	delay:	asynchrony	is	detected	approximately	40ms	faster	when	viewed	from	this	
“self	perspective”	than	when	movements	are	viewed	from	a	perspective	considered	
third-person	or	other	(e.g.,	upside	down)	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012;	2014).		Self-generated	
movements	provided	participants	with	efferent	information	as	well	as	proprioceptive	
information,	which	are	important	factors	in	determining	whether	you	are	the	agent	of	
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the	action	(Gallagher,	2000;	Farrer	et	al.,	2003;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005).	In	turn,	the	sense	of	
agency	is	an	important	contributor	to	the	sense	of	body	ownership	(Tsakiris	et	al.,	2010).	
The	advantage	in	asynchrony	detection	thresholds	suggests	an	enhanced	sense	of	body	
ownership	when	an	action	is	viewed	in	a	self	perspective.	This	measure	can	therefore	be	
taken	as	an	objective	measure	of	body	ownership.			
Given	that	the	vestibular	system	has	been	linked	to	registering	spatial	and	
temporal	aspects	of	the	self	(Ferrè,	Vagnoni,	&	Haggard,	2013;	Lopez	et	al.,	2008)	we	
examined	whether	disruption	of	vestibular	activity	using	GVS	in	healthy	individuals	
affected	the	self	advantage	in	temporal	asynchrony	detection.		
	
4.3.	Methods	
4.3.1.	Participants		
	 9	right-handed	adults,	with	a	mean	age	of	29	(±	12	SD)	years,	participated	in	this	
study.	The	experiment	was	approved	by	the	York	University	office	of	research	ethics	and	
followed	the	guidelines	of	the	Declaration	of	Helsinki.	Handedness	was	determined	by	
an	adapted	version	of	the	Edinburgh	Handedness	Inventory	(Oldfield,	1971).		
4.3.2.	Galvanic	vestibular	stimulation	
	 The	vestibular	stimulation	consisted	of	a	small	current	applied	through	electrodes	
positioned	on	the	mastoid	processes	behind	the	ears.	A	reference	electrode	was	placed	
in	the	centre	of	the	forehead.	The	electrodes	were	3.25	cm	diameter	round	carbon-
conductor	electrodes	(9000	series	electrodes;	Empi	Recovery	Sciences,	St.	Paul,	
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Minnesota,	USA).	The	vestibular	stimuli	were	generated	by	a	GVS	system	(Good	
Vibrations	Engineering	Ltd.,	Nobleton,	Ontario,	Canada)	controlled	by	a	PC.	Our	
vestibular	stimulus	was	a	sum-of-sines	waveform	with	dominant	frequencies	at	0.16,	
0.32,	0.43,	and	0.61	Hz	(maximum	current	limited	to	+/-	5	mA)	which	has	shown	to	be	
disruptive	to	the	vestibular	system	(MacDougall,	Moore,	Curthoys,	&	Black,	2006;	
Moore	et	al.,	2006).	Bilateral,	bipolar	stimulation	was	applied	in	5-minute	blocks	
interleaved	with	5-minute	blocks	without	stimulation	so	that	data	collected	with	and	
without	GVS	were	interleaved	over	the	total	experimental	time	of	40	minutes.		
4.3.3.	Apparatus	and	stimuli	
	 Participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	chair	at	a	table	with	their	head	on	a	chinrest	50	
cm	away	from	a	LCD	display	(HP	Fv583AA	20”	widescreen	monitor;	1600	x	900	pixels;	5	
ms	refresh	response	time)	centred	at	eye	level	as	shown	in	Figure	16.	They	placed	their	
hand	on	the	table	shielded	from	view	by	a	black	cloth.	A	PlayStation	Eye	camera	(SCEI;	
resolution	640x480	@	30	Hz)	was	mounted	on	the	front	of	the	chinrest	and	pointed	
down	at	their	hand.	The	camera	was	angled	to	capture	the	view	as	seen	from	a	“natural”	
egocentric	perspective	as	if	participants	were	looking	down	at	their	own	hands.		
	 The	video	signal	from	the	camera	was	fed	into	a	computer	(iMAC11,	2,	mid	2010),	
read	by	MATLAB	(version	R2009_b)	and	played	through	the	LCD	screen	at	either	a	
minimal	delay,	or	with	an	added	delay	of	between	33	and	264ms.	To	calibrate	the	
system	we	had	the	camera	view	a	flashing	LED	and	compared	the	voltage	across	it	with	
its	appearance	on	the	screen	measured	by	a	light	sensitive	diode.	This	revealed	a	
minimum	delay	of	85ms	±	one-half	camera	refresh	duration	and	confirmed	the	delay	
	 97	
values	we	introduced	with	the	software.		
	 We	asked	participants	to	perform	a	single	flexion	of	the	right	index	finger	through	
approximately	2cm.	They	made	the	movement	as	soon	as	they	saw	their	hand	on	the	
screen	in	a	given	trial.	Participants	avoided	touching	the	table	or	other	fingers	with	their	
index	finger	during	the	movement	so	as	to	not	introduce	additional	tactile	cues.	To	
reduce	between-subject	differences	in	the	speed	and	type	of	movement,	all	participants	
went	through	a	15-trial	practice	phase	during	which	the	experimenter	observed	and	
corrected	movement	prior	to	testing.	Video	images	were	manipulated	using	the	
Psychophysics	Toolbox	extension	of	MATLAB	subroutine	PsychVideoDelayLoop	(Brainard,	
1997;	Pelli,	1997).	Participants	were	presented	with	two	views	of	their	movements:	1)	a	
“self”	perspective	(the	expected	first-person	perspective),	and	2)	an	“other”	perspective	
(the	unexpected	third-person	perspective	where	the	video	images	are	flipped	around	
the	x	and	y	axes	so	that	it	was	upside	down	and	back	to	front).	Examples	of	these	views	
are	shown	in	insets	in	Figure	17.		
	 98	
	
Figure	16.		Apparatus:	participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	chair	at	a	table	50	cm	from	an	
LCD	screen	centred	at	eye	level.	The	right	hand	was	placed	on	the	table	shielded	from	
direct	view	by	a	black	cloth.	A	Playstation	Eye	camera	was	mounted	on	the	front	of	a	
chinrest	and	pointed	down	to	capture	the	view	as	seen	from	a	natural	self-perspective.	
Two	stimulating	electrodes	were	placed	on	the	mastoid	processes	behind	the	ears	and	
one	reference	electrode	was	placed	on	the	center	of	the	forehead.	The	electrodes	were	
connected	to	a	GVS	generator.	Foot	pedals	were	used	to	make	responses.	
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4.3.4.	Procedure		
	 To	assess	the	thresholds	for	detecting	temporal	synchrony,	a	two-interval	forced	
choice	(2IFC)	discrimination	paradigm	was	used.	Each	trial	consisted	of	two	1s	periods	
separated	by	an	inter-stimulus	interval	of	100ms:	in	one	period	a	minimal-delay	
presentation	of	the	movement	was	shown	and	in	the	other,	the	presentation	was	
delayed	by	a	variable	amount.	Whether	the	minimal-delay	presentation	or	the	delayed	
presentation	was	displayed	first	was	randomly	chosen	by	MATLAB.	There	were	nine	
possible	differences	in	visual	delays	in	any	given	trial:	0,	33,	66,	99,	132,	165,	198,	231,	
and	264ms	corresponding	to	a	delay	of	an	integral	number	of	video	frames.	Participants	
indicated	which	presentation	was	delayed	using	foot	pedals	(Yamaha	FC5):	left	for	first	
and	right	for	second.	The	experiment	was	run	in	a	block	design	where	GVS	was	applied	
in	five-minute	blocks	interleaved	with	five	minutes	of	no	stimulation	for	a	total	of	eight	
blocks	taking	40	minutes	in	total.	Five	participants	started	with	a	control	block	and	4	
participants	started	with	a	GVS	block.	In	total,	the	nine	differences	in	visual	delay	were	
presented	eight	times	for	the	two	visual	perspectives	in	a	random	order	with	and	
without	GVS	resulting	in	a	total	of	288	trials.			
4.3.5.	Data	analysis		
	 To	explore	differences	in	performance	across	conditions	we	fitted	logistic	
functions2	to	the	proportion	of	times	participants	correctly	chose	the	delayed	period	as	
a	function	of	the	delay	using:	
																																																								
2	This	function	was	incorrectly	named	cumulative	Gaussian	in	the	published	version	
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……........................................................................................................................(1)	
where	x	is	the	delay,	x0	is	the	75%	threshold	and	b	is	the	standard	deviation.	The	
statistical	analysis	comprised	of	repeated	measures	analysis	of	variances	(ANOVAs)	and	
paired	t-tests.	For	all	tests,	alpha	was	set	at	P	<	0.05.	
	
4.4.	Results	
	 Figure	17	shows	the	mean	proportion	of	trials	in	which	the	participants	correctly	
identified	the	presentation	with	the	delay,	plotted	as	a	function	of	the	total	delay	
(system	delay	plus	added	delay),	averaged	across	the	nine	participants	for	the	two	
experimental	conditions	(with	and	without	GVS)	and	the	two	perspectives	of	the	
movement	(“self”	and	“other”).	Illustrative	psychometric	functions	are	plotted	through	
these	average	data	for	the	four	conditions.	Threshold	values	for	detecting	the	added	
visual	delay	were	defined	as	the	75%	point	of	this	curve.	Each	participant’s	performance	
was	analysed	separately	for	the	statistical	tests.	The	mean	thresholds	and	standard	
errors	are	shown	in	Table	4.		
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Table	4:	Mean	detection	thresholds	averaged	across	all	participants,	with	SEs.	The	
values	were	obtained	by	adding	the	system	delay	(85	ms)	to	the	delay	added	to	the	
video.	
	
	 A	2x2	repeated	measures	ANOVA	revealed	a	significant	interaction	between	the	
perspective	of	the	hand	(“self”	vs	“other”)	and	whether	GVS	was	applied	or	not,	F(1,	8)	=	
12.54,	P	=	0.008,	ηp2	=	0.61.	In	the	absence	of	GVS,	when	participants	saw	their	hand	in	
the	expected	“self”	perspective	they	were	better	at	detecting	the	delay,	showing	a	self	
advantage	of	29ms	on	average	compared	to	when	the	hand	was	viewed	in	the	“other”	
perspective	(t(8)	=	5.70,	p	=	0.001,	d=	4.03).		The	presence	of	disruptive	GVS	increased	
the	threshold	to	detect	asynchrony	in	the	“self”	perspective	by	32ms	compared	to	the	
no-GVS	condition	(t(8)	=	3.17,	p	=	0.01,	d=		2.24)	thus	eliminating	the	self	advantage	that	
was	apparent	in	the	control	condition.	Critically,	GVS	did	not	affect	performance	while	
participants	viewed	their	movements	in	the	“other”	perspective:	the	GVS	“self”	
perspective	showed	no	significant	difference	in	performance	from	either	the	control	or	
the	GVS	“other”	perspective	(GVS	“self”	vs	GVS	“other”	t(8)	=	0.10,	p	=0.92,	d	=	0.07;	GVS	
“self”	vs	control	“other”	t(8)	=	0.46,		p	=	0.66,	d	=	0.35).		
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Figure	17.		A)	Thresholds	for	detecting	an	imposed	visual	delay	in	the	visual	feedback	
concerning	a	self-generated	movement.	The	mean	proportion	correct	is	plotted	as	a	
function	of	the	imposed	visual	delay.	The	curves	are	psychometric	functions	fitted	
through	the	data	for	the	“self”	perspective	(solid	black	line	and	black	triangles),	the	
“other”	perspective	(dashed	black	line	and	inverted	white	triangles),	GVS	“self”	
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perspective	(solid	grey	line	and	grey	circles),	and	GVS	“other”	perspective	(dashed	grey	
line	and	white	circles).	B)	The	mean	75%	thresholds	averaged	from	the	fits	to	the	
individual	participant’s	data	in	the	control	condition	(black	bars)	and	the	GVS	condition	
(grey	bars)	for	the	“self”	and	“other”	perspectives.	Error	bars	are	SEMs.	n.s		p>	0.05	**	p	
=	0.01	***	p	=	0.001.	
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	 Analysis	of	the	slopes	of	the	psychometric	functions	(b,	see	methods)	showed	no	
significant	effect	(F	(3,	316)	=	2.40,	p	=	0.07),	although	there	was	a	trend	in	which	the	
“self”	perspective	without	GVS	tended	towards	being	lower	(20.3	±	3	ms)	than	the	other	
three	conditions	(GVS	“self”	=	35.9	±	6	ms;	GVS	“other”	=	36.5	±	5	ms;	and	control	
“other”	=	27.9	±	5	ms).		
	
4.5.	Discussion	
	 Here	we	showed	that	disruptive	vestibular	stimulation	affected	the	ability	to	
detect	temporal	asynchrony	between	a	self-generated	movement	and	visual	feedback	
about	the	movement	but	solely	when	self-generated	movement	was	seen	in	the	
expected	“self”	perspective.	We	replicated	our	previous	finding	of	a	self	advantage	
where	one	is	more	sensitive	to	a	temporal	mismatch	when	the	hand	is	shown	in	the	
expected	“self”	perspective	and	showed	that	this	self	advantage	is	completely	abolished	
by	disruptive	GVS.	Since	threshold	for	detecting	a	delay	for	movements	seen	from	the	
“other”	perspective	were	unaffected	by	GVS,	the	GVS	was	clearly	not	exerting	its	effect	
by,	for	example,	degrading	the	visual	scene	by	eye	movements	or	any	other	such	
indirect	influence.	Does	this	effect	indicate	a	reduced	sense	of	body	ownership	or	a	
reduced	sense	of	agency?	
	 The	sense	of	agency	-	the	sense	of	being	in	control	of	your	intended	actions	
(Gallagher,	2000)	-	contributes	to	the	sense	of	body	ownership	(van	den	Bos	&	
Jeannerod,	2002)	but	can	be	dissociated	from	it.	Patients	with	vestibular	disorders	have	
reported	that	they	experience	a	lessened	sense	of	agency	(Sang	et	al.,	2006)	and	sense	
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of	agency	can	be	felt	for	objects	that	are	not	seen	as	part	of	the	body	(such	as	using	a	
computer	mouse	to	control	a	cursor	on	a	screen;	Balslev,	Cole,	&	Miall,	2007).	The	
current	study	required	participants	to	compare	efferent	and	proprioceptive	information	
concerning	the	self-generated	finger	movement	with	visual	information.	It	may	be	that	
the	noisy	vestibular	information	from	the	artificial	vestibular	stimulation	caused	
participants	to	be	less	aware	of	their	movements	–	reducing	the	sense	of	agency.	
However,	one	would	expect	that	if	our	effect	disrupted	the	ability	to	compare	visual	
with	proprioceptive/efferent	signals	(i.e.,	the	sense	of	agency),	both	the	“self”	and	
“other”	perspectives	would	be	equally	affected.	Since	this	was	not	the	case	and	the	
“other”	judgments	were	unaffected,	it	seems	improbable	that	the	disruptive	GVS	
affected	the	sense	of	agency	but	rather	that	our	task	is	probing	the	sense	of	body	
ownership.		
	 The	fact	that	disruptive	vestibular	stimulation	only	affected	performance	when	the	
hand	was	seen	from	the	first-person	perspective	suggests	that	the	vestibular	system	
plays	a	role	in	providing	some	kind	of	grounding	information	to	the	multisensory	
representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.	This	is	in	line	with	other	research	investigating	
the	contribution	of	the	vestibular	system	to	the	ownership	of	a	body	part	seen	in	a	first-
person	perspective.	Ferrè	and	colleagues	(2014)	found	that	in	the	presence	of	vestibular	
stimulation,	participants	were	more	apt	to	identify	characters	drawn	on	their	forehead	
as	being	from	the	self-perspective	rather	than	from	the	third-person	perspective.	This	
propensity	for	responding	to	the	first	person-perspective	during	a	graphesthesia	task	
also	suggests,	but	in	a	more	indirect	way	than	the	present	study,	that	vestibular	inputs	
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are	an	integral	component	of	the	development	of	the	body	representation	in	the	brain.		
	 When	movements	are	seen	in	the	“self”	perspective,	the	self-	advantage	we	
report	here	of	29ms	(comparable	to	the	40ms	we	reported	previously,	Hoover	&	Harris,	
2012),	provides	a	quantitative	example	of	how	the	sense	of	body	ownership	aids	
performance	(Gallagher,	2000).	This	enhancement	suggests	that	participants	are	better	
able	to	detect	temporal	asynchrony	between	making	a	movement	and	seeing	the	
movement	when	the	visual	information	matches	their	internal	representation	of	their	
hand	moving.		When	disruptive	GVS	is	applied,	it	seems	that	the	disruption	of	the	
vestibular	signal	creates	a	reduced	sense	of	body	ownership	–	thus	eliminating	the	self	
advantage.		Under	this	interpretation	our	observation	provides	a	quantitative	measure	
of	the	effect	of	vestibular	input	on	body	ownership	which	is	consistent	with	other	more	
qualitative	reports	of	vestibular	stimulation	leading	to	a	lessened	sense	of	self	(Ferrè	et	
al.,	2014;	Lopez	et	al.,	2008;	Lopez,	2013)	and	being	more	susceptible	to	the	rubber	
hand	illusion	(Lopez	et	al.,	2010).		
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5.1.	Abstract	
Seeing	our	body	from	a	‘self’	perspective	while	performing	a	movement	improves	our	
ability	to	detect	asynchrony	between	the	visual	and	proprioceptive	information	
concerning	that	movement:	a	signature	of	enhanced	body	ownership	referred	to	as	the	
‘self	advantage’.		We	consequently	experience	no	self	advantage	when	seeing	our	body	
from	an	‘other’	perspective.	Here	we	ask	whether	introducing	visuo-tactile	stimulation	
(VTS),	similar	to	that	used	in	the	rubber	hand	illusion	to	invoke	ownership	over	a	
dummy	hand,	would	produce	a	self-advantage	when	viewing	the	body	from	a	typically	
‘other’	perspective.	Prior	to	the	experiment,	participants	watched	a	live	video	of	their	
own	back	using	a	camera	mounted	behind	them	while	their	back	was	tapped	with	a	rod	
for	two	minutes.	The	video	was	either	synchronous	(sVTS)	or	asynchronous	(aVTS)	with	
the	tapping.		Participants	then	raised	their	hands	and	made	a	stereotyped	finger	
movement	that	they	watched	from	the	same	camera	either	in	the	original,	natural	
perspective	or	upside	down.	Participants	indicated	which	of	two	periods	(one	with	
minimum	delay	and	one	with	an	added	delay	of	33	to	264ms)	appeared	delayed.	
Sensitivity	was	calculated	using	psychometric	functions.	The	sVTS	group	showed	a	self-
advantage	of	about	45ms	in	the	natural	visual	condition	compared	to	the	upside	down	
condition,	whereas	the	aVTS	group	showed	no	difference	between	the	two	conditions.	
Synchronous	visuo-tactile	experience	increased	the	feeling	of	ownership	over	a	typically	
‘other’	perspective	in	a	quantifiable	way	indicating	the	multisensory	and	malleable	
nature	of	body	representation.	
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5.2.	Introduction	
The	first-person	perspective	is	our	visual	frame	of	our	body	in	the	world.	It	
provides	us	with	information	about	body	ownership	(Gallagher,	2000)	and	our	body	
location	in	space	(Haggard,	Christakou,	&	Serino,	2007;	Serino	et	al.,	2013).	The	first-
person	perspective	is	therefore	an	important	component	in	the	construction	of	the	
representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.	When	seeing	a	static	image	of	a	hand,	for	
example,	from	an	egocentric	vantage	point	we	are	better	able	to	determine	that	this	is	
our	hand	as	opposed	to	someone	else’s	(Conson	et	al.,	2010;	van	den	Bos	&	Jeannerod,	
2002).	We	also	do	better	at	making	laterality	judgements	(Dyde	et	al.,	2011;	Fiorio	et	al.,	
2007;	Parsons,	1994)	and	when	moving	our	fingers	to	a	target	(Sutter	&	Müsseler,	
2010).	This	identification	of	ownership	is	reflected	in	our	ability	to	detect	an	added	
visual	delay	in	the	visual	feedback	concerning	a	self-generated	finger	movement	when	
the	hand	is	seen	in	the	first-person	perspective	compared	to	another	view	(Hoover	&	
Harris,	2012).	This	improved	ability	to	detect	asynchrony	in	the	‘self’	perspective	is	
called	the	self-advantage	and	is	a	quantitative	measure	of	body	ownership.		
The	malleable	nature	of	the	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain	has	been	
exposed	by	ingenious	experiments	that	introduce	conflicting	visual,	tactile,	and/or	
proprioceptive	sensory	information	that	challenge	a	participant’s	sense	of	body	
ownership.	In	the	rubber	hand	illusion	(RHI;	Botvinick	&	Cohen,	1998;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	
2010a;	Tsakiris	&	Haggard,	2005b),	for	example,	the	experimenter	strokes	the	
participant’s	hand	(hidden	from	view)	and	a	dummy	rubber	hand	synchronously	to	
provide	a	misleading	visual-tactile	correlation.	Many	people	report	feeling	as	though	the	
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dummy	hand	is	their	own	hand,	or	that	their	real	hand	is	closer	to	the	dummy	hand	
than	it	actually	is	(Botvinick	&	Cohen,	1998).	The	RHI	only	occurs	if	the	seen	stroking	of	
the	dummy	hand	and	the	felt	stroking	of	the	real	hand	are	synchronous.	When	the	
visuo-tactile	components	are	separated	by	more	than	approximately	300ms,	individuals	
do	not	assign	ownership	to	the	rubber	hand	(Shimada	et	al.,	2009).	Further,	the	RHI	is	
diminished	if	the	dummy	hand	is	not	aligned	in	an	anatomically	plausible	position	
(Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	Holmes	&	Spence,	2007).	Both	the	binding	of	the	visual	
and	tactile	information	and	an	anatomically	possible	position	of	the	hand	are	necessary	
for	the	developing	a	sense	of	ownership	over	a	dummy	hand.			
Previously,	we	have	shown	that	detecting	temporal	asynchronies	between	visual	
and	proprioceptive	information	during	self-initiated	hand	or	head	movements	viewed	
from	behind	(via	a	video	camera)	shows	no	self	advantage,	in	contrast	to	when	viewing	
parts	of	the	body	that	are	seen	all	the	time	(natural,	egocentric	view	looking	down	at	
the	body)	or	some	of	the	time	(face	in	the	mirror).	We	concluded	that	unseen	views	of	
the	body	may	not	be	independently	represented	visually	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2014).	This	is	
inline	with	others	who	have	shown	that	simply	detecting	a	tactile	stimulus	on	parts	of	
the	body	that	cannot	bee	seen	directly	(e.g.,	back	of	the	neck)	is	more	difficult	than	on	
parts	that	can	be	seen	(e.g.,	hands)	(Tipper	et	al.,	2001)	and	with	the	initial	absence	of	
ownership	over	indirect	views	of	real	or	virtual	bodies	in	full	body	illusion	(Ehrsson,	
2007;	Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007).	An	illusion	equivalent	to	the	RHI,	called	the	whole-
body	illusion	or	the	out-of-body	illusion,	is	evoked	when	seeing	the	body	presented	in	a	
third	person	perspective	(from	behind)	being	tapped	at	the	same	time	as	feeling	the	tap.	
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The	synchrony	of	the	seen	and	felt	taps	induces	the	sense	of	self-identification	with	the	
virtual	body	and	the	sense	of	the	real	body	being	located	outside	of	itself	(Blanke	&	
Metzinger,	2009;	Ehrsson,	2007;	Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007).	This	change	in	self-location	
is	typically	analysed	with	self-report	questionnaires	similar	to	RHI	questionnaires	or	by	
skin	conductance	responses	when	the	seen	body	is	threatened	(Ehrsson,	2007;	Petkova	
et	al.,	2011;	Guterstam	&	Ehrsson,	2012;	Preston	et	al.,	2015).			 	 	
Here,	we	introduced	synchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation,	similar	to	that	used	
in	the	RHI	and	full-body	illusions,	and	had	participants	make	temporal	discrimination	
judgments	that	we	have	previously	used	to	quantify	body	ownership	without	explicitly	
asking	about	it	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012;	2014;	2015a;	Hoover,	Elzein,	&	Harris,	2016).	
Participants	performed	self-generated	finger	movements	while	viewing	their	arms,	
hands	and	bodies	from	behind	(Figure	18).	The	live	movements	were	presented	in	the	
natural	perspective	or	flipped	around	both	the	vertical	and	horizontal	axes,	and	with	
varying	amounts	of	delay.	We	hypothesized	that	participants	who	received	synchronous	
visuo-tactile	stimulation	encouraging	them	to	interpret	that	view	as	‘self’	would	
subsequently	show	an	advantage	in	detecting	temporal	asynchrony	thus	providing	a	
quantitative	assessment	of	the	induced	body	ownership	in	the	full-body	illusion,	
whereas	those	in	the	asynchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation	group	would	not	show	such	
an	advantage.	We	also	predicted	that	asynchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation	would	
evoke	no	difference	in	performance	between	the	viewpoints.	
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5.3.	Methods	
5.3.1.	Participants	
20	right-handed	adults,	with	a	mean	age	of	24	(±	4	SD)	years,	participated	in	this	
study.	Half	of	the	participants	were	recruited	through	the	York	University	
undergraduate	participant	pool	and	awarded	class	credit	for	their	participation.	The	
remaining	participants	were	recruited	through	word	of	mouth	on	campus.	They	were	
randomly	divided	into	two	groups	of	ten.	Each	group	had	five	participants	from	each	
pool.	The	experiment	was	approved	by	the	York	University	office	of	research	ethics	and	
followed	the	guidelines	of	the	Declaration	of	Helsinki.	All	participants	gave	informed	
consent.	Handedness	was	determined	by	an	adapted	version	of	the	Edinburgh	
Handedness	Inventory	(Oldfield,	1971).	
5.3.2.	Apparatus		
Participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	chair	at	a	table	50	cm	away	from	a	LCD	screen	
(HP	Fv583AA	20”	widescreen	monitor;	1600	x	900	pixels;	5ms	refresh	response	time).	
Participants	placed	their	heads	at	the	entrance	to	a	cylindrical	shroud	that	was	mounted	
in	front	of	the	LCD	screen	so	that	they	could	not	see	their	body	directly	and	all	
surrounding	visual	distractions	from	the	laboratory	room	were	obscured	(Figure	18A).	A	
PlayStation	Eye	camera	(SCEI;	resolution	640x480	@	30	Hz)	was	mounted	to	a	pole	
40cm	behind	the	participant’s	head.		Since	the	camera	was	positioned	behind	the	
participants,	the	visual	image	presented	on	the	LCD	screen	was	of	the	back	of	their	head,	
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shoulders,	and	upper	back.	The	LCD	screen	was	hidden	from	view	of	the	camera	with	a	
surround	of	black	foamcore.		
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Figure	18.	Apparatus:	(A)	Participants	sat	on	an	adjustable	chair	50cm	away	from	the	
LCD	screen	and	placed	their	head	in	a	shroud	that	was	mounted	in	front	of	the	screen.	A	
PlayStation	Eye	camera	was	mounted	to	a	pole	40cm	behind	the	participant	head.		Since	
the	camera	was	positioned	behind	the	participants,	the	visual	image	presented	on	the	
LCD	screen	was	the	back	of	their	heads,	shoulders,	and	upper	back.	Insets	(B)	shows	
what	was	presented	on	the	LCD	screen	during	the	VTS	phase.	The	back	of	the	
participant’s	head,	their	shoulders	and	back,	and	the	experimenter’s	arm	with	the	rod	
are	visible.	Inset	(C)	shows	what	was	visible	on	the	LCD	screen	during	the	experiment	for	
the	natural	and	axes	flipped	views.	
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	 The	video	signal	from	the	camera	was	fed	into	a	computer	(iMAC11,	2,	mid	2010),	
read	by	MATLAB	(version	R2009_b),	and	played	through	the	LCD	screen	at	either	a	
minimal	delay,	or	with	an	added	delay	of	between	33	and	389ms.	Calibration	of	the	
system	(see	Hoover	&	Harris,	2012;	2014)	revealed	a	minimum	delay	of	85ms	±	one-half	
camera	refresh	duration	and	confirmed	the	delay	values	we	introduced	with	the	
software.		
	
5.5.4.	Movement	
	 While	resting	their	right	elbow	on	an	armrest,	participants	held	their	right	hand	
and	forearm	up	beside	their	head	in	view	of	the	camera	and	performed	a	single	flexion	
of	the	right	index	finger	through	approximately	2	cm	taking	about	1	s	to	do	so.	This	
same	active	finger	movement	used	in	our	previous	studies	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2012;	
2014;	Hoover	et	al.,	2016).	Participants	were	prompted	to	start	the	movement	after	
hearing	a	beep	and	as	soon	as	the	image	appeared	on	the	screen	in	a	given	trial.	
Participants	avoided	touching	the	shroud,	their	face	or	other	fingers	to	avoid	
introducing	other	tactile	cues.	Each	participant	had	a	15	trial	practice	phase	where	the	
experimenter	observed	and	corrected	movements	prior	to	testing	to	ensure	consistency	
of	speed	and	type	of	movement.		
	
5.3.5.	Stimuli	
	 Live	video	images	were	manipulated	using	the	Psychophysics	Toolbox	extension	of	
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MATLAB	subroutine	PsychVideoDelayLoop	(Brainard,	1997;	Pelli,	1997).	Participants	
were	presented	with	two	views	of	their	movements:	1)	a	natural,	expected	view	of	the	
body	seen	from	behind,	as	if	they	were	viewing	their	body	while	sitting	behind	
themselves,	and	2)	an	unexpected	view	of	the	body	from	behind	where	the	live	video	
images	were	flipped	around	the	horizontal	and	vertical	axes	so	that	the	video	was	
upside	down	and	back-to-front.	Examples	of	these	views	are	shown	in	insets	in	Figure	
18C.		
5.3.6.	Visuo-tactile	stimulation	
Each	block	of	trials	started	with	a	two-minute	visuo-tactile	stimulation	(VTS)	
period.	The	experimenter	stood	behind	and	off	to	the	right	side	of	the	participant	and	
tapped	the	upper	center	of	the	participant’s	back	just	below	the	neck	with	a	rod	(see	
Figure	18B)	in	a	consistent	tapping	pattern	at	approximately	60	taps	per	minute.	The	
experimenter’s	hand,	the	rod	and	the	point	at	which	they	were	touched	on	the	back	
were	visible	on	the	video	images	presented	on	the	LCD	screen	in	the	natural	view.		
Participants	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	two	experimental	groups:	(1)	the	
synchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation	(sVTS)	group	and	(2)	the	asynchronous	visuo-
tactile	(aVTS)	group.	The	synchronous	group	saw	the	touch	on	the	LCD	screen	at	the	
same	time	(with	the	system’s	minimum	delay)	as	they	felt	the	touch.	The	asynchronous	
group	saw	the	touch	on	the	LCD	screen	with	varying	time	delays	and	lengths	of	delay	
presentation	within	the	stimulation	session.	This	was	done	so	that	there	was	no	
association	made	between	a	specific	delay	and	the	touch	(see	Pfeiffer,	Schmutz,	&	
Blanke,	2014).	Each	two-minute	stimulation	period	(for	the	aVTS	group	only)	was	
	 117	
divided	into	11	segments	of	time	(10,	5,	20,	10,	20,	5,	10,	20,	5,	10,	and	5s)	and	visual	
delays	between	85	and	382	ms	were	assigned	to	each	of	the	11	segments	(349,	184,	
283,	382,	316,	151,	85,	382,	184,	349,	217	ms).		This	was	to	make	sure	that	there	could	
be	no	association	between	an	added	delay	and	the	amount	of	time	for	which	each	delay	
was	experienced.		
5.3.7.	Procedure	
We	used	a	two-interval	forced	choice	(2IFC)	discrimination	paradigm	to	assess	
temporal	asynchrony	discrimination.	Each	trial	had	two	1s	periods	separated	by	an	
inter-stimulus	interval	of	100ms:	one	period	had	a	minimal-delay	presentation	of	the	
video	of	them	making	a	finger	movement,	and	the	other	period	had	a	presentation	
delayed	by	a	variable	amount.	The	period	in	which	the	minimal-delay	and	the	added	
delay	appeared	was	chosen	randomly	by	MATLAB.	There	were	nine	possible	differences	
in	visual	delays	in	any	given	trial:	0,	33,	66,	99,	132,	165,	198,	231,	and	264ms	
corresponding	to	a	delay	of	an	integral	number	of	video	frames.	Participants	used	foot	
pedals	(Yamaha	FC5)	to	indicate	which	of	the	two	periods	had	the	added	delay:	left	for	
first	and	right	for	second.		
The	experiment	was	run	in	four	blocks.		Each	block	was	preceded	by	two	minutes	
of	synchronous	or	asynchronous	VTS	(depending	on	group	assignment)	followed	by	36	
trials,	which	took	about	six	minutes.	The	nine	differences	in	visual	delay	were	presented	
eight	times	in	each	of	the	two	views	(natural	or	flipped)	randomly	interleaved	for	a	total	
of	144	trials	for	each	participant.		
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5.3.8.	Data	analysis	
	 Detection	thresholds	were	obtained	for	each	participant	and	condition	by	fitting	
a	logistic	function	to	the	proportion	of	times	they	correctly	chose	the	delayed	period	
plotted	as	a	function	of	the	delay	using:	
.....................................................................................(1)	
	
where	L	is	the	performance	rate	when	the	delay	was	clearly	detectable	and	was	set	to	≤	
1,	x	is	the	delay,	x0	is	the	75%	threshold	and	b	is	the	slope	of	the	function.	The	lapse	rate	
was	1-L.	The	statistical	analysis	comprised	of	analysis	of	variances	(ANOVAs)	and	t-tests.		
Multiple	comparison	p-values	were	corrected	with	the	false	discovery	rate	method	
(Benjamini	&	Hochberg,	1995).		For	all	tests,	alpha	was	set	at	p	<	0.05.		
	
5.4.	Results	
	 Figure	19A	plots	the	mean	response	rate	as	a	function	of	delay	for	the	natural	and	
flipped	views	following	either	sVTS	or	aVTS.	A	2	x	2	between-within	ANOVA	revealed	a	
significant	interaction	between	VTS	group	(synchronous	vs	asynchronous)	and	the	view	
(natural	vs	axes	flipped),	F(1,	18),	5.95,	P	=	0.03,	ηp2	=	0.25.	(Figure	19B).	The	sVTS	group	
was	able	to	detect	the	visual	delay	at	a	lower	threshold	for	the	natural	view	(the	view	
they	had	experienced	while	being	tapped)	than	for	the	axes-flipped	view,	showing	an	
advantage	of	45ms	(t(9)	=	2.51,	p	=	0.03,	Cohen’s	d	=	1.16.		The	aVTS	group	showed	no	
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difference	between	the	views,	(t(9)	=	0.37	p	=	0.72,	Cohen’s	d	=	0.05):	there	was	no	
advantage	to	seeing	the	movements	from	the	natural	view.		
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Figure	19.		(A)	Thresholds	for	detecting	the	added	visual	delay	in	the	visual	feedback	for	
self-generated	movement.	The	mean	proportion	correct	is	plotted	as	a	function	of	the	
added	visual	delay.	The	curves	are	logistic	functions	(see	text)	fitted	through	the	data	for	
the	synchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation	group	(sVTS)	natural	view	(solid	black	line	and	
black	triangles),	the	sVTS	group	axes	flipped	view	(dashed	black	line	and	inverted	white	
triangles),	the	asynchronous	visuo-tactile	stimulation	group	(aVTS)	natural	view	(solid	
grey	line	and	grey	circles),	and	the	aVTS	group	axes	flipped	view	(dashed	grey	line	and	
white	circles).	(B)	The	mean	75%	thresholds	averaged	from	the	fits	to	the	individual	
participant’s	data	for	the	sVTS	group	(black	bars)	and	the	aVTS	group	(grey	bars)	for	the	
two	views.	Error	bars	are	SEMs.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 121	
	
	 Analysis	of	the	slopes	of	the	psychometric	functions	(b,	see	methods)	showed	no	
significant	interaction	F(1,	18)	=		1.16,	P	=	0.30,	ηp2	=	0.06,	effect	of	view,	F(1,	18),	0.04,	P	=	
0.86,	ηp2	=	.00,	or	effect	of	group	F(1,	18),=	1.21,	p	=	0.29,	ηp2	=0.10.			
	
5.5.	Discussion	
After	viewing	the	back	of	their	body	from	a	third-person	perspective	and	seeing	
themselves	being	touched	by	a	rod	that	they	could	also	feel,	participants	were	able	to	
detect	a	shorter	visual-proprioceptive	delay	than	if	what	they	saw	was	not	synchronized	
to	what	they	felt.	sVTS	generated	a	45ms	advantage	for	detecting	the	delay	for	the	
experienced,	natural	view	whereas	aVTS	created	no	such	advantage.		This	advantage	is	
comparable	to	the	18	–	29	ms	self-advantage	we	have	reported	previously	(Hoover	et	
al.,	2016;	Hoover	&	Harris,	2012;	2015a;	2015b)	when	the	perspective	and	view	of	the	
body	match	the	internal	representation	of	the	body.	Interestingly,	our	observations	
show	that	a	first-person	perspective	is	not	a	sine	qua	non	for	evoking	the	sense	of	self.			
Petkova	and	colleagues	(2011)	found	that	although	a	first-person	perspective	helps	
evoke	a	stron	sense	of	ownership,	the	feeling	of	ownership	over	a	just	one	part	of	a	
mannequin	body	generalized	to	ownership	over	the	entire	mannequin	body.	In	our	task	
although	participants	are	detecting	delay	in	the	movement	of	only	a	finger	we	interpret	
this	as	corresponding	to	ownership	over	the	entire	back	view	of	the	body.			
	 We	have	previously	shown	that	when	viewing	the	self	from	the	back	while	making	
hand	movements	there	is	no	difference	in	thresholds	for	detecting	differences	in	delay	
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between	the	upright,	natural	view	of	the	body	compared	to	an	inverted,	unexpected	
view	of	the	body	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2015a).	To	draw	direct	comparisons	between	the	
previous	study	and	the	present	one,	we	calculated	difference	scores	between	delay	
detection	thresholds	for	the	axes-flipped	and	the	natural	views	in	the	sVTs	and	aVTS	
conditions	in	the	present	study,	and	the	back	view	with	no	VTS	from	Hoover	et	al.	
(2004).	The	difference	scores	are	shown	in	Figure	20.		A	significant	one-way	ANOVA	
revealed	a	significant	between	groups	effect	(F(2,	29)	=	5.41,	p	=	0.01).	The	aVTS	
difference	score	(-2.9	±8ms)	was	no	different	from	the	difference	score	for	the	back	
view	in	the	previous	study	(-2.2±6ms;	Mean	difference	=	0.75,	SE	=	16.5,	p	=	0.96,	d	=	
0.03)	(Hoover	&	Harris,	2015a)	but	both	scores	were	significantly	different	from	the	
sVTS	difference	score	(44.5±18ms;	mean	difference	=	47.4,	SE	=	16.5,	p	=	0.009,	d	=	1.09	
and	mean	difference	=	46.6,	SE	=	16.5,	p	=	0.008,	d=	1.12,	respectively).	This	confirms	
that	when	felt	tapping	is	not	synchronous	with	the	seen	tapping	during	the	stimulation	
period	(aVTS),	thresholds	are	effectively	the	same	as	after	receiving	no	tapping	at	all	
prior	to	performing	the	delay	detection	task.	This	observation	emphasizes	the	need	for	
synchronous	multisensory	experience	(sVTS)	to	create	a	sense	of	ownership	over	an	
otherwise	non-self	representation	of	the	body.		
Although	out	display	was	a	live	video,	it	was	viewed	in	2D.	It	is	possible	that	our	
values	might	even	be	an	underestimate	and	the	evoked	self-advantage	could	have	been	
even	larger	if	we	had	used	a	3D	display	such	as	a	VR	system	(Ijsselteijn	et	al.,	2006;	but	
c.f.,	Zopf	et	al.,	2015).	Our	results	are	consistent	with	a	plethora	of	multisensory	illusions	
in	which	feelings	of	ownership	are	invoked	over	dummy	hands	(Botvinick	&	Cohen,	
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1998;	Tsakiris	&	Haggard,	2005b),	other	people’s	faces	(Dobricki	&	Mohler,	2015;	
Paladino,	Mazzurega,	Pavani,	&	Schubert,	2010;	Tajadura-Jiménez,	Lorusso,	&	Tsakiris,	
2013),	virtual	bodies	(Blanke	&	Metzinger,	2009;	Ehrsson,	2007;	Slater,	Perez-Marcos,	
Ehrsson,	&	Sanchez-Vives,	2009),	and	mannequins	(Pomes	&	Slater,	2013;	Petkova,	
2011;	Preston,	Kuper-Smith,	&	Ehrsson,	2015;	Petkova	&	Ehrsson,	2008).		
	
	
	
Figure	20.		Difference	scores	were	calculated	for	the	sVTS	(black	bar),	aVTS	(gray	bar),	
and	a	no	touch	condition	(light	gray	bar;	data	from	Hoover	&	Harris,	2015a)	by	
subtracting	the	threshold	for	natural	view	from	the	axes-flipped	view.	There	was	a	
significant	effect	across	the	groups	(F(2,	29)	=	5.03,	p	=	0.02)	where	the	aVTS	difference	
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score	was	no	different	from	the	no	touch	difference	score.	Both	scores	were	
significantly	lower	than	the	sVTS	difference	score.	Error	bars	are	SEMs.	
	
	
	
	
The	strength	of	our	method	is	that,	without	explicitly	asking	whether	our	
participants	identified	with	the	back	view	of	the	body	shown	to	them	in	the	third-person	
perspective,	we	were	able	to	assess	their	sense	of	ownership	over	that	view	of	the	body.	
Measuring	the	threshold	for	delay	detection	provides	an	objective	behavioural	measure	
that	is	superior	to	subjective,	self-identification	questionnaires	(Ehrsson,	2007;	
Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007;	Petkova	et	al.,	2011)	that	are	susceptible	to	task-compliance,	
cognitive	bias,	and	confabulation.		Monitoring	one’s	own	body	movements	has	been	
established	as	an	important	contributing	factor	to	body	ownership	and	subsequently	
self-recognition	(see	Jeannerod,	2003	for	a	review;	“Limited	conscious	monitoring	of	
motor	performance	in	normal	subjects,”	1998;	Nielsen,	1963).	Therefore	measuring	
threshold	differences	in	seen	and	felt	self-generated	movements	provides	a	quantitative	
objective	method	to	complement	questionnaire,	proprioceptive	drift,	and	skin	
conductance	measures.	
5.5.1.	Neurophysiological	correlates	of	self-perception	
Neuroimaging	studies	have	found	differential	activation	depending	on	synchrony	
between	a	movement	and	the	corresponding	visual	feedback.	During	the	presentation	
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of	synchronous	visual	and	proprioceptive	information	during	hand	movements,	which	
would	invoke	body	ownership,	bilateral	superior/middle	parietal	areas	are	activated	
(Shimada,	Hiraki,	&	Oda,	2005).	In	contrast,	during	the	presentation	of	asynchronous	
visual	and	proprioceptive	information,	which	would	inhibit	the	sense	of	body	ownership,	
right	inferior	parietal	areas	were	activated	(Shimada	et	al.,	2005;	Tsakiris,	Longo,	&	
Haggard,	2010b).	Such	differential	activation	can	be	interpreted	as	corresponding	to	
regarding	body	parts	as	either	part	of	the	‘self’	or	part	of	an	‘other’.		Further,	full-body	
illusions	have	been	shown	to	activate	multisensory	areas	of	the	brain	such	as	the	
putamen,	left	ventral	premotor	cortex,	and	intraparietal	cortex	(Petkova	et	al.,	2011;	
Gentile	et	al.,	2015;	Petkova	&	Ehrsson,	2008;	Bekrater-Bodmann,	Foell,	&	Kamping,	
2011;	Ehrsson,	Holmes,	&	Passingham,	2005;	Gutertam	et	al.,	2015)	suggesting	a	
network	of	areas	that	are	important	in	maintaining	the	representation	of	our	whole	
body	in	the	brain.	Our	study	suggests	that	this	network	is	plastic	and	can	be	expanded	
to	incorporate	new	body	parts	(such	as	rubber	hands	or	the	back	of	the	body)	in	
response	to	new	information	indicating	that	they	should	be	regarded	as	part	of	the	self.	
5.5.2.	Conclusion	
We	have	demonstrated	that	synchronous	visual	and	tactile	experience	can	
elucidate	feelings	of	ownership	over	a	typically	‘other’	view	of	the	self.		The	ability	to	
detect	temporal	asynchrony	provides	an	objective	measure	of	body	ownership	with	
which	we	can	track	the	malleability	of	the	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.		
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6.	CHAPTER	6:	GENERAL	DISCUSSION	
The	suite	of	experiments	I	present	here	has	contributed	to	the	literature	on	the	
‘self’	in	a	fundamental	way.	I	have	successfully	used	a	quantitative	experimental	method	
that	explicitly	assesses	body	ownership.	I	have	manipulated	visual,	proprioceptive,	
vestibular,	and	tactile	senses	in	varying	ways	as	described	in	the	method	sections	of	
each	of	the	experimental	chapters	(sections	2.3,	3.3,	4.3,	and	5.3)	in	order	to	probe	the	
representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.	As	Descartes	(1637)	once	wrote	“My	body	is	an	
integral	part	of	‘me’,	in	a	way	that	other	objects	are	not.	Moreover,	the	relation	
between	my	body	and	‘me’	is	quite	different	from	the	relation	between	my	body	and	
other	people”.		Together,	my	data	provide	a	window	into	what	of	the	body	we	consider	
as	‘self’	and	subsequently	what	we	consider	as	‘other’:	a	topic	that	has	been	pondered	
for	centuries.			
6.1.	A	measure	of	perceptual	sensitivity	for	body	ownership	
I	am	the	first	to	use	the	2IFC	task	for	self-recognition	during	active,	real-time	
movement	with	delay	detection.	The	2IFC	task	provides	a	measure	of	perceptual	
sensitivity	that	is	less	vulnerable	to	response	bias.	Temporal	synchrony	judgements	have	
been	used	before	to	evaluate	movement	recognition	(Farrer	et	al.,	2008;	Jeannerod,	
2009;	Shimada,	Qi,	&	Hiraki,	2010;	van	den	Bos	&	Jeannerod,	2002),	however,	generally	
in	these	studies	participants	were	asked	to	make	a	self/not	self	(or	yes/no)	judgement	
about	the	movement	that	they	saw.	Shimada	and	colleagues	(2010),	for	example,	
showed	participants	their	own	right	index	finger	movements,	which	were	captured	by	a	
video	camera	and	reflected	to	the	participants	using	a	double-sided	mirror,	presented	
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with	an	added	visual	delay	ranging	between	118	and	352ms	(including	the	inherent	
delay	of	the	system).	Participants	were	asked	to	make	judgements	about	delayed	and	
not-delayed	trials.	The	average	PSE	for	active	movements	was	231ms	suggesting	that	
added	visual	delays	of	less	than	around	230ms	are	undetectable.	The	undetectable	
system	delay	and	asking	participants	to	identify	the	delay	are	features	of	both	my	
studies	and	the	ones	described	above.	The	major	difference,	however,	is	that	I	used	a	
2IFC	method.	Instead	of	using	simple	yes-no	judgments	I	presented	my	participants	with	
two	intervals.	One	interval	of	any	given	trial	showed	movements	with	just	the	inherent	
system	delay	of	85ms,	and	the	other	had	an	added	visual	delay	ranging	up	to	
approximately	350ms	(depending	on	the	specific	experiment).	The	2IFC	is	less	
vulnerable	to	response	bias,	as	it	provides	a	baseline	(no	delay)	for	participants	to	
compare	with	the	delayed	interval.		
6.2.	Major	Findings	
In	the	task	I	used	for	all	the	experiments	described	here,	I	measured	the	ability	
to	detect	an	added	visual	delay	during	active	movements	while	viewing	the	motion	from	
different	perspectives	(and/or	views)	of	the	body.	From	the	results	of	this	series	of	
experiments,	I	suggest	that	participants	were	more	able	to	discern	the	added	visual	
delay	during	the	movement	when	the	presented	view	of	the	body	matched	that	of	the	
internal	representation	of	the	body	thus	giving	us	a	window	on	the	form	of	that	
representation.	Participants	made	two	movements	in	each	trial	and	compared	what	
they	saw	with	what	they	experienced	to	determine	which	of	the	two	presentations	of	
movements	had	the	added	visual	delay.	I	then	calculated	the	threshold	(75%	correctly	
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identifying	the	delay)	by	using	a	logistic	function	and	compared	thresholds	across	
variables	and	groups.	On	average,	there	was	an	increase	in	sensitivity	to	delay	of	
approximately	25-45ms	for	the	special	cases	in	which	one	saw	the	‘self’.	I	have	called	
this	increase	the	self-advantage	and	regard	it	as	a	signature	of	body	ownership.	In	the	
following	sections	I	will	outline	my	major	findings,	the	special	cases	in	which	a	self-
advantage	was	found,	and	situate	my	research	within	the	current	literature	on	the	self.		
6.1.1.	An	upside-down	hand	is	not	considered	self	
Which	views	of	the	body	are	treated	as	self?	Is	it	necessary	to	see	the	body	part	
as	being	anatomical	attached	to	you?	Simply	flipping	the	presentation	of	a	hand	on	its	
axes	changes	how	we	view	this	hand	–	it	goes	from	being	attributed	to	oneself	to	being	
seen	as	belonging	to	another	person.	When	right-handed	people	were	asked	to	make	
finger	movements	while	viewing	their	hand	as	if	they	were	looking	down	at	it	(this	view	
is	commonly	referred	to	as	either	the	egocentric,	natural,	or	first-person	view)	they	
showed	a	self-advantage	for	temporal	asynchrony	detection.	This	advantage	was	lost	
when	their	movements	were	shown	in	an	unexpected	view	(unnatural,	third	person	or	
allocentric	view;	Figure	11A	in	Chapter	2	for	an	example).		I	will	speak	to	how	hand	
dominance	and	the	type	of	movement	used	changed	performance	in	the	following	
section	(6.1.2).	Here,	I	focus	solely	on	the	results	from	the	dominant	hand	making	
discrete	movements	(Chapter	2,	dark	gray	line	in	Figure	11A	and	dark	gray	bar	in	Figure	
11C).		These	results	are	robust	and	are	reproduced	using	the	same	conditions	but	
different	participants	in	Chapters	3	and	4	(Chapter	3,	black	line	in	Figure	14A;	Chapter	4	
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black	line	in	Figure	17A)	and	in	a	paper	of	mine	that	is	not	included	in	this	dissertation	
looking	at	the	differences	between	right-	and	left-handers	(Hoover	et	al.,	2016).		
The	significant	variation	in	performance,	specifically	the	self-advantage	of	25-
45ms	in	delay	detection,	I	found	was	dependent	on	whether	the	visual	perspective	of	
the	hand	was	egocentric	or	allocentric.	The	improved	performance	for	the	upright	hand	
is	in	line	with	many	other	studies	that	looked	at	self-recognition	(Conson	et	al.,	2010),	
laterality	judgements	(Dyde	et	al.,	2011),	and	mental	rotation	(Parsons,	1994)	of	static	
images	of	the	hand	where	participants	all	performed	at	higher	levels	when	hands	were	
shown	upright	and	not	inverted.		My	studies,	however,	provide	an	implicit,	quantifiable	
measure	of	self-recognition	during	active	movements.	This	will	be	discussed	at	greater	
lengths	below.			
Why	would	the	inversion	of	a	hand	make	such	a	difference	as	the	information	
content	of	the	images	is	the	same?	To	answer	this	we	could	consider	the	rubber	hand	
illusion	(see	1.5.1.	for	an	explanation	of	that	task)	under	differing	hand	postures	
(Costantini	&	Haggard,	2007;	Ehrsson,	Spence,	&	Passingham,	2004;	Tsakiris	&	Haggard,	
2005b).	When	the	dummy	hand	and	real	hand	are	not	aligned	in	space	(for	example,	
dummy	had	placed	at	a	rotation	of	90°)	the	effect	of	the	RHI	is	diminished.		The	RHI	
relies	on	multisensory	integration	of	synchronous	vision	and	touch	in	order	to	induce	
feelings	of	ownership	over	the	dummy	hand.	However,	if	it	were	solely	dependent	on	
this	type	of	bottom	up	process	then	changing	the	posture	of	the	hand	would	not	
diminish	the	effect	–	after	all,	the	correlation	between	the	senses	would	be	the	same.	
Spatial	misalignment	diminishing	the	illusion	suggests	a	top-down	process	as	well	and,	
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considering	the	illusion	plays	with	the	sense	of	body	ownership,	suggests	that	a	stored	
representation	of	the	body	must	be	compatible	with	the	seen	body	for	the	illusion	to	be	
effective.	If	there	is	conflict	between	the	internal	representation	and	what	is	seen	the	
illusion	is	not	felt.	We	interpret	the	results	from	asynchrony	detection	while	looking	
down	at	the	hand	in	this	same	manner	–	when	the	hand	that	is	seen	does	not	match	
what	we	have	stored	in	our	body	schema	(e.g.,	when	the	view	of	the	hand	is	flipped)	
there	is	no	advantage	in	delay	detection.		
		 The	experiments	described	above	to	which	I	have	compared	my	results,	however,	
provided	participants	with	static	views	of	the	hand	and	the	participants	did	not	perform	
movements.	In	my	experiments	participants	were	asked	to	judge	the	timing	of	their	
active	movements	with	respect	to	live	video	feed	(with	varying	visual	delays).	Although	
the	visual	manipulations	of	the	video	images	flipped	along	the	x,	y,	and	xy	axes	are	
similar	to	the	visual	stimuli	in	the	static	images,	hand	movements	provide	added	
proprioceptive	information	as	well	as	the	sense	of	agency.			
When	making	an	active	movement	there	is	not	only	a	motor	command,	but	also	
efferent	and	afferent	information.	The	sense	of	agency,	the	sense	that	one	is	the	agent	
of	one’s	movements	(Gallagher,	2000),	is	also	present	during	active	movements	unlike	
when	viewing	static	images.	Many	studies	have	attempted	to	tease	apart	the	
contribution	of	the	sense	of	agency	(motor	command	and	efferent	copy)	by	looking	at	
differences	between	active	and	passive	movements	(Farrer	et	al.,	2008;	Jeannerod,	
2009;	Shimada	et	al.,	2010;	Tsakiris	et	al.,	2005;	Tsakiris	&	Haggard,	2005a).	During	self-
other	discrimination,	participants	tended	to	make	fewer	attribution	errors	when	making	
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active	movements	than	they	do	during	passive	movements.	However,	when	judging	
temporal	asynchrony	participants	were	able	to	detect	smaller	delays	during	active	
versus	passive	movements	(Shimada	et	al.,	2010).	This	suggests	that	although	agency	
provides	added	information	it	does	not	make	the	temporal	window	smaller	for	
detecting	asynchronies	between	the	visual	and	proprioceptive	information.	In	all	of	my	
studies,	participants	performed	active	movements	(I	never	manipulated	the	sense	of	
agency)	therefore	by	manipulating	the	visual	perspective	(or	viewpoint)	I	exclusively	
addressed	the	sense	of	body	ownership.	Further,	in	a	3D	virtual	reality	replication	of	my	
study	presented	in	Chapter	2,	Zopf	and	colleagues	(2010)	confirmed	an	18ms	advantage	
for	an	upright	hand	compared	to	an	upside	down	hand	when	detecting	added	visual	
delays.	They	conferred	that	anatomical	plausibility	of	an	upright	hand	aided	the	
temporal	asynchrony	detection.		
To	summarize,	there	is	a	self-advantage	in	the	detection	of	multisensory	discord,	
specifically	between	vision	and	proprioception,	during	active	movements	when	
movements	are	seen	in	a	perspective	that	matches	that	of	the	internal	representation	
of	the	self.	Further,	this	increase	in	sensitivity	to	visual	delay	of	20	–	45ms	can	be	seen	
as	a	quantifiable	measure	of	body	ownership	–	one	that	is	without	subjective	bias.		
6.1.2.	The	self-advantage	for	the	dominant	hand	is	movement	dependent	
Not	only	do	we	see	our	movements	from	an	egocentric	perspective,	there	is	a	
special	role	for	the	dominant	hand	in	the	creation	of	body	representation.	In	my	
experiment	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	I	looked	at	the	difference	in	performance	in	delay	
detection	for	right-handers	when	they	move	their	dominant	(right)	hand	and	when	they	
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move	their	non-dominant	(left)	hand.	Interestingly,	I	found	that	only	during	discrete	
movements	(single	flexion	of	the	finger)	and	not	during	continuous	movements	
(repetitive	finger	movements)	did	right-handers	show	a	self-advantage	for	the	dominant	
(not	the	non-dominant)	hand	making	the	movements.	The	differences	between	the	two	
types	of	movements	will	be	discussed	below.		
The	majority	of	people	show	a	right-hand	preference	(Annett,	1985;	Oldfield,	
1971).	This	asymmetric	preference	of	the	right	hand	over	the	left	hand	has	been	linked	
to	differences	in	performance	between	the	two	hands	during	motor	tasks	(see	Goble	&	
Brown,	2008).	The	dominant	right	hand	tends	to	be	stronger	(Farthing,	Chilibeck,	&	
Binsted,	2005)	and	faster	when	performing	tasks	(J.	Annett,	Annett,	Hudson,	&	Turner,	
1979),	as	well	as	being	more	precise	(Heuer,	2007)	than	the	left	hand	for	fine	motor	
tasks.	Right-handers	also	show	performance	biases	for	the	right	hand	for	hand	laterality	
judgements	(Dyde	et	al.,	2011;	Gentilucci,	Daprati,	&	Gangitano,	1998;	Ní	Choisdealbha,	
Brady,	&	Maguinness,	2011)	and	during	mental	rotation	tasks	(Takeda,	Shimoda,	Sato,	
Ogano,	&	Kato,	2010)	where	aspects	of	the	right	hand	were	identified	with	greater	
speed	and	accuracy.	When	asked	to	imagine	other	people	making	movements,	right-
handers	tended	to	imagine	more	of	the	actions	being	performed	with	a	right	hand	
(Marzoli,	Menditto,	Lucafò,	&	Tommasi,	2013)	and	during	a	pointing	task	to	targets	on	
the	body	without	vision	of	the	body	right-handers	pointed	more	rightward	(Hach	&	
Schütz-Bosbach,	2010).	This	suggests	that	right-handers	have	a	strong	rightward	bias	
that	may	actually	affect	the	way	in	which	their	entire	body	is	represented.			
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Casasanto	(2009)	proposed	that	given	the	extensive	use	of	the	right	hand,	right-
handers	interact	with	their	environment	in	a	different	manner	than	their	left-handed	
counterparts.	His	Body	Specificity	Hypothesis	suggests	that	the	dominant	hand	provides	
a	frame	of	reference	for	the	representation	of	the	entire	body	and	its	actions	in	the	
brain	(Casasanto,	2009;	Willems	et	al.,	2010a).		For	example,	when	making	self/not	self	
judgments	of	pictures	of	hands,	Conson	and	colleagues		(2010)	found	that	right-handers	
more	quickly	identified	their	own	dominant	right-hand	compared	to	their	non-dominant	
left	hand.	The	authors	suggested	that	the	motor	experiences	from	using	the	dominant	
hand	provide	a	frame	of	reference	for	the	body	and	the	body’s	actions.	These	dominant	
hand	specific	experiences	would	then	provide	improved	ability	to	distinguish	between	
the	self	and	an	“other”	when	presented	with	images	(or	in	the	case	of	my	experiments,	
live-video	feed	of	active	movements)	of	the	dominant	hand.	This	Body	Specificity	
Hypothesis	predicts	that	there	would	be	a	self-advantage	for	right-handers	using	and	
seeing	only	their	dominant	hand	and	not	the	non-dominant	hand	in	my	study	and	that	is	
exactly	what	I	found	--	a	self-advantage	only	for	dominant	hand	movements	while	
viewing	movements	in	self-perspective.			
Of	importance,	though,	is	that	this	exclusive	dominant	hand	self-advantage	was	
only	present	during	discrete	movement	and	not	for	the	continuous	movement.	During	
the	continuous	movements	both	the	right	and	left	hand	movements	presented	in	both	
upright	perspectives	(natural	and	y-axis	reflection;	see	Figure	10)	showed	significantly	
lower	thresholds	compared	to	the	inverted	perspectives	(x-	and	xy-axes	reflections;	see	
Figure	10).	I	suggest	that	this	is	most	likely	due	to	some	differences	between	the	two	
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types	of	movements.	When	participants	performed	a	discrete	movement	they	were	
prompted	to	initiate	the	movement	when	they	saw	the	hand	shown	on	the	display.	
Whereas,	when	they	performed	the	continuous	movements	participants	initiated	the	
movement	prior	to	seeing	the	hand	on	the	display	and	continued	to	make	the	same	
movement	repeatedly	until	the	trial	ended.	Thus	there	was	a	distinct	visual	onset	of	the	
movement	for	the	discrete	trials,	which	provided	participants	with	sharply	timed	
efferent	information.	This	was	not	the	case	for	the	continuous	movement.	The	
thresholds	for	the	discrete	movement	and	the	continuous	movement	viewed	in	self-
perspective	were	123ms	and	145ms,	respectively.	The	difference	was	22ms,	which	is	
similar	to	a	29ms	advantage	when	detecting	active	finger	movements	over	passive	
finger	movements	(Winter	et	al.	2008;	Lau	et	al.	2004).	Therefore,	we	can	conclude	that	
clear	efferent	information	provides	a	slight	advantage	overall,	but	why	was	there	not	a	
dominant	hand	advantage	for	the	continuous	movements?		
Right-handers	use	their	dominant	hand	for	more	accurate	and	precise	
movements	(Bryden	et	al.,	2000).		Goal	directed	movements	have	distinct	start	and	end	
times.	Therefore	discrete	movements	could	be	considered	as	goal	directed	movements	
and	using	the	dominant	hand	for	such	a	movement	would	be	advantageous	while	
performing	tasks.	Continuous	movements	could	be	associated	more	with	less	precise	
bimanual	tasks	(Swinnen,	2002)	in	which	the	dominant	and	non-dominant	hands	work	
together	or	are	yoked	together.	When	a	participant	was	presented	with	the	hand	in	an	
upright	perspective	but	flipped	as	if	it	was	their	other	hand	(y-reflection	of	the	right	
hand),	it	could	be	interpreted	as	the	left	hand	moving	in	phase	with	the	right	hand	
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(hidden	from	view).		This	would	explain	why	the	self	and	y-reflection	presentation	of	the	
movements	did	not	differ.	These	perspectives	are	both	upright	and	could	be	deciphered	
as	plausible	self-perspectives	(see	Figure	10).				
The	results	presented	in	Chapter	2	show	that	there	is	a	special	case	for	the	
dominant	hand	in	the	creation	of	the	representation	of	the	body	and	this	is	most	likely	
due	in	part	to	the	way	in	which	right-handers	interact	with	their	environment	
supporting	Casasanto’s	Body	Specificity	Hypothesis.		
6.1.3.	Disruption	to	vestibular	system	makes	you	less	sure	of	your	’self’	
	 Up	to	this	point	I	have	discussed	the	visual	and	proprioceptive	senses	and	their	
contribution	to	the	sense	of	self,	but	other	senses	are	also	integrated	in	order	to	create	
a	full	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.	In	Chapter	4,	I	found	that	applying	galvanic	
vestibular	stimulation	during	the	temporal	asynchrony	detection	task	affected	
thresholds	for	detecting	visual/proprioceptive	delays	during	finger	movements	
displayed	in	the	self-perspective.	Detection	with	views	in	the	other	perspective	were	not	
affected	(Chapter	4;	Figure	17).		
	 When	the	vestibular	reference	was	disrupted	under	disruptive	GVS	participants	
did	not	detect	delays	any	differently	in	the	self	and	other	conditions:	the	self-advantage	
was	abolished.		In	the	control	condition	(with	no	GVS	–	trials	interleaved),	the	signature	
self-advantage	was	found	where	the	visual	delay	was	detected	for	smaller	delays	when	
the	movements	were	displayed	in	the	self-perspective	compared	to	the	other	
perspective.	The	vestibular	system,	therefore,	provides	information	concerning	the	body	
that	helps	one	differentiate	between	self	and	other.	What	sort	of	reference	might	the	
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vestibular	system	provide?	
	 Patients	with	vestibular	disorders,	such	as	vestibular	vertigo	or	vestibular	
deafferentation,	have	reported	distorted	percepts	of	their	body	and/or	body	parts	
suggesting	the	vestibular	system	maintains	a	coherent	schema	of	the	body.		Along	with	
misperceiving	the	size	and	shape	of	the	body	and	its	parts	(Lopez,	Halje,	&	Blanke,	2008;	
Sang,	Jáuregui-Renaud,	Green,	Bronstein,	&	Gresty,	2006;	Lopez	&	Blanke,	2007;	
Schilder,	1935)	some	vestibular	patients	have	reported	feeling	that	their	body	is	not	
whole	(Vallar	&	Papagno,	2003),	feeling	as	though	they	are	outside	of	their	body	
(Brugger,	1997),	and	the	loss	of	the	feeling	that	they	are	in	control	of	their	actions	(Sang	
et.	al,	2006).	Since	vestibular	patients	have	shown	distortions	in	the	representation	of	
the	body	would	introducing	noise	to	the	vestibular	system	affect	healthy	participants	in	
a	similar	way?		
	 In	previous	studies,	vestibular	input	has	been	experimentally	manipulated	by	using	
either	galvanic	or	caloric	stimulation	in	healthy	participants.	Disruptive	GVS	(such	as	
passing	+ve	current	through	one	ear	and	–ve	through	the	other)	produces	illusory	tilting	
of	the	head,	even	when	the	head	is	stabilized	with	a	head	rest,	which	suggests	that	
disruption	to	the	vestibular	system	demonstrates	a	disconnect	between	the	actual	
posture	of	the	body	and	the	perceived	posture	of	the	body.	Inline	with	the	results	from	
my	study,	Lopez	and	colleagues	(2012b)	found	that	participants	under	GVS	distorted	the	
perception	of	the	size	and	shape	of	their	own	hands.	Vestibular	stimulation	also	reduces	
accuracy	at	pointing	to	tactile	stimuli	on	the	hand	(Ferrè	et	al.,	2013).	Further,	others	
have	found	that	a	lessened	sense	of	self	(Ferrè	et	al.,	2014;	Lopez	et	al.,	2008;	Lopez,	
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2013)	and	a	greater	susceptibility	to	multisensory	illusions,	such	as	the	RHI	(Lopez	et	al.,	
2010).		Taken	together,	the	vestibular	contribution	seems	to	bear	considerable	weight	in	
the	development	of	the	sense	of	the	body	and	subsequently	the	self.	It	integrates	with	
proprioceptive,	visual,	and	tactile	cues.			
	 As	we	have	seen	in	the	last	two	sections,	changes	in	visual	perspective	affects	the	
ability	to	discern	visual	delay	during	active	movements	for	our	hands	as	if	seen	in	a	
natural,	egocentric	perspective.	If	these	changes	in	visual	perspective	suggest	that	vision	
is	so	important,	what	can	we	say	about	parts	of	our	body	that	we	cannot	see?	 		
6.1.4.	No	sense	of	ownership	for	views	of	the	body	that	are	rarely	seen		
The	first-person	perspective,	as	we	have	seen,	is	integral	when	distinguishing	
between	the	self	and	other.		When	the	visual	component	is	aligned	with	the	
representation	of	the	body	(the	view	of	the	hand	matched	up	with	what	we	expect)	
there	is	an	added	benefit	when	detecting	asynchrony	between	visual	and	proprioceptive	
information	during	active	movements.	But	what	about	when	there	can	be	no	direct	
vision	(such	as	for	the	face)	or	even	no	vision	at	all	(such	as	for	the	back)?	In	Chapter	3,	I	
looked	at	two	additional	views	of	the	body:	the	view	you	see	when	looking	in	the	mirror	
(see	Figures	15B	and	16A,	Chapter	3)	and	the	view	someone	else	would	see	of	your	
body	from	behind	(allocentric	view;	see	Figures	15C	and	16B,	Chapter	3).		
Firstly,	I	found	that	there	was	systematic	variation	in	performance	across	the	
viewpoints	for	the	natural	perspective	(the	upright	expected	perspective)	where	delay	
was	detected	at	lower	thresholds	for	the	direct	view	of	the	hand,	higher	thresholds	for	
the	allocentric	viewpoint	from	behind,	and	intermediary	thresholds	for	the	mirror	
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viewpoint	(see	Figures	15A,	B	and	C,	Chapter	3).	This	suggests	that	visual	experience	
(familiarity)	is	important	for	deciding	what	is	represented	as	the	body.	Secondly,	there	
was	a	self-advantage	for	both	the	egocentric	and	mirror	views	of	the	body,	which	was	
evident	from	the	significantly	lower	threshold	in	the	expected	perspectives	compared	to	
the	other	perspectives	(x,	y,	and	xy	axes	flipped).	The	back	view,	however,	showed	no	
such	advantage	as	participants	detected	the	delay	at	similar	thresholds	for	all	four	
perspectives.	Given	this	result,	I	conclude	that	the	back	view	of	one’s	body	is	normally	
regarded	as	‘other’.			
These	results	are	in	line	with	a	study	done	by	Tipper	and	colleagues	(2001)	who	
found	that	it	is	more	difficult	(longer	latencies)	to	detect	tactile	stimuli	on	parts	of	the	
body	that	cannot	be	viewed	directly	(e.g.,	the	back	of	the	neck)	compared	to	parts	of	
the	body	that	can	be	viewed	directly	(e.g.,	hands;	Tipper	et	al.,	2001).	Even	the	simple	
act	of	being	able	to	see	a	body	part	(e.g.,	image	of	the	hand	on	a	display)	without	
orienting	the	eyes	to	the	actual	body	part	improves	the	ability	to	detect	tactile	stimuli	
(Tipper	et.	al.,	1998;	Maravita	et.	al.,	2000).		This	suggests	that	visual	experience,	and	to	
some	extent	body	part	familiarity,	is	enough	to	improve	somatoperception.		
Seeing	the	body	from	the	first-person	vantage	point	is	such	a	strong	cue	to	self	
that	even	inanimate	mannequins	can	be	experimentally	manipulated	into	becoming	‘self’	
–	induced	body	ownership	if	seen	from	the	right	angle	in	VR	(Petkova	&	Ehrsson,	2008).	
Identifying	virtual	bodies	as	self	was	more	effective	when	the	body	was	presented	in	the	
first-person	and	not	third-person	viewpoint	(Petkova	et	al.,	2011;	Slater	et	al.,	2009).		
Further,	as	discussed	in	section	6.1.1.,	there	are	differentially	activated	areas	of	the	
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brain	for	self	and	other	(Saxe	et	al.,	2006).	Given	the	separation	between	such	cortical	
networks,	it	is	possible	that	detection	of	smaller	visual	and	proprioceptive	disparities	is	
more	finely	tuned	for	events	that	we	relate	to	the	self,	compared	to	those	we	relate	to	
another	person.		
	 What	implications	does	the	visually	absent	back	of	the	body	have	on	our	
perception	of	our	whole	body?	For	example,	D’Amour	and	Harris	(2014)	have	suggested	
that	there	is	a	special	connection	between	the	front	and	back	of	the	body.	This	would	
suggest	that	the	‘other’	part	of	our	body	is	pinned	to	the	‘self’	part	of	our	body.	But	how	
does	one	bring	parts	of	the	body	that	are	previously	missing	from	this	representation	of	
the	body	into	the	visually	driven	body	image?		
6.1.5.	Multisensory	stimulation	induces	body	ownership	of	an	‘other’	
In	Chapter	3,	I	found	that	back	views	of	the	body,	regardless	of	body	part	moving	
(hand	or	head),	awarded	no	self-advantage.	This	result	suggests	that	this	view	of	the	
body	is	not	visually	represented	in	the	body	schema.	Although	participants	knew	that	
this	was	their	body	they	demonstrated	no	advantage	over	this	view	(as	seen	by	no	
differences	in	delay	detection	thresholds)	and	therefore	I	concluded	that	the	back	view	
of	the	body	was	seen	at	least	to	some	extent	as	other	and	not	self.		In	Chapter	5,	I	
employed	a	multisensory	stimulation	technique	to	induce	ownership	for	this	otherwise		
“other”	view	of	the	body.	After	experiencing	synchronous	multisensory	stimulation	
(tapping	on	the	participants	back	while	they	viewed	themselves	from	behind	being	
tapped),	participants	were	better	able	to	detect	temporal	asynchrony	for	the	natural	
perspective	of	the	back	of	the	body	compared	to	the	axes	flipped	presentations	(see	
	 141	
Figure	19):	in	other	words	they	developed	a	self-advantage	that	they	didn’t	previously	
have.	A	control	group	received	asynchronous	multisensory	stimulation	and	never	
showed	an	advantage	for	the	natural	perspective	over	the	axes	flipped	perspective.		
		 My	study	fits	into	an	extensive	array	of	studies	that	exploit	multisensory	
integration	in	order	to	provoke	participants	to	adopt	a	new	extremity	(Botvinick	&	
Cohen,	1998),	someone	else’s	face	(Sforza,	Bufalari,	Haggard,	&	Aglioti,	2010;	Tajadura-
Jiménez	et	al.,	2013),	the	back	view	of	the	body	(Ehrsson,	2007;	Lenggenhager	et	al.,	
2007),	virtual	bodies	(Petkova	et	al.,	2011),	and	mannequins	(Petkova	&	Ehrsson,	2008).	
By	allowing	participants	to	experience	simultaneous,	multisensory	events	while	
watching	it	happen	from	behind	themselves	(using	a	video	camera)	they	were	able	to	
detect	shorter	delays	(the	classic	signature	SA)	when	the	displayed	view	of	the	body	
matched	the	view	they	experienced.	I	conclude	that	synchronous	visuo-tactile	
stimulation	induced	ownership,	which	is	evident	by	a	self-advantage	of	45ms	(see	Figure	
19).	The	results	from	my	study	provide	further	evidence	for	the	malleability	of	the	
representation	of	the	brain	and	how	multisensory	stimulation	(new	information	about	
the	self)	is	incorporated	into	an	updated	self.		
What	is	considered	self	can	be	extended	to	include	rubber	hands,	virtual	bodies,	
and	even	to	include	parts	of	the	body	that	are	not	visually	represented,	such	as	the	back,	
through	synchronous	multisensory	experience.		
6.3.	Possible	limitations	
There	are	some	limitations	to	the	studies	I	conducted	with	respect	to	1)	the	
method;	2)	the	timing	of	delays;	3)	the	visual	stimuli;	4)	the	participants;	and	5)	the	lack	
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of	control	conditions.	Although	2IFC	is	a	robust	psychophysical	method	because	it	takes	
twice	as	long	to	complete	a	trial	than	a	simple	yes/no	judgement	task	I	only	collected	
eight	data	points	per	difference	of	delay	in	any	given	condition.	One	mistake	in	response	
could	have	had	effects	on	the	curves	used	to	calculate	thresholds.			
	 	The	inherent	system	delay	was	approximately	85ms	and	although	this	was	
within	the	range	of	delay	that	is	undetectable	to	human	observers	it	still	was	different	
than	looking	at	genuinely	live	movements.	Further,	the	added	visual	delay	increments	
were	linked	to	the	refresh	rate	of	the	screen,	which	was	approximately	33ms.	Having	
greater	control	over	the	delay	could	have	allowed	me	more	precise	measurement	and	
smaller	incremental	steps	in	the	temporal	component	of	the	visual	stimuli.			
	 The	visual	stimuli	were	displayed	in	black	and	white	and	not	colour.	Colour	
images	might	have	increased	the	degree	to	which	ownership	was	felt	over	the	views	of	
the	body	parts	and	possibly	decreased	thresholds.	However,	as	some	studies	have	
suggested,	if	participants	are	able	to	feel	ownership	over	inanimate	rubber	hands	and	
gloved	hands	then	black	and	white	images	may	not	haven	been	too	much	of	a	hindrance.	
Further,	for	all	the	hand	movements	conditions	in	my	studies	(Chapters	2,	3,	and	4)	
there	could	have	been	greater	care	in	setting	up	the	apparatus	so	that	the	hands	were	
shown	in	the	same	spatial	location	as	the	hand	making	the	movement	(See	Shimada	et	
al.,	2010).		In	a	temporal	delay	detection	task	Keetels	and	Vroomen	(2012)	compared	
performance	when	the	hands	were	seen	on	a	LCD	display	like	in	my	studies	and	using	
mirrors	and	LCD	displays	to	create	a	more	spatially	aligned	set	up.	They	found	no	
significant	different	in	performance.	Given	our	extensive	use	of	trackpads	and	mice	
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controlling	cursors	on	computer	screens	it	is	reasonable	to	regard	seeing	our	
movements	in	such	a	set	up	as	a	‘natural’	view.		
Another	limitation	to	my	initial	experiment	(Chapter	2)	was	that	I	did	not	have	a	
control	condition	for	movements	on	the	screen	that	was	not	a	body	part.	For	example,	I	
could	have	used	a	rod	that	moved	with	the	finger	movements.	In	the	replication	of	my	
study,	Zopf	and	colleagues	(2015)	used	3D	virtual	reality	where	participants	wore	gloves	
that	were	connected	to	the	computer.	There	were	points	on	the	glove	that	were	
connected	to	create	either	a	virtual	reality	hand	or	points	of	light	along	the	fingers	as	a	
control.	They	found	that	delay	detection	was	significantly	enhanced	for	the	virtual	hand	
compared	to	the	control.	This	suggests	that	the	self-advantage	I	found	in	my	studies	was	
indeed	body	specific.		
Finally,	the	people	who	participated	in	my	studies	were	undergraduate	and	
graduate	students	for	the	most	part.	A	more	diverse	sample	of	the	population	may	have	
changed	the	results.	I	might	have	also	been	able	to	look	for	a	correlation	between	age	
and	threshold.			
	
6.4.	Future	Research	
There	are	many	possible	directions	in	which	the	studies	presented	in	this	
dissertation	could	be	developed.	In	my	experiments,	I	presented	the	body	movements	
in	four	different	perspectives	(See	Figure	6	in	Chapter	2	for	examples)	that	were	based	
on	flips	about	the	horizontal	and	vertical	axes.	It	would	be	informative	to	present	the	
body	parts	in	smaller	degrees	of	rotations	to	be	able	to	determine	the	tuning	of	where	
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exactly	the	hand	is	regarded	as	“self”.	I	could	compare	delay	detection	thresholds	and	
use	the	self-advantage	as	a	measure	of	body	ownership	for	a	range	of	shifts	of	the	
orientation	of	the	video	–	not	just	the	90°	used	in	this	dissertation.	This	would	reveal	the	
actual	tuning	and	position	of	the	internal	representation	of	the	body.	Along	these	same	
lines,	I	only	used	three	viewpoints	of	the	body	(looking	down	at	the	hand,	looking	at	the	
face	in	the	mirror,	and	looking	at	the	body	from	behind)	and	it	would	be	interesting	to	
extend	the	viewpoints	to	include	such	views	as	profile	views	of	the	body	and	looking	
down	at	the	legs.		This	would	provide	a	more	complete	picture	of	what	perspectives	and	
viewpoints	of	the	body	that	are	represented	in	the	body	image.		
If	I	were	to	look	at	delay	detection	from	viewpoints	of	the	body	that	include	the	
legs,	the	natural	next	step	would	be	to	have	participants	discriminate	temporal	
asynchrony	during	leg/foot	movements.	Would	there	be	a	self-advantage	for	the	feet?	
Would	footedness	(similar	to	handedness)	affect	the	ability	for	one	to	discriminate	
delay?	Would	people	that	have	more	experience	looking	at	their	legs/feet,	such	as	ballet	
dancers,	have	a	self-advantage	over	those	of	us	that	do	not	pay	that	close	attention	to	
those	movements?		
The	self-advantage	could	also	be	useful	in	clinical	settings.	For	example,	people	
who	suffer	from	schizophrenia	are	more	likely	to	have	a	skewed	perception	of	the	body,	
the	self,	and	the	senses	of	agency	and	ownership	(Jeannerod,	2009).	Given	that	this	test	
measures	the	sense	of	body	ownership	without	directly	asking	questions	that	relate	to	
the	self,	it	could	provide	a	objective	measure	of	what	parts	of	the	body	they	consider	to	
be	self.	Further,	could	the	implementation	of	visuo-tactile	stimulation	(along	the	lines	
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described	in	chapter	5)	help	to	update	or	strengthen	their	representation	of	their	body?		
6.4.	Conclusion	
For	the	projects	presented	in	my	dissertation,	I	used	an	experimental	design	in	
which	participants	were	required	to	make	multisensory	temporal	asynchrony	
discrimination	after	self-generated	movements.	I	measured	sensitivity	for	visual	delay	
detection	between	the	movement	(proprioceptive,	efferent	and	afferent	information)	
and	the	visual	image	of	that	movement	under	differing	visual	conditions.			
Vision	of	the	body,	mainly	our	first-person	perspective	of	it,	provides	input	for	
the	creation	of	the	multiple	representations	of	the	body	that	we	have	(See	Figure	21).	
These	representations,	namely	the	postural	and	superficial	schemas,	come	together	to	
provide	us	with	a	template	as	to	what	we	consider	to	be	our	body	–	the	self.	
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Figure	21.		Schematic	of	the	components	that	make	up	the	representation	of	the	brain.		
Somatosensory,	visual,	proprioceptive,	and	vestibular	inputs	create	representations	of	
the	body	that	aid	in	the	localization	of	tactile	stimuli	on	the	body,	and	where	the	body	is	
in	space	(adapted	from	Harris	et.	al.,	2015).		
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The	lowered	threshold	for	detecting	added	visual	delay	during	self-generated	
movement,	the	self-advantage,	is	indicative	to	what	we	consider	self	and	subsequently	
not-self.	Thus	the	self-advantage	is	an	implicit	measure	of	body	ownership,	which	is	a	
key	sense	of	self.	Overall,	the	results	from	this	dissertation	suggest	that	the	tolerance	
for	temporally	matching	visual,	proprioceptive	and	efferent	copy	information	that	
informs	about	the	perceived	position	of	body	parts	depends	on:	whether	one	is	viewing	
one’s	own	body	or	someone	else’s;	the	view	we	have	of	the	body;	the	dominant	hand;	
the	reliability	of	vestibular	cues	which	help	us	situate	our	body	in	space;	and	congruent	
multisensory	experience.	The	experiments	provide	support	for	the	malleable	nature	of	
the	representation	of	the	body	in	the	brain.	
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